University of Pennsylvania

ScholarlyCommons
Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations
2016

Orbital Decay: Space Junk and the Environmental History of
Earth's Planetary Borderlands
Lisa Ruth Rand
University of Pennsylvania, lrrand@sciencehistory.org

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations
Part of the Environmental Sciences Commons, and the History Commons

Recommended Citation
Rand, Lisa Ruth, "Orbital Decay: Space Junk and the Environmental History of Earth's Planetary
Borderlands" (2016). Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations. 1963.
https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/1963

This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/1963
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.

Orbital Decay: Space Junk and the Environmental History of Earth's Planetary
Borderlands
Abstract
What is space junk, and who defines pollution in an environment seemingly devoid of nature as we know
it? Beginning with the launch of Sputnik in 1957, spacefaring nations transformed the region between the
upper atmosphere and the moon from a wilderness into a landscape. Like any terrestrial industry, the
construction of a satellite infrasctructure in orbit also yielded a system of byproducts—human-made
waste colloquially known as “space junk.” Although remote and largely invisible to the majority of space
technology users, the orbital environment nonetheless played a critical role in Cold War geopolitics.
Contrary to current space policy literature that portrays space junk and awareness of space junk as recent
phenomena, communities around the world were both aware and concerned about space junk from the
very first moments of the Space Age. By tracing convergent changes in the orbital landscape and in the
political landscape below during the Cold War, concurrent with the rise of mainstream environmentalism,
this dissertation reveals the roots of an international understanding of the borderlands between Earth and
outer space as a natural environment at risk. Focusing on highly mobile, unruly space junk artifacts
illuminates the many ways that humankind mutually shaped and was shaped by the global ecosystem
surrounding our planet during the Cold War. Situated at the intersection of the histories of science,
technology, and the environment, this dissertation illustrates how space junk in orbit and falling to Earth
brought geographically and politically disparate states into dangerous proximity during the Cold War. An
international consciousness of outer space as a fragile environment emerged early in the Space Age, and
influenced the negotiation of new modes of international scientific and environmental governance in nearEarth space.
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ABSTRACT
ORBITAL DECAY: SPACE JUNK AND THE ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY OF
EARTH’S PLANETARY BORDERLANDS
Lisa Ruth Rand
John Tresch
Adelheid Voskuhl
What is space junk, and who defines pollution in an environment seemingly devoid of
nature as we know it? Beginning with the launch of Sputnik in 1957, spacefaring nations
transformed the region between the upper atmosphere and the moon from a wilderness
into a landscape. Like any terrestrial industry, the construction of a satellite
infrasctructure in orbit also yielded a system of byproducts—human-made waste
colloquially known as “space junk.” Although remote and largely invisible to the
majority of space technology users, the orbital environment nonetheless played a critical
role in Cold War geopolitics. Contrary to current space policy literature that portrays
space junk and awareness of space junk as recent phenomena, communities around the
world were both aware and concerned about space junk from the very first moments of
the Space Age. By tracing convergent changes in the orbital landscape and in the political
landscape below during the Cold War, concurrent with the rise of mainstream
environmentalism, this dissertation reveals the roots of an international understanding of
the borderlands between Earth and outer space as a natural environment at risk. Focusing
on highly mobile, unruly space junk artifacts illuminates the many ways that humankind
mutually shaped and was shaped by the global ecosystem surrounding our planet during
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the Cold War. Situated at the intersection of the histories of science, technology, and the
environment, this dissertation illustrates how space junk in orbit and falling to Earth
brought geographically and politically disparate states into dangerous proximity during
the Cold War. An international consciousness of outer space as a fragile environment
emerged early in the Space Age, and influenced the negotiation of new modes of
international scientific and environmental governance in near-Earth space.
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INTRODUCTION
On February 10, 2009, a defunct Russian communications satellite and a functioning
American commercial communications satellite approached each other from opposite
directions. As they crossed over Siberia, Kosmos 2251 and Iridium 33 collided head-on,
destroying both satellites and generating two intersecting plumes of debris clustered
along their former orbital paths. Widely considered the most destructive on-orbit accident
in history, the event validated a prediction made over thirty years earlier by Donald
Kessler and Burton Cour-Palais in the Journal of Geophysical Research.1 In the 1978
article, Kessler and Cour-Palais suggested that, given the growing volume of satellites
and other objects being launched into orbit by an ever-increasing club of spacefaring
nations, the first major orbital collision would occur within the next few decades.2 This as
yet hypothetical destructive chain reaction, now called the Kessler Syndrome, has
become a bogeyman among the international space policy community.
The 2009 Cosmos-Iridium accident was by no means the first on-orbit collision,
nor did it yield the largest amount of orbital debris from a single incident. Two years
earlier, China intentionally destroyed one of its own defunct weather satellites using a

1

Frank Jr. Morring, “Collision Of Satellites Was Worst Ever,” Aviation Daily & Defense Report,
February 12, 2009, http://aviationweek.com/awin/collision-satellites-was-worst-ever; Paul Marks,
“Satellite Collision ‘more Powerful than China’s ASAT Test’,” New Scientist, February 13, 2009;
Geoff Brumfiel, “Kaputnik Chaos Could Kill Hubble,” Nature, February 17, 2009, 940–41.
2
Donald J. Kessler and Burton G. Cour-Palais, “Collision Frequency of Artificial Satellites: The
Creation of a Debris Belt,” Journal of Geophysical Research Vol. 83, No. A6 (1978): 2637–2646
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projectile anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon.3 The resulting debris cloud accounted for a 60
percent spike in the number of observable orbital debris.4 The detritus produced by both
the 2007 ASAT test and the 2009 Iridium-Cosmos collision continues to circle the globe
at speeds upwards of eight kilometers per second. This orbital debris, or “space junk,”
moves so quickly that even the small pieces could damage or destroy functioning
satellites.
In late 2011, the National Research Council (NRC) published a report that painted
a grim picture of the built environment in Earth orbit. The authors of the report
emphatically argued that the quantity of human-made objects orbiting the planet had
grown to such an extent that a state of continuous collision and cascading spacecraft
failure will almost certainly arise in the surprisingly near future—that the planetary
periphery had reached a “tipping point.”5 This characterization draws much of its
rhetorical strength from its association with climate change research. The term “tipping
point” describes a delicate threshold after which global scale change cannot be stopped or
reversed.6 A majority of climate researchers worldwide have agreed that the planetary
3

Frank Jr. Morring, “China ASAT Test Called Worst Single Debris Event Ever,” Aviation Week
& Space Technology, February 12, 2007, http://aviationweek.com/awin/china-asat-test-calledworst-single-debris-event-ever.
4
Nicholas L. Johnson et al., “History of On-Orbit Satellite Fragmentations, 14th Edition”
(Houston, TX: NASA Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center, June 2008), i.
5
National Research Council, Limiting Future Collision Risk to Spacecraft: An Assessment of
NASA’s Meteoroid and Orbital Debris Programs (Washington, D.C.: The National Academies
Press, 2011).
6
For more on the rhetoric of thresholds and tipping points in climate science and public
discourse, see Richard D. Besel, “Communicating Climate Change: Climate Rhetorics and
Discursive Tipping Points in United States Global Warming Science and Public Policy”
(Dissertation, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2007). For an accessible take on the
idea of tipping points in different contexts, see Malcolm Gladwell, The Tipping Point: How Little
Things Can Make a Big Difference (Little, Brown, 2000).
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climate has already crossed the threshold. A famous 2006 Time cover story featuring a
polar bear balanced precariously on a tiny ice floe proclaimed to the world that Earth had
reached the point of no return.7 Past the tipping point, ocean ice will shrink away,
greenhouse gases will stifle the atmosphere, shorelines will bulge, and global
temperatures will rise with drastic consequences for biodiversity, ecological resilience,
and human environments.
The orbital tipping point, perhaps, cannot be as alarmingly and effectively
illustrated—no charismatic, imperiled polar bears circle the planet, no ice floes
encapsulate landscape change in a landless, illegible, invisible environment. And yet, to
anyone who has noticed the regularity of news stories about astronauts taking shelter as
debris approaches the International Space Station, satellites disabled by space junk, and
spacecraft riskily moved to avoid collision with other objects in orbit, the NRC argument
that a looming debris crisis may be imminent provides a fitting analog.8 These dramatic
encounters between functioning spacecraft and orbital debris—defined by NASA, the
United Nations, and the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee as humanmade objects in space, or reentering the atmosphere, that do not serve a designated
purpose—comprise only the most recent newsworthy incidents capping half a century of

7

Naomi Oreskes, “The Scientific Consensus on Climate Change,” Science 306, no. 5702
(December 3, 2004): 1686; “Earth at the Tipping Point: Global Warming Heats Up,” Time, April
3, 2016.
8
“NASA: Space Station Dodged Debris 16 Times in Past 15 Years,” accessed February 19, 2014,
http://www.networkworld.com/community/blog/nasa-space-station-dodged-space-debris-16times-past-15-years; Leonard David, “Russian Satellite Hit by Chinese Anti-Satellite Test
Debris,” SPACE.com, March 8, 2013, http://www.space.com/20138-russian-satellite-chinesespace-junk.html; “The Day NASA’s Fermi Dodged a 1.5-Ton Bullet,” NASA, April 30, 2013,
http://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/GLAST/news/bullet-dodge.html.
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mounting material evidence of a growing anthropogenic waste system encircling the
planet.9
On the surface, the story of humankind’s presence in near-Earth space since the
launch of Sputnik on October 4, 1957 might seem like a textbook narrative of
environmental decline. Operating under Big Sky Theory—the belief that space is so vast
as to be unfillable—a small club of spacefaring nations launched ever more objects into
orbit and transformed the foothills of the mythical final frontier into an unmanageable,
moving junkyard.10 Many current space policy analysts portray orbital debris as a recent
problem—the gradually compounding result of ignorance at best and negligence at worst
on behalf of the Soviet and American space industries of the 1960s.11 This misconception

9

“Handbook for Limiting Orbital Debris,” NASA-HANDBOOK 8719.14 (Washington, D.C.:
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, July 30, 2008), 21; “Space Debris Mitigation
Guidelines of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space” (United Nations Office for
Outer Space Affairs, January 2010); Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee, “IADC
Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines,” September 2007.
10
Big Sky Theory’s antecedent, Big Sea Theory, has also been challenged by the presence of an
unmanageable, moving junkyard, in the form of so-called “garbage patches”—plastic and
chemical debris, mostly microscopic, caught in several of the major ocean gyres. The Great
Pacific Garbage Patch has been estimated to be the size of Texas. Lindsey Hoshaw, “Researchers
Explore Growing Ocean Garbage Patches,” The New York Times, November 9, 2009.
11
Representations of the history of orbital debris awareness in space policy analysis of recent
decades vary. Research staff at the NASA Orbital Debris Program Office typically recognize
early awareness among those in the space industry, but in at least one publication make the false
argument that orbital debris only entered the public eye very recently. See for example Nicholas
L. Johnson, “Orbital Debris Research in the U.S.,” in Proceedings of the 4th European
Conference on Space Debris (ESA SP-587) (4th European Conference on Space Debris (ESA SP587), Darmstadt, Germany, 2005); Jer-Chyi Liou, “The Near-Earth Orbital Debris Problem and
the Challenges for Environment Remediation” (3rd International SPACE World Conference,
Darmstadt, Germany, November 6, 2012). However, outside of NASA, presumptions of ignorant
negligence on the part of the American and Soviet space industries during the Cold War
perennially crop up in policy documents and presentations. See for example Marshall H. Kaplan,
“An Integrated Approach to Orbital Debris Research and Management” (Space Traffic
Management Conference, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, 2014), 1–2; Marietta Benko
and Kai-Uwe Schrogl, “Space Debris in the United Nations: Aspects of Law and Policy,” in
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erases a remarkably longstanding transnational environmental dialog about outer space—
a dialog that brought spacefaring and non-spacefaring nations into material and
discursive contact during the early years of the Cold War Space Race, and influenced the
development of new, tenuous models of international governance in near-Earth space.
In recent decades environmental historians investigating the histories of terrestrial
landscapes and envirotechnical systems have charged that such a declensionist,
presentist—and often racist and classist—approach ignores the categorically messier
ways that humans and the non-human biological and geophysical world interact and
mutually shape one another over time.12 Histories of environments on Earth merit a closer
look at a broader range of actors, physical forces, and living and nonliving actants. A
similarly nuanced, multivalent approach to environmental change also more accurately
illuminates the history of humankind’s virtual and material encounter with the outer
space environment. I refer to the near-Earth space environment as the planetary
borderlands to call attention to the ways that the physical ecosystem of outer space
collapse geography and bring states and polities into proximity. Additionally, this
categorization explicitly counters the racial and teleological undertones of the Turnerian
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frontierism that motivated the Soviet and American space programs, and acknowledges
the global and extraterritorial attributes of the orbital environment.13
In exploring a half-century of environmental change in an extreme, remote
environment, the historical analysis in this dissertation traces early perceptions of outer
space as an environment at risk. It prioritizes these historiographical imperatives of
environmental history and merges them with a theoretical grounding in the histories of
science and technology. The conceptual frameworks of the social construction of
technology and technological momentum apply to both the history of the early
development of satellite technology and a coinciding new perception of space as a
pollutable natural environment. Space junk itself, it will be shown, is socially
constructed.14 In many cases, then and now, on Earth and in space, one person’s useful
spacecraft can be another person’s dangerous space junk. Perhaps surprisingly, given its
lack of colonized peoples or biota, near-Earth space—for the purposes of this analysis,
defined as the regions of cislunar space that contain the majority of human-made space
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objects—has been a subject of environmental concern since the first days of human
access.15
Near-Earth space fits remarkably well within classical narratives of both
wilderness and landscape. As a region “where man himself is a visitor who does not
remain,” the orbital regions of planet Earth fit nearly perfectly into the definition of
wilderness set forth in the landmark Wilderness Act of 1964.16 Once humankind began to
cultivate orbit by constructing a satellite infrastructure, it also became a place well
described by John Brinckerhoff Jackson’s characterization of landscape as “a
composition of man-made or man-modified spaces to serve as infrastructure or
background for our collective existence.”17 Considering David Nye’s suggestion that
Western society views modern landscapes only through inventions and interventions of a
largely technical visual culture, near-Earth space may be considered an extreme example
of a technological landscape. Cultivated by human interventions, the very satellites that
enable valued technological practices on the ground are all but invisible to the majority of
Earthbound users.18 Only specialized equipment and abstract modeling allow direct
visualization of an infrastructure that has become, in the words of Paul Edwards, “the
connective tissues and the circulatory systems of modernity”—invisible structures that
15
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we only notice on the rare occasions when they fail.19 During the first decades of the Cold
War Space Race, the United States and the Soviet Union constructed an information
infrastructure in orbit, thereby shaping the true wilderness of outer space into a
landscape.
While popularly portrayed as a void—the opposite of verdant green-and-blue
nature portrayed by environmentalists and artists alike—the nearest reaches of outer
space support an abiotic ecosystem consisting of energy exchanges, radioactivity, natural
rocky objects and energetic plasmas, and gravitational forces. Space has its own
“weather” driven by regular solar cycles that affect the matter and energy in near-Earth
space, including artificial satellites and uncontrolled orbiting waste.20 Near-Earth space
even boasts self-cleaning mechanisms to rival any river or wind current—the atmosphere
expands and contracts along regular solar cycles, exerting drag on space junk until it falls
back to Earth through intense friction and pressure. However, the boundary between
space and terrestrial climates has become more tenuous as humankind has expanded its
domain into the nearest regions of the cosmos. Even anthropogenic climate change has
impacted the near-Earth ecosystem: Burgeoning carbon dioxide emissions have caused
the planet’s thermosphere to contract, thereby reducing the altitude at which atmospheric
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drag brings space junk out of orbit and diminishing the resilience of this ecosystem.21
These exchanges suggest that the planetary borderlands consist of an interactive
continuum of natural and anthropogenic exchange in what anthropologist Valerie Olson
calls “the extended ecological heliosphere.”22
In 1961, four years after the Soviet Union launched Sputnik 1 into orbit, some 380
trackable anthropogenic objects circled the planet. By the end of 1963, that number had
mushroomed to 685—though this number only included objects large enough to be seen
from the ground. Among the byproducts of human-driven change to the orbital
environment during these years were objects too small to be detected by space
surveillance technology at the time. At most recent count, the Space Surveillance
Network estimates that nearly seventeen thousand objects large enough to be tracked
orbit the planet. Of these, 77% have been confirmed as objects with no designated use or
purpose—space junk.23 Another approximately 500,000 pieces of debris between one and
ten centimeters in diameter, and over 100 million anthropogenic particles smaller than
one centimeter, round out the system of waste in near-Earth space.24
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These minute, largely invisible bits of anthropogenic material orbit alongside the
empty rocket bodies, dead satellites, and other large objects speeding overhead.25
Awareness of the potential dangers of accumulating debris drove the first international
debates in the late 1950s over how to define and control pollution in outer space. As soon
as the first satellites reached orbit, both the United States and the Soviet Union sought to
use this new environment for both peaceful and nefarious purposes. Both superpowers
carried out high altitude and exoatmospheric nuclear weapons tests beginning in 1958
and ending in 1963 with the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. New kinds of satellites—
from giant, shiny inflatable balloons to a ring of hundreds of millions of tiny copper
fibers—tested the use of space for communications while spurring controversy over
whether such satellites could interfere with astronomy, crowd the electromagnetic
spectrum, or present a collision hazard to other spacecraft.26 Just as outer space became a
site of political prestige and technological utility during the Cold War, scientists around
the world came to embrace Earth orbit as a valuable subject and site of investigation, and
rapidly abandoned the idea of a physically isolated Earth.
25
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As the Space Age wore on, the larger objects became a threat—not just to other
objects in orbit, but to people, property, and environments on the ground. The natural
geophysical ecosystem of the Earth-Sun environment experienced particularly stormy
periods of space weather during the first peaks of the eleven-year solar cycle to take place
after the launch of Sputnik. As the atmosphere expanded, uncontrolled objects succumbed
to friction and fell back to Earth through the destructive upper atmosphere. With no
control over where surviving fragments might land, orbital space became a site from
which pollutants could cross geographic boundaries and extraterritorial regions. In cases
such as the nuclear-powered satellite Cosmos 954, which fell over the Northwestern
Territories of Canada in 1978, such reentries raised a very real specter of radioactive
contamination of ground, sea, and sky—originating not out of geopolitical antagonism
but rather the caprice of the natural geophysical forces of the Sun. From the first space
nukes to the reentry of Cosmos 954, the circulating imprint of what Will Steffen calls the
“Great Acceleration” extended from underground to outer space.27 As the first byproducts
of the fledgling space industry circled the planet, newly minted space scientists reached
the consensus that the physical influence of our planet extended dozens of kilometers into
a physically interactive solar system. Just as the Great Acceleration coincided with the
rise of mainstream environmentalist movements around the world, concern over
27
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environmental risk extended into the nearest reaches of outer space from the first
moments of the Space Age.
Representations of outer space as the final frontier permeated popular culture
during the Cold War—particularly in America, where the heady rush to the Moon
replicated a mythology of American exceptionalism rooted in the conquest of the West.28
However, despite the appearance of unregulated orbital prospecting by the United States
and the Soviet Union, the conquest of near-Earth space did not occur in an absence of
authority. As during the colonization of the American West before it, state governments
played a large role in facilitating and regulating the expansion of empire in yet another
expansive frontier.29 Scientific, industrial, and state actors of spacefaring and nonspacefaring nations alike competed to exercise control in the planetary borderlands
during the Cold War Space Race. I will show that in the early days of the satellite age, the
built environment in orbit was constructed atop a web of international governance driven
in part by an early worldwide understanding of near-Earth space as an environment at
risk. Concurrent with the rise of mainstream environmentalism, the material and
rhetorical matter of space junk undergirded a multivalent, wide-reaching dialogue about
cosmic environmental morality at the dawn of the space age—far earlier than recognized
in most current space policy research.
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The Envirotechnical History of Near-Earth Space
This dissertation brings together the histories of science, technology, and the environment
to trace the mutual influences and interactions of humankind, terrestrial environments,
and orbital environments over the first decades of human access to outer space. It breaks
new ground in space history by highlighting the role of the geophysical world of outer
space as a historical actor of equivalent importance to astronauts, engineers,
governments, and publics. Historians of space technology examine the emissaries that
humankind has sent into the alien beyond, but not how these artifacts in their afterlives
interacted with the orbital ecosystem—with profound consequences for Cold War
geopolitics.30 Roger Launius has noted that to date the extensive space history scholarship
has given little more than passing notice of the space environment itself as an important
feature in the history of space technology and politics.31
Since the late 20th century, environmental historians have sought to represent the
natural world as a significant force in human history—a priority often neglected in the
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preceding decades of historical scholarship.32 This study of the history of human
interactions with the near-Earth ecosystem takes up Martin Melosi’s call to reframe this
priority to include a more expansive definition of nature and the natural. In his critique of
Donald Worster and those historians who isolate “the natural world” as a narrow,
necessarily miniscule category of spaces and assemblages devoid of any human
intervention, Melosi argues that environmental historians ought to focus instead on “the
role and place of the physical environment in human life.”33 The physical environment of
near-Earth space encompasses naturally occurring phenomena and the built environment,
growing over the course of the Cold War into an exemplary combination of what Bill
Cronon calls “first nature” and “second nature.” In Cronon’s take on Hegelian and
Marxist rhetoric, first nature represents the natural world that existed before humans, and
second nature the artificial structures that human societies construct upon first nature.
When first and second natures merge into a landscape made up of geophysical, material,
and economic forces they become all but invisible, indistinguishable from one another.
Just like the flow of commodities and capital through the markets and hinterlands of
Chicago, the second nature of the satellite infrastructure quickly became as invisible, and
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its technological and economic momentum as unstoppable as any natural force (with
notable exceptions that will be covered in the chapters that follow).34
Second nature not only turns creatures, plants, and things into market
commodities—it also collapses the distance between the point of production and the point
of consumption. Most consumers of the products of modern capitalism do not see the
origins of these products, nor do they reside in proximity to the byproducts of this
consumption.35 Scholars of waste and discard studies also emphasize the temporal and
geographic discontinuity between sites of consumption and the transformation and spatial
relocation of byproducts. Susan Strasser, Joel Tarr, Martin Melosi, and Carl Zimring
represent a few among many historians who examine the afterlives of waste. Other social
scholars of waste and discard have emphasized the global pathways of refuse, including
Anna Davies on the geographies of waste circulation, Marisa Cohn on the decay of global
technological systems, and Joshua Reno on waste at social and spatial peripheries.36 In
studies of the byproducts of similarly high-tech, invisible information infrastructures,
Phaedra Pezzullo, Josh Lepawksy, and Nathan Ensmenger examine the high-technology
wasteways of electronics production.37 Like these terrestrial wastes, space junk that

34

William Cronon, Nature’s Metropolis: Chicago and the Great West (W. W. Norton &
Company, 1991).
35
Ibid., 266–267.
36
Anna Davies, The Geographies of Garbage Governance: Interventions, Interactions, and
Outcomes (Aldershot, Hampshire, England; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2008); Marisa Cohn,
“Lifetimes and Legacies: Temporalities of Sociotechnical Change in a Long-Lived System”
(Dissertation, University of California, Irvine, 2013); Joshua O. Reno, Waste Away: Working and
Living with a North American Landfill (Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 2016).
37
Phaedra C. Pezzullo, “What Gets Buried in a Small Town: Toxic E--Waste and Democratic
Frictions in the Crossroads of the United States,” in Histories of the Dustheap: Waste, Material
Cultures, Social Justice, by Stephanie Foote and Elizabeth Mazzolini (Cambridge, MA: MIT

16
remains in orbit or falls back to Earth nearly always winds up in regions far removed
from the state of origin, and far from the communities that use the information produced
using the technologies of the space industry.
This analysis of environmental change in near-Earth space both contributes to and
expands upon recent historical scholarship in environmental history which connects the
acceleration of global environmental change during the Cold War to the shifting
environmental politics of the era.38 By illuminating how Cold War spacefaring humanity
shaped, and was shaped by, the orbital geophysical environment, this dissertation for the
first time situates the history of near-Earth space within a burgeoning historiography that
analyzes the interactions of Cold War politics, technology, and environmental change.39
During this period, the global scale of the conflict between the United States and its allies
and the Soviet Union translated into an imperative to know the enemy by way of
knowing the Earth, as evidenced by the rise of federal funding for geosciences and Earth
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surveillance in the postwar period.40 With the boon of state support, scientific disciplines
from geophysics to ecosystem ecology served the double purpose of controlling the
enemy and controlling the environment. Like global-scale ecosystems within the
biosphere, the near-Earth space environment proved difficult to control, and the objects
placed into the environment did not always stay where they were placed—much like the
circulation of pollution at the poles or the consolidation of plastics in ocean gyres. Like
garbage patches circling within the gyres, gravity wells in orbit tend to attract and pool
objects whose position in orbit can no longer be actively maintained.41
However, as in the burgeoning field of Anthropocene studies, most existing
efforts stop at the arbitrary line of the atmosphere. My dissertation explores the historical
permeability of this demarcation, demonstrating how Cold War environmental discourse
spatially extended humankind’s ecological impact beyond the biosphere. The history of
humankind’s technological presence in the nearest reaches of outer space suggests a
broader, more nebulous reality in which terrestrial and extra-terrestrial environments
intertwine in a natural, cultural, and technological continuum with the cosmos. During
the first decades of the Space Age, changing scientific and popular understanding of the
outer space environment, rising transnational awareness of invisible pollution, and
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material evidence of real or anticipated mismanagement of orbital resources led to nearEarth space becoming the subject of the earliest international debates about the “global
environment.”
This dissertation diverges from an American environmental history literature that
has largely overlooked what Steve Pyne calls “extreme environments”: remote,
uninhabited, and unruly natural places that nonetheless constitute compelling sites of
human practices and politics.42 Near-Earth space resembles Antarctica, the deep sea, and
the atmosphere in its illegibility, unruly boundaries, and remoteness.43 As Steve Pyne has
argued, these extreme environments represent places where humans can go, but only by
using life-sustaining technologies, and only temporarily. In these places life either does
not exist, or exists only at the microbial level and at the margins. Pyne argues that a lack
of other humans and even biota to resist or conquer has translated to a lack of urgency in
examining the environmental histories of extreme environments. As the first historical
study to assess the history of outer space itself as a natural environment, this dissertation
pushes historiographical boundaries by spotlighting the environmental history of a non-
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terrestrial ecosystem.44 By dismantling the discontinuous planetary boundary of
environmental studies scholarship, I demonstrate a new way of seeing the history of the
Space Age inextricably bound up in larger questions about environmental governance in
an increasingly globalized world.
As an extreme environment that humankind may only access by direct or virtual
technological mediation, this dissertation balances environmental history with the history
of technology. My analysis of the evolving discourse of environmental risk employed by
different communities to control the extreme orbital environment heeds the call by Nelly
Oudshoorn and Trevor Pinch to keep users at the center of histories of technology.45
However, in order to explore how the politics and practices of early space technology
users shaped an inchoate orbiting information infrastructure, I take an interdisciplinary
approach which prioritizes not only how users matter, but also how nature matters—even
in environments so extreme and illegible as to push the limits of our understanding of the
natural. In addition to treating the satellite network as an infrastructure, I examine the
ways that the evolution of technological systems in an extreme, remote, illegible, and
physically complex environment both illustrate, and require the expansion of, existing
theories of technological development. In particular, the construction and decay of an
orbiting infrastructure calls for a closer look at the social construction of technology and
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the ways that the geophysical world participates in the shaping of technologies and
waste.46 This analysis of the mutual shaping of space environment and space technology
over the course of the Cold War contributes to envirotech scholarship—interdisciplinary
studies that highlight the mutually shaping interrelationships between the nonhuman
natural world and technology.
Finally, this dissertation also explores how Cold War scientific politics factored
into broader cultural understanding of near-Earth space as natural environment. By
examining the ways that astronomers, orbital physicists, and other space scientists sought
to use and protect the planetary borderlands, I show how the interactions between
specialist and lay communities inflected a discourse of environmental protection of outer
space. I also demonstrate the pathways by which communities of scientists sought to
position themselves as the ideal arbiters of safe activity in outer space. The analysis of
internal and external conflicts among astronomers during the earliest moments of human
access to space contribute to the historiography of Cold War physical sciences and the
unique cultural space carved out by American and European astronomers as separate
from their physicist colleagues.47
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Anthropocene Without Borders
In the decade and a half since Paul Crutzen and Eugene Stoermer published the first
printed use of the term “Anthropocene” to describe the current epoch of human-driven
geophysical change, environmental scientists, social scientists, and humanists have
debated its temporal limits.48 Some argue that the era began with the industrial revolution
in the late 18th century, others millennia earlier at the Neolithic Revolution in crop and
livestock domestication—and still others argue that such an epoch should not be
recognized at all as a formal geological period separate from the Holocene.49 In 2015,
climate scientist Will Steffen suggested a dramatically recent start to the Anthropocene:
the post-war period that he, Crutzen, and John McNeill previously named the “Great
Acceleration.”50 Claiming that records of large-scale environmental change prior to the
Second World War could be attributed to the natural variability of the Holocene, Steffen
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and his co-authors poignantly describe the current state of planet Earth as “a no-analogue
world.”51
The Great Acceleration marked an exponential increase in atmospheric
greenhouse gases and large-scale environmental degradation that resulted from the
exploding human population and resource use. The first atomic bomb was exploded over
New Mexico at the cusp of the Great Acceleration, unleashing an unprecedented quantity
of radioactive material into the atmosphere which became one of the hallmarks of this
period as the nuclear arms race unfolded. At the same time that nuclear weapons and the
first intercontinental ballistic missiles annihilated the time and space of annihilation,
humankind used these same technologies to irrevocably and incontrovertibly expand the
spatial dimensions of anthropogenic change beyond the atmosphere. Starting with the
launch of Sputnik in October 1957, the environment of anthropos expanded into outer
space. In the midst of the Great Acceleration, humans began to play a major, measurable
role in the evolution of natural environments beyond the tenuous boundaries of the
terrestrial biosphere.52 Valerie Olson and Lisa Messeri recently took steps to break down
the discursive boundaries between “inner” and “outer” environments in theorizing the
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spatial parameters of the Anthropocene.53 As anthropologist Alice Gorman has argued,
the Anthropocene cannot truly be understood without considering the place of outer space
in geophysical change.54
As difficult as it may be to imagine human-caused global change, thinking about
the Anthropocene also requires shaking up a more basic, seemingly innate set of
assumptions about the world around us. It requires reimagining our ideas about nature
and the natural, and redrawing the limits of the human environment to include even those
places most alien, empty, and seemingly antithetical to nature as most understand it. The
Earth of the Anthropocene is a much larger world than can be bounded by biology,
geology, or atmosphere. Through the production, use, and discarding of spacecraft and
space junk, humanity has broadened the boundaries of Earth into the universe. Our use
and disuse of the nearest regions of space rendered our species materially and virtually
cosmopolitan, in the earliest meaning of the word espoused by the Cynics and Stoics of
Ancient Greece. A cosmopolitan rejects loyalty to a particular polity in favor of being a
citizen of the universe.55 This effective cosmopolitanism, arising in the midst of the
deeply stratified Cold War Space Race, represented a deeply paradoxical new identity for
spacefaring societies.
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Silent Spring / Sullied Space
In September 1962, Rachel Carson’s groundbreaking book Silent Spring hit bookshelves
across America and rapidly became a worldwide best seller. Silent Spring introduced an
international mainstream readership to an unseen biological threat, the gravity of which
Carson likened to nuclear fallout—but not as broadly recognized, understood, or resisted
by affected communities at the time. Carson criticized en masse the authoritarian
government officials that she deemed responsible for indiscriminately dispensing
chemical pesticides in an effort to selectively eliminate specific unwanted organisms, but
ultimately harming entire ecosystems and human bodies. Silent Spring articulated failures
of visibility, consent, authority, and education as key social factors underpinning
dangerous chemical pesticide use around the world. Should these practices continue
unabated, Carson argued, humanity could face a shocking ecological apocalypse—from
the loss of cherished birdsong insinuated in the book’s title, to the destruction of soil
productivity and subsequent conquest by the very organisms targeted for eradication.56
The same month that Silent Spring was released, newly knighted British radio
astronomer Bernard Lovell published an article in Nature detailing a similarly grave,
similarly invisible environmental threat. In this article and a simultaneously published
book—neither of which accrued the same broad readership as Silent Spring—Lovell
extolled recent advances in satellite-facilitated knowledge about the outer space
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environment that had totally transformed scientific understanding of Earth’s place in the
cosmos. Not yet five years after Soviet engineers launched Sputnik into orbit, a rapidly
coalescing international community of space scientists discovered a complex topography
of magnetism, radiation, energy, dust, and atmospheric and trapped solar particles
extending tens of thousands of kilometers from Earth into space. Lovell lauded these
discoveries as early as 1960, noting that the “earth’s environment” now dominated its
own cosmic neighborhood to a distance of some ten Earth radii.57 In The Exploration of
Outer Space he warned, however, that the near-Earth space environment—new to human
access and study—had already been polluted beyond repair by the same faceless
authorities that drenched an unconsenting society with chemical pesticides.58 Lovell
argued that in a jingoistic race to technological supremacy, Cold Warring states had taken
egregious risks by launching dangerous materials—including nuclear devices—into a
poorly understood, fragile environment that scientists could no longer study in its natural
state. Without proper oversight, Lovell anticipated the imminent militarization of outer
space and the apocalyptic destruction of entire scientific disciplines, whose practitioners
believed themselves to be standing on the cusp of revolution predicated on future access
to outer space.59
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While many in the chemical industry vilified Carson as anti-science, her text
proclaimed otherwise. She argued that pesticide programs required oversight by
scientists, many of whom could lose the ability to study organisms and ecosystems in an
unaltered, chemical-free state.60 Likewise, Lovell also anticipated that invisible
contamination, abuses of authority, and insufficient consent of affected communities
could lead to irreparable destruction of the mythical final frontier as an object of analysis.
Both Carson and Lovell claimed that, in American suburbs and thousands of kilometers
overhead, moral scientific governance provided the only hope of reversing the dire fates
they announced. Hope for salvation could be found only by giving regulatory power to
those specialists “guided by the purest of scientific motives,” as put by Lovell.61
Both Carson and her astronomer contemporaries sought to educate concerned
citizens and promote a specific kind of specialist as the most qualified and morally
equipped individuals to serve as clairvoyant environmental watchdogs against Cold War
state authorities. Lovell’s writings exemplify surging dissent among transnational
networks of American, European, and Soviet astronomers that emerged during the early
1960s against American military space activities. Just as chemical pesticides threatened
the work of zoologists and biologists, these astronomers feared that an increasing amount
of artificial material launched into orbit threatened the contemporary and anticipated
research practices of astronomers around the world. Lovell and many of his colleagues
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promoted astronomers as the best line of defense against potential ethical and moral
disasters wrought by poorly informed bureaucrats in positions of unchecked power.62
Like Carson, they enrolled the metaphor of nuclear resistance to garner popular and
legislative support for the protection of an invisible environment. Attaining regulatory
authority over outer space activities required engaging new opponents and forging new
alliances—particularly with those outside the astronomy community who might have the
power to affect policy change. Astronomers’ efforts to manage environmental risk in
space gave shape and meaning to invisible orbital pollutants. Outer space itself became
real, tangible, and vulnerable in the hands of mainstream journalists who employed protoenvironmentalist language legible to lay communities that would never directly encounter
the environment—and unlike the pesticides of Silent Spring, would not likely experience
bodily encounters with the pollution in question.
The confluence of publications by Rachel Carson and Bernard Lovell—both of
which called for similar forms of expert governance to avoid ecological destruction—
suggests that at this moment, widely considered a germinal moment in the subsequent
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expansion of mainstream environmentalism, the very definition of the natural
environment itself had begun to expand beyond the boundaries of the biosphere.63 Like
chemical pesticides released into watersheds, chemical fuels, fission particles, and metal
fragments shed by spacecraft in orbit could not be guaranteed to stay put, or disappear
without consequences. These material and rhetorical parallels suggest that the discourses
of invisible environmental threat, destruction of nature broadly defined, and the politics
of scientific morality and authority of Silent Spring extended well beyond the elm-lined
streets of suburbia, farmlands of the Midwest, and marine estuaries of the eastern
seaboard. Aptly, if coincidentally, the frontispiece to Chapter 10 of Silent Spring features
a drawing of a nuclear family gazing into a night sky dotted with stars. At the same time
that communities around the world confronted the prospect of a silent spring, many also
came face to face with the prospect of a crowded sky.
Chapter Overview
Rather than conducting a chronological examination of a single institution, group, or
cultural movement, this dissertation will present four intersecting case studies which
together reveal the formation of an international environmental consciousness of outer
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space during the Cold War. The five substantive chapters demonstrate how different
communities attempted to control an environment that few had directly encountered, and
how early perceptions of environmental risk in orbit shaped the material and discursive
contours of the planetary borderlands.
Chapter one, “’Sputnik’s Companion’: 1957α1 as Global Boundary Object,”
begins with a case study of the rocket that launched Sputnik and accompanied it into
orbit. Most Americans who reported seeing Sputnik cross the night sky actually glimpsed
the much larger, shiner core of the rocket. Different communities around the world
understood and used this globally mobile artifact as a scientific instrument, political tool,
and intelligence commodity, among many other interpretations. With the mythical final
frontier opened, the United States and the Soviet Union launched greater numbers of
satellites into orbit. These early space artifacts took multiple forms, from passive to
active, and the shape, materiality, and institutional home of each contributed to a deep
interpretive flexibility during the first few years of the Space Age.
In a geopolitical reality in which high-altitude nuclear devices could be used to
disable radio systems across an entire continent, the United States military sought new
ways to communicate in case the Cold War turned hot. Chapter two traces the history of
Project West Ford, a United States Air Force experiment that culminated in the launch of
hundreds of millions of tiny copper needles into space for use in long-range radio
communications. In “Under the Copper Curtain: Project West Ford and the Roots of
Outer Space Environmentalism, 1958-1964” I follow an international community of
astronomers—no strangers to environmental conflict after a century spent battling the
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sky-obscuring effects of urbanization— which protested the project in an attempt to halt
the extension of the industrial atmosphere into orbit.64 Astronomers’ disciplinary fight
against West Ford transformed in popular presses around the world into a prohibition on
“littering,” “trashing,” and “dumping” in outer space. This rhetoric was consistent with
an emergent zeitgeist of proto-environmentalist anxiety heralded by the concurrent
publication of Silent Spring. While project designers saw the needles as valuable
information infrastructure, news items and letters from concerned citizens in America and
abroad suggest that some interpreted these artifacts alongside fallout and pesticides as
invisible environmental threats imposed upon a non-consenting society.
Chapter three focuses on what happens when what goes up comes back down.
Subjected to punishing friction, objects that reenter the atmosphere typically break into
fragments. In passing through the planetary borderlands, these artifacts change
materially, but also ontologically—particularly in legal discourse after space junk falls
where it should not. In “’Terror in the Skies:’ Falling Space Junk, Space Weather, and
International Environmental Liability During the Long 1970s” I argue that falling space
junk becomes a perilous kind of boundary object, bringing states, legal regimes, and
bodies into unexpected and dangerous proximity, principally in instances where the
reentry causes real or anticipated environmental damage.65 Such reentries, particularly of
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artifacts containing radioactive materials, evoked Cold War apprehensions of nuclear
terror coming from the skies. Whether unintentional delivery vehicles for toxic waste or
alien pathogens (as feared by some American biologists at the dawn of the space age), the
fear of invasion by our own out-of-control technologies punctuated popular responses to
high profile reentries. This anxiety also surfaced in mass culture from novels to films that
portray existential disaster delivered by falling space junk.
Finally, chapter four illuminates how economic concerns about space junk
factored into a temporary turn away from the single-use culture of the American space
industry. This shift occurred during the development and operation of the Space Shuttle
and Space Station programs, when NASA faced a shrinking budget under the guidance of
an administrator with deep personal environmental commitments. In “Salvaging Space:
Refuse, Reuse, and the Pursuit of Orbital Economy, 1968-1986” I examine the Space
Shuttle itself—partially reusable and initially expected to facilitate retrieval and reuse of
damaged or dead satellites. I have also rediscovered a largely forgotten space station
proposal, called the Space Operations Center, which was championed by its designers as
an on-orbit salvage and recycling facility. As in postwar American civic recycling
programs, these priorities fell away when the cost of reuse surpassed that of single-use
operations, and space commerce returned to the throwaway ethos of the early sixties.66
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unintentionally ominous reference to another historical moment of exchange between
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“old” and “new” worlds, serves as a tragic but apt coda: its early intended use for orbital
cleanup, its unique capability to provide safe passage for space artifacts through the
destructive planetary borderlands, and its ultimate transformation during the final
passage, along with its human passengers, into falling space junk. This final analysis
synthesizes the ways that the technologies nations have fashioned, sent aloft, and ceased
to control, have brought us into jarring contact with the near-Earth space environment,
and with each other.
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CHAPTER 1
“Sputnik’s Companion”: 1957α1 as Global Boundary Object
On October 4, 1957, the Soviet Union launched the first artificial satellite into orbit
around the planet. American citizens picked up newspapers and tuned their radios and
televisions to breathless reports of nationwide agitation and fear: The Communists—
whose economic system and social backwardness should, by contemporary American
jingoist logic, have kept them on the ground—had beaten the United States to outer
space.67 In the days following the spectacular achievement, illustrations and eventually
photographs of the so-called “red moon” presented Americans with an idea of the
object’s physical appearance. News programs reproduced the sound emitted by the radio
beacon aboard Sputnik, diffusing a taunting, now-iconic “beep-beep” through the radios
of a nation that had nearly four months to go until it would successfully launch its own
artificial moon. These visual and aural indices of the first artificial satellite became
symbols of a new chapter in the Cold War that began with Sputnik—an era known as the
Space Age.68
Though these mediated encounters with the satellite through photos and sounds in
mass media constituted most Americans’ first exposure to the first satellite, many
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subsequently attempted to view the Russian moon with their own eyes. Regional, local,
and national news outlets printed schedules of when readers could expect the satellite to
pass overhead in the hours immediately following dusk and preceding dawn, when the
light of the sun from below the horizon illuminated the shiny object against a dark sky.
Interested individuals went outside and looked up, hopeful that they would catch a
glimpse of something that no one had ever seen before—perhaps not knowing exactly
what they might find.
Those who looked in the right place at the right time, under the right weather
conditions, saw a point of light moving rapidly across the night sky, reminiscent of a tiny
star traversing the familiar spread of fixed constellations and planets.69 Hundreds of
thousands of people on either side of the Iron Curtain viewed the same bright object.
Some 4% of Americans reported seeing Sputnik overhead during its short months in
orbit.70 The Sputnik-watching experience has been memorialized in memoirs, historical
literature, Hollywood movies, and the personal recollections of multitudes. However, the
tiny moving star that shone twice as bright as the North Star was not what it seemed.71
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The object that the newly minted cosmopolitans of Earth breathlessly tracked through the
night sky was not Sputnik, but part of the rocket that had sent it aloft.72
This strange, obscure, largely forgotten object received the official designation of
“1957α1” in the official catalog of orbiting objects now maintained by the US
Department of Defense (DOD). It continues to occupy the first entry in a list that has now
grown to over 39,000 since October 1957.73 Sputnik itself comes in second, as
“1957α2.”74 The round spherical satellite with the trailing “whiskers” or “mustaches”
received a proper name and occupies a hallowed place in history as the first artificial
satellite. However, Sputnik was only one of a trio of human-made objects that first
orbited Earth on October 4, 1957: the named satellite, the core of the rocket that launched
it into space, and an uncatalogued object that some believed to be the nose cone that
protected Sputnik during launch. These objects, of drastically different sizes and shapes,
chased each other around the planet until one by one each reentered the atmosphere and
plummeted back to Earth. By early January 1958, the last of the artifacts fell from orbit.
Like more familiar discarded things on the ground, space artifacts such as the
rocket core do not always fit into neat binary categories of product and byproduct.75
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Rather, this particular object meant a variety of different things to different communities
during the few short months it circled the Earth. Most waste products are mobile in some
way—from the transportation of municipal solid waste to the circulation of carbon
emissions in the atmosphere. Unlike these out-of-sight, out-of-mind wastes, which never
truly disappear even when rendered invisible at the point of consumption, 1957α1
remained both visible and mobile, passing over most populated regions of the planet and
visible to everyone regardless of access to technology. The global, visible mobility of
1957α1 contributed to its exceptional array of uses and user communities, and heralded a
new form of technology that would be subject to a high level of interpretive flexibility
during the early years of the Space Age.
The many identities imposed upon Sputnik’s empty rocket core illustrate how the
politics of different communities on the ground determine the meaning and value of
space technologies along a slippery, shifting dialectic of utility and waste.76 From the very
beginning of the satellite age, the potential for multiple, coexisting, contrasting
definitions of objects transiting through outer space and returning to Earth influenced the
design, purpose, and use of space technologies themselves. The stories of how these
objects came to be valued or discarded also reveal how state actors, scientific
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communities, and ordinary citizens across the world confronted a new and illegible
environment as the Cold War extended beyond the tenuous boundaries of the biosphere.
The Many Identities of 1957α1
The brief history of Sputnik’s rocket core reveals how the first artifacts that would come
to be known to some observers as “space junk” became broadly flexible, heterogeneous
boundary objects, collapsing vast geographical distances and political divides both while
in orbit and after returning to Earth through the atmosphere. Multiple communities used
and interpreted this first broadly visible space artifact in a variety of sometimes
contradicting ways, from space waste to space craft. Beyond constituting the first
encounter with outer space as a human environment for thousands of untrained
individuals around the world, this artifact also became a range of other artifacts, from
political tool to scientific instrument to intelligence commodity. The meaning of the
artifact was contingent on the identity of the user and the location of the rocket core
relative to the user.
The rocket core artifact in many ways fits the categorization of a “boundary
object” as initially described by Star and Greisemer. A boundary object must have a
strong identity that nevertheless can be stretched to meet the local needs of different
communities, thus serving as a unifying point of translation between divergent social
worlds. Unlike the atlases, museums, forms, and state boundaries at play for the different
communities of the Museum of Vertebrate Zoology that Star and Greisemer use as a case
study, 1957α1 appeared on the world scene as something entirely novel and different, an
artifact that drew together new communities of unaffiliated users. Different groups
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collaborated to produce representations of outer space and spaceflight using an artifact
that turned out to be both elastic in meaning and robust in identity.77 The rocket core
meant different things within different social worlds, but remained recognizable as a
Soviet-built piece of space technology. In addition to representing different meanings and
uses to different communities, the global motion and visibility of the orbiting artifact
redrew the boundaries of what could be considered a “boundary”—between
communities, environments, and worlds.
Valerie Olson has argued that near-Earth objects (NEOs) such as asteroids and
meteors act as boundary objects that tack between astronomy and environmental and
national security communities, as well as between Earthly and extraterrestrial
environments.78 As naturally occurring objects, however, NEOs boast a much longer
presence in geophysical and human history, with records of terrestrial boundary crossing
in abundant evidence through geological impact features and texts ranging from Chinese
folklore to the Bible.79 Olson and Lisa Messeri group NEOs alongside solar radiation as
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objects that gain significance through cultural interpretations of their crossing between
Earth and space. Olson and Messeri look at how these cosmic transitory objects challenge
acts of discursive boundary drawing through which different communities separate the
planet from the rest of the cosmos.80 The transit of early space artifacts like the Sputnik
rocket core through and from space challenges this distinction between the planet and the
rest of the universe further, particularly due to the anthropogenic nature of these objects.
Designed and built by humans, 1957α1 retained the initial inscriptions from its creators,
which then influenced the proliferation of alternate meanings and uses beyond its primary
use as the means by which the named first artificial moon reached orbit. It was
simultaneously familiar and strange: Though human-made, it inhabited a space external
to any that humankind had directly encountered—an uncanny alien artifact that sat astride
environments and eras.
In what follows, I identify eight discrete interpretations of the Sputnik rocket core
by different communities of users during its short few months in orbit and immediately
after its plunge to Earth in December 1957. This wide variety of meanings and uses was
echoed in the subsequent development and deployment of the first communications and
scientific satellites during the following decade. I then compare Project Echo and Project
West Ford81—two passive satellite systems with common material attributes imbued with
widely varying cultural meanings. The divergent interpretation of these two systems
illustrates the persistent material and social flexibility of space artifacts during the years
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following the launch of the first space boundary object. Before the form of the satellite
settled into the active, electronics-laden version that we currently understand to be the
archetypal satellite, the first flexible space artifacts further blurred the distinction between
satellite and space junk. As the interpretive flexibility of satellites subsided—as a
particular form of active satellite became successful and as a result became “black
boxed”—the expanse of communities and uses for these boundary objects also
narrowed.82 Before anyone could fear space junk, they first had to know what space junk
could be. This chapter shows how the category of “space junk” emerged within a range of
many possible interpretations of the same space artifact: propaganda tool, scientific
instrument, diplomatic offering, intelligence object, and environmental pollution.
First Satellite
The rocket core reached orbit at the same time as Sputnik, separating from the sphere
314.5 seconds after the full R7 rocket assembly lifted off from the windswept plains of
Kazakhstan. The Soviet engineers responsible for designing the version of the R-7
ballistic missile that launched Sputnik gave it the nickname “Article 8K71PS,” following
the Soviet practice of labeling classified technology with deliberately neutral, obscure
descriptions and by extension leaving it open to the manufacture of unlimited meanings
beyond its initial designed purpose.83 In contrast, the planned Soviet satellite itself gained
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the relatively specific moniker prosteyshyy sputnik, or Simplest Satellite.84 An aluminum
sphere with a radio transmitter aboard could be seen as simple indeed; and yet, Article
8K71PS, also made of metal and containing a transmitter that was, in the words of an
eminent Soviet engineer, “so basic that it would be a snap for any group of young hobby
technicians to reproduce it,” could have been described by the same name.85
Appropriately, Russians today typically refer to the rocket launcher as “Sputnik,” the
name most Westerners use for the satellite itself.86
Even as the image of the named satellite graced news reports around the world,
the core became the object that most observers, knowingly or unknowingly, assumed to
be the first artificial satellite. Many American news outlets neglected to note the true
identity of the moving star, while some explicitly identified the naked-eye visible object
as the rocket core. The Los Angeles Times claimed that 1957α1 “stole the show” from
Sputnik as the more spectacular of the two objects, to which Sputnik received second
billing in other articles as its “companion” in space.87 Many Americans had easy access to
information identifying the object as the rocket body. However, few memoirs and oral
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histories of Americans who recalled seeing Sputnik mention realizing the true identity of
the moving star. In popular memory, the rocket body has become Sputnik itself. During
its time in space, the rocket core, together with reproduced images and sounds of and
from the named satellite, made up the Sputnik Experience for those who looked into the
dawn and dusk sky in October and November of 1957.88
The rocket core served as a visual index that enabled a direct, unmediated
connection with the first human-made moon. Except among certain communities of
specialists and the amateur astronomer networks enrolled to track the first satellites, this
artifact has been all but subsumed under the identity of its more famous companion.89 In
hindsight, even some specialists seem to have forgotten the existence of the rocket core.
Engineer Homer Hickam, who would pen the best-selling memoir Rocket Boys that
inspired the 1999 Hollywood film October Sky, recalls the moment in which he first saw
Sputnik crossing over his West Virginia coal mine town as the motivation behind his
entering a career designing spacecraft for NASA.

I stared at it with no less rapt attention than if it had been God Himself in a golden
chariot riding overhead. It soared with what seemed to me inexorable and
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dangerous purpose, as if there were no power in the universe that could stop
it…in less than a minute, it was gone.90

Had 17-year-old Homer known that this powerful, dangerous, inexorable, nearly divine
object had been a piece of a rocket rather than the Russian moon, perhaps he would still
have built a career in rocket engineering. However, for most Americans, a satellite was
something remarkably different from the rockets that, until October 4 1957, had only
served to lift warheads into globe-crossing trajectories. The named satellite attained lofty
cultural status as an artifact of value and meaning due to a combination of socially
constructed realities including its having a legible name, novel purpose, and a sound that
could be heard indirectly by anyone with a radio receiver or television. In spite of ample
contemporary news reporting that clarified the true identity of the moving star, the rocket
core has disappeared in a worldwide act of collective forgetting. As something designed
to place the named satellite into orbit and then to be discarded, the small moving star
would mean little more than waste if defined solely by its planned use. In seeing the
rocket core with their own eyes and identifying it as the first satellite, communities
around the world first experienced outer space as a real, tangible place through a messy
visual encounter with an artifact that was simultaneously spacecraft and something else
entirely new: space waste.
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Figure 1.1: Researchers at the Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory put together this
map of the path of the rocket core as it traced a path across the globe. Note that the
caption refers to the core by its catalog name, and identifies it as a satellite.91
First Space Junk
Unlike those who looked up into the sky with the naked eye, many specialists with access
to the equipment and information necessary to view Sputnik would have been aware of
the rocket core as a separate object entirely. Soviet engineers designed the rocket core to
provide the final push that sent Sputnik into its path around the planet. To those who
acknowledged the rocket’s primary function, 1957α1 could be best understood as a
discarded industrial byproduct in an environment that humankind could now claim as part
of its domain. Professional and amateur scientists and radio operators who could see the
actual satellite or used the radio signal to signify its existence were aware of the
91
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difference between the two artifacts. American astrophysicist Alan Hynek called the
rocket core “a traveling junk pile in the sky.”92 To many of those who could identify and
encounter Sputnik through technologically mediated means, 1957α1 became little more
than useless space junk—the very first of a highly mobile, illegible, uncontrollable form
of waste that would grow in quantity and complexity as the Space Age progressed.
Nothing about the construction of 1957α1 rendered it more space junk than space
craft, particularly given its many material similarities to 1957α2. In spite of its high level
of visibility, in intentionally or unintentionally subsuming the identity of the rocket core
within that of its named companion, an array of observers, by omission, relegated 1957α1
to the category of invisible waste. Like all artifacts that humankind sends into space, the
rocket core would eventually fall back to Earth. 1957α2 would follow a month later.
Upon passing through the nebulous borderlands between Earth and outer space, 1957α1
became the first example of a different kind of space junk—the kind that replicated a
distinctly Cold War cultural anxiety of technological destruction delivered from afar and
above.

Political Tool
The mistaken identity of the rocket core as Sputnik proper did not come about entirely by
accident. The very first Soviet press release announcing the successful launch noted that
some form of equipment would be required to view the simplest satellite as it circled the
planet:

92

“Travelling ‘Junk Pile’ In The Sky Forecast,” The Times of India, October 13, 1957.

46

At the present time the satellite is describing elliptical trajectories around the
earth, and its flight can be observed in the rays of the rising and setting sun with
the aid of very simple optical instruments (binoculars, telescopes, etc.).93

At only 58 centimeters in diameter, roughly the size of a beach ball, Soviet engineers
realized that the sphere would be too small to view from the ground with the naked eye,
so they planned to make the much larger rocket core a more easily visible substitute.94
Following orders issued via the Soviet Academy of Sciences, they outfitted the 20-meterlong rocket core with reflective prisms designed to deploy when it reached orbit so that
Soviet radars could more easily track it.95 Beyond this officially stated purpose, the core
performed the perfect Sputnik impersonation. Because it was much larger and designed
to catch and reflect more sunlight, anyone on the ground with the ability to see,
regardless of education or access to specialized equipment, could spot the rocket core and
confirm for themselves that the notoriously secretive Soviet Union had indeed put a new
moon into orbit.
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Figure 1.2: Sputnik 1 alongside a technician, compared to the R7 rocket used to launch
the satellite. Note that the central core of the rocket is shorter than the entire assembly
prior to launch, as pictured here with an average person for scale.96
Such a sight had public relations benefits beyond the expectations of Sputnik’s
designers: Ordinary viewers saw the object and felt pride or terror, anticipation or
anxiety, depending on their political inclinations and nationality. The Soviet engineers
intentionally crafted the rocket core to be more than waste: They shaped the material
form of the object so that, even in what some might determine to be a state of disuse, it
yet served a valuable technical and political purpose. By providing a visible index for the
Soviet achievement, Soviet engineers ensured that their achievement would become
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incontrovertibly understood as the instigating moment of what would unfold into over a
decade of proxy conflict known as the Space Race.97
In order to capitalize further on this additional use of the rocket core, the Soviet
government released information about the revolutions, distances traveled, and apogee
heights of each component of the Sputnik system. The Kremlin continued to publish such
information over the next few launches, including predictions of where and when specific
satellites might be visible to observers on the ground.98 For the second Sputnik launch,
Soviet engineers decided not to separate the spacecraft from the core stage of the
launching rocket.99 As a result, Sputnik 2 would be just as visible from the ground as the
unnamed rocket core launched weeks prior. The Kremlin continued to release viewing
information for this most recent satellite, privileging information about the more visible
artifacts over the orbital viewing times of Sputnik 1.
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Figure 1.3: This graph, released by the Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory to
illustrate Soviet predictions of when 1957α1 (the core of the Sputnik R-7 rocket) and
1957β1 (Sputnik 2) would be visible from different latitudes at dawn and dusk. Note that
both featured artifacts are R7 rocket cores, and this information was not provided for the
much smaller Sputnik 1.100
Scientific Instrument
Although they had access to the optical and radio equipment necessary to “see” Sputnik,
some specialist communities in the West found the discarded rocket core to be more
useful than the named satellite. American and British physicists found an additional use
for the object as an unprecedented opportunity to study the upper atmosphere. A group of
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British physicists, who would soon take on the new professional identity of “orbital
analysts,” used the rocket core as a research instrument that they did not have to design,
order, operate, or pay to use. Tracking the object as it tumbled end over end in its path
around the planet, orbital analysts at the Royal Aircraft Establishment (RAE) and the
Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory (SAO) examined the motion of the rocket core to
study its interactions with atmospheric particles at high altitudes.101 These particles
exerted drag on the object, causing its orbit to “decay,” or dwindle in altitude far more
quickly than it would in a vacuum.102 During its over eight weeks on orbit, 1957α1
revealed entirely new information about the wind currents and density of the upper
atmosphere and the shape of the Earth itself.103
The calculations made by RAE and SAO researchers using the tumbling rocket
core represented the first in situ data about the material dimensions of near-Earth space
that would subsequently reveal a complex physical landscape of interacting gravitational
forces, radiation, and energy. Earth’s atmosphere and geophysical influence constituted
neither a thin, fragile shell around the planet, nor a “vast region of emptiness,” as Bernard
Lovell put it.104 Using the rocket core to measure high altitude wind currents and particle
density, physicists on the other side of the Iron Curtain from the launching state took
enormous first steps towards a new understanding of the natural environment of planet
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Earth that extended far beyond the biosphere, tens of thousands of kilometers into space,
where planetary forces shape natural processes and human-made objects alike.105
The early research produced using the rocket core changed contemporary
understanding of the orbital environment. Before the Sputnik, RAE physicist Desmond
King-Hele called scientific understanding of the atmosphere “abysmally inadequate.”106
However, once the Soviet press revealed details on the dimensions of the rocket core,
physicists could then observe the motion of the rocket and determine how friction and
gravity interacted to bring the object back to Earth. Research conducted using the rocket
core fostered SAO researchers’ claim that the atmosphere at altitudes of 220 kilometers
and 233 kilometers was far denser than initially thought.107 The first orbital analysts
themselves attached great value to 1957α1. As King-Hele noted in 1960, most upper
atmospheric data used for these revolutionary studies came from tracing the paths of the
first rocket bodies to orbit the planet, rather than from native instruments designed for the
specific purpose of measuring particle density. Sputnik 3, which the Soviet Union
launched in May 1958, would be the first satellite to fly with direct atmospheric
measuring devices on board.108 Thus, American and European physicists made some of
the first measurements of the near-Earth space environment indirectly, using an
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improvised scientific instrument unintentionally provided by a foreign, hostile power.109
Although the named satellite fulfilled multiple roles in scientific and political arenas, to
King-Hele and his cohort of orbital analysts the empty rocket was “more important than
the satellite itself.”110 Some saw it as waste; the Soviets turned it into propaganda; orbital
scientists used it as an instrument.

Diplomatic Gift
Unlike the data gathered by Soviet scientists using instruments aboard satellites like
Sputnik 3 and the first American satellite Explorer 1, the rocket core’s motion and its
global visibility rendered the technology non-proprietary and free to use by observers in
any nation regardless of political or national affiliation.111 The relatively simple rocket
core and its successors provided cost-effective means of atmospheric and space research
during the 1960s, when funding for European space science remained remarkably low,
and before and during the unprecedented state spending bonanza that would soon
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characterize the American space program.112 In stark contrast to the $110 million that the
US federal government spent on the early Vanguard satellite program, those who studied
1957α1 generated groundbreaking, prestigious scientific research at a price tag of $0 to
taxpayers in America and the UK.113
Desmond King-Hele of the RAE wrote an entire popular book to justify the
expense of satellite research to the British public—and noted that many of the discoveries
made through such research essentially cost nothing to said public.114 By “stealing a look
at satellites launched by other nations,” orbital researchers like King-Hele reformed
models of the upper atmosphere without having to pay for satellite development and
launch. King-Hele and his cohort at the RAE gave effusive public thanks for the
foresight, ingenuity, and unintentional generosity displayed by the Soviet engineers for
providing a free, non-proprietary instrument for learning about the orbital environment.
He even expressed some degree of guilt over the RAE’s uncompensated use of 1957α1,
referring to British study of the rocket core as “piratic.”115 However, a subsequent meeting
between British orbital analysts at the RAE and Soviet astronomer Alla Massevitch to
discuss and exchange information about the decay of 1957α1 forged new links between
Western European, American, and Soviet scientific communities. As part of this
exchange, the Smithsonian-sponsored Operation Moonwatch shared its observational
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data with Massevitch, who in turn provided analogous Soviet data and feedback on the
equipment used by the amateur astronomer network as compared to Soviet satellite
tracking technology.116
The launch of Sputnik set off a new, antagonistic proxy front in the Cold War
between the United States and the Soviet Union. The existence of the satellite itself posed
a challenge and a taunt to the US from across the world, and the subsequent American
effort to catch up with and surpass Soviet space achievements would yield harsh
exchanges between the two states and cost billions of dollars. However, at the same time
the forgotten rocket core became the focus of a brief, nearly anomalous reprieve in these
tense relations during the Sputnik crisis. At the outset of the Space Race, 1957α1 became
a peacemaking object and a diplomatic tool, bringing together kindred amateur and
professional scientists on either side of the contentious Cold War conflict in peaceful
collaboration. This was the first instance of an ebbing and flowing relationship between
Soviet and Western scientists that often followed its own amicable route independently of
the temperature of the Cold War as the Space Race progressed.117

Telemetry Test
Compared to Sputnik and its beeping radio signal, which quickly became an aural icon of
116

Emile Tavel, “US, Soviets to Swap Moonwatch Reports,” The Christian Science Monitor,
October 14, 1957; AP, “RUSS, U.S. SCIENTISTS TO TRADE ‘MOON’ DATA: Watchers to
Reveal Findings,” Los Angeles Times, October 15, 1957; Gordon Brown, “U.S. and Soviet
Arrange To Swap Satellite Data,” The Washington Post and Times Herald, October 15, 1957; AP
and The Times of India News Service, “FACTS ABOUT SATELLITE: U. S.-Soviet Exchange,”
The Times of India, October 15, 1957.
117
Audra J Wolfe, Competing with the Soviets: Science, Technology, and the State in Cold War
America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013).

55
the Space Age, the orbiting rocket cores appeared to be “dumb, deaf, and blind.”118
However, in the context of British orbital analysts’ research, 1957α1 was far from silent.
Soviet engineers installed an early version of the new Tral telemetry system into the
rocket core that remained active throughout its time on orbit. Telemetry systems like Tral
provide a constant stream of data regarding the rockets’ operation, altitude, and position.
Before they could acquire Sputnik’s radio signal, the signal emitted by Tral aboard the
rocket core provided Soviet engineers with the first confirmation that both the rocket and
satellite had successfully reached orbit. Sputnik itself would not reveal its location until
completing a second arc around the planet.119
So successful was this telemetry system test that when the Soviet Union began to
make plans to launch its second Simplest Satellite, they determined that the rocket core’s
Tral provided enough data to dispense with a separate detachable satellite with a native
radio transmitter like the one on Sputnik 1. Rather than outfit Sputnik 2 with its own
radio, the Tral-equipped rocket core itself would remain attached to the named satellite,
with its canine passenger, Laika, ensconced in the cabin.120 During this second Soviet
space flight, the rocket core once again provided an easily visible visual index for the
named satellite and emitted a series of signals to confirm its place in orbit around the
planet. The talkative 1957α1 served as a test article for Tral, which the Soviet space
program would use as a primary telemetry system throughout the Sputnik and Vostok
programs, and which would serve as the basis for subsequent ground tracking
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technologies.121 The otherwise silent rocket core spoke volumes to those who had the
means to listen.

Intelligence Commodity
Soviet engineers and orbital analysts around the world tracked the rocket body until its
orbit fully decayed.122 After 882 trips around the planet, the object began to spiral into the
atmosphere on November 30, 1957, ultimately falling back to Earth on December 2
1957.123 As it plunged into denser regions of the atmosphere, punishing heat and pressure
caused it to fracture into pieces. Some of these pieces dissipated into the atmosphere; and
some of the larger fragments survived intact. In its return to terra firma, 1957α1
transformed into the first of a different kind of space junk—the kind that falls to Earth,
often far from the launching state, with the potential to threaten the safety of people,
property, and ecosystems.
Upon hitting the ground the artifact transformed once again, offering new value to
a different set of communities. The American intelligence community valued the rocket
core as a potential source of information about the design and production capabilities of
the Soviet space industry. Soviet officials sought to uncover any surviving fragments
with equal urgency, driven by the inverse objective of preventing such information from
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falling into enemy hands. Observers on either side of the Iron Curtain tracked the rocket
body as it fell from the sky, but disagreed about where the object landed. Soviet scientists
and officials claimed that it landed in Alaska, and that the American government had
covered up its retrieval of exploitable debris. The Americans in turn argued that the
object had landed in Mongolia, well within Soviet territory.124 The matter eventually
faded from public view, and the final resting place of the rocket body fragments remains
unknown.125 However, the debate over its landing site initiated several decades of tense
exchange between the Cold Warring super powers in which space junk like 1957α1
became intelligence commodities—critical political currency of the Space Race. Where
traditional intelligence methods failed, the natural geophysical environment of near-Earth
space provided occasional insight by delivering falling space junk across geographic
boundaries and geopolitical divides.126
The Matter of Early Satellites
The multiple interpretations of 1957α1 foreshadowed the interpretive flexibility of the
first artificial satellites launched after Sputnik. While the material attributes of the rocket
core remained static over months on orbit and on the ground, different, dispersed user
communities found varying meanings and uses for it. As will be discussed in further
detail in the following chapter, during the earliest days of the satellite age engineers in the
US and USSR considered multiple forms that communications and science satellites
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might take. The stuff of satellites mattered greatly during the design phases of each
satellite program, as the shape and makeup of passive satellites determined how that
satellite functioned, who could use it, and perhaps just as importantly, whether the
satellite would be accepted as a technological benefit or technological threat. In a broad
field of potential satellite technologies, the matter, shape, size, and quantity of objects
sent into space during the first five years of the satellite age deeply impacted how
astronomers and other concerned groups interpreted the safety of space artifacts. The
material configuration of satellites played a large role in how those on the ground
determined a satellite’s scope of use, its designers’ intent, and its modernity—an
important attribute in the early days of the Space Age.127
Two passive satellite projects developed in the United States during the late 1950s
and early 1960s resulted in deeply divergent outcomes on this last point. Project West
Ford, a space communications system designed by the MIT Lincoln Laboratory and
funded by the US Air Force, launched twice—in 1961 and again in 1963. West Ford
consisted of a field of hundreds of millions of tiny copper fibers orbiting at an
approximate altitude of 3500 kilometers, tuned for use with microwave signals sent from
a powerful transmitter on the ground. NASA launched two versions of Project Echo—
Echo 1 in 1960 and Echo 2 in 1964—sending inflatable Mylar “satelloons” into orbit,
also for use as a reflector of microwave signals. Both West Ford and Echo served similar
purposes in relaying signals sent from one point on the ground to another point without
127
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using any electronics installed aboard the satellite themselves. The space components of
both satellite systems coexisted in orbit, and both received attention in open literature and
popular presses before, during, and after their primary missions. However, West Ford
ultimately inspired a furor from astronomers, diplomats, and journalists who interpreted
the copper fibers as dangerous space pollution, whereas Echo became known to most
communities as useful, anomalously friendly satellites in a largely hostile night sky.128
During the International Geophysical Year (IGY) of 1957 to 1958, American
atmospheric researchers working under the auspices of the National Advisory Committee
for Aeronautics (NACA) designed a small inflatable sphere that could be launched into
the upper atmosphere, where its movements would allow researchers on the ground to
determine air density at high altitudes, primarily for use in aircraft design. After the
Soviet Union provided 1957α1 free of charge for this purpose, the project evolved into a
balloon satellite, or “satelloon,” of exponentially larger diameter to be used primarily to
test experimental communications methods. After the Sputnik experience touched
thousands of people around the world, NACA officials hoped that a satelloon could also
serve similar nationalist purposes. Like the rocket core, an American space object that
would be visible to the naked eye could yield pride and a sense of accomplishment
among American citizens who might have experienced the inverse upon seeing the first
Russian moon. Under the name Project Echo, the fledgling National Aeronautics and
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Space Administration launched the first of these satelloons into orbit in August 1960,
followed by the launch of Echo II in January 1964.129

Figure 1.4: An Echo satellite undergoes static testing at a facility in Weeksville, NC on
June 28, 1961.130
Echo and West Ford had plenty of material attributes in common. At the most
basic level, both were passive satellites constructed out of shiny, metallic materials, and
both were intended to test novel radio communications methods. The designers of each
project hoped that their satellites would yield new information about the near-Earth space
environment. West Ford’s designers hoped that their project would test the hypothesis
129
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that sunlight pressure could be relied upon to bring down objects with low mass-to-area
ratios from relatively high orbits.131 Echo’s designers anticipated that the motion of the
satelloons over time would reveal how solar energy affects the expansion, contraction,
dormancy, and decay of large objects in low orbits.132 Both West Ford and Echo reflected
signals sent and received by MIT equipment on either side of the continental United
States. Supporters of both West Ford and Echo celebrated the inherent universal
accessibility of each satellite form as communications devices—for those who had the
resources and capital to use them. On the negative side, astronomers and astrophysicists
anticipated likely interference to their observations by both passive satellite systems. This
specialist community initially opposed satellites of all forms, including the active
(containing an electronic repeater) type. Bernard Lovell anticipated that West Ford, Echo,
and active satellites like Telstar all posed possible threats to astronomical research.133
Astronomers affiliated with the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) conducted studies
of what impact an Echo or West Ford system would have on their research should either
type of passive satellite become a permanent part of the orbital infrastructure.134
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However, in spite of these similarities in construction, method of use, and alarm
among astronomy communities, the response to Echo among scientists, politicians, and
general publics worldwide was generally positive in stark contrast to the battle that raged
around West Ford. Even in the admittedly hostile audience of the Soviet popular press,
which pilloried West Ford as a “criminal act,” Echo earned the nickname “the Friendship
Sputnik.”135 At the Eleventh Meeting of the International Astronomical Union (IAU),
during which the assembled passed anti-West Ford resolutions, the daily programs
distributed to attendees listed where and when Echo 1 would pass over their Berkeley
location each night, in English and in French.136 Echo was emblazoned on
commemorative postage stamps issued by states and local governments around the world,
from Paraguay to Kazakhstan to Qatar.137 Besides being photographed next to a generic
postage stamp to illustrate the small size of the dipoles, West Ford never received such
philatelic honors.
The sponsoring institution may have been part of the reason for this disparity.
Both military and civil science communities considered potential applications of balloon
satellites—in a defense context, an Echo type satellite might pose as a decoy to trick
enemy spacecraft detection systems, much like West Ford’s World War II radar foil
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ancestor Project Chaff.138 However, the newly formed NASA—a civilian agency—
ultimately funded Echo.139 West Ford was funded by the United States Air Force, and
launched atop an Air Force missile as a secondary payload to a classified military
satellite. In 1960 the Space Science Board (SSB) of the NAS advised the Lincoln
Laboratory to consider NASA sponsorship instead. In a report to the general board,
members of a West Ford review committee included an appendix addressing the issue of
public perception of the project should it remain attached to a branch of the armed forces.
The committee strongly suggested that sponsorship by a civilian agency might go far to
ward off popular assumptions at home and abroad that, however benign in practice, the
project had a malicious purpose.140 However, the New York Times reported that due to
the U2 incident the preceding year, NASA declined to take over West Ford in order to
avoid any appearance of military engagement within the agency—though the US
delegation to the United Nations chose a representative from NASA to defend West Ford
against critics who accused the United States of military aggression after the second
launch in May 1963.141
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In comparing the material attributes of each system, the West Ford and Echo
projects most drastically diverged in the shape of the orbital components. Both projects
were designed to launch a small container that released the reflective payload once it
reached the intended orbit. The West Ford dispenser, which bundled hundreds of millions
of copper fibers into a cylinder smaller than a coffee can, would slowly release the
dipoles into a widely dispersed band that surrounded the planet at an altitude of about
3500 kilometers. Each dipole would be separated by about 400 meters.142 In contrast, the
Echo “shot-put” mechanism, about a meter in diameter, jettisoned and instantaneously
inflated a single satelloon to a diameter of over 30 meters (Echo I) or over 40 meters
(Echo II). Echo I and Echo II orbited at under half the altitude of West Ford, reaching a
perigee of approximately 1600 kilometers.
The shape and size of these two satellite systems largely determined who could
use the satellites, and how. The primary purpose touted by Echo and West Ford
managers—a test of passive satellite communications—could not be undertaken without
specialized equipment. However, NASA touted several ancillary uses for the Echo
satelloons, including their accessibility as a “worldwide laboratory tool” for both radio
communications and for measuring high altitude air currents. NASA welcomed
independent communications researchers to use the satellite at will, offering to provide
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any interested parties with tracking data to facilitate such experimenting.143 The first radio
transmission sent via Echo I carried a voice message from President Eisenhower inviting
all nations to use the satellite for its own communications interests.144 The SSB West Ford
committee envisioned similar public relations benefits from the non-proprietary nature of
the proposed dipole system, noting in its April 1960 report that “properly handled, the
Project might even be made into an asset in the realm of international cooperation in
space activities, since it is the type in which scientists of any country can participate
independently.” They suggested that the belt be used to transmit signals to the Soviet
Union and to Western Europe in order to demonstrate its universal accessibility.
Otherwise, the project might be open to negative interpretations—the dipoles could be
seen as the dangerous waste byproducts of a wanton, unchecked American military.145
Neither Echo nor West Ford were particularly “useful” in the primary purpose for
which they were designed for any users outside of the state-funded research organizations
that had the powerful transmitters and receivers on the ground to send and receive signals
from the satellites. This did not preclude others from trying to use them, however.
Following the successful second West Ford launch, a British amateur radio operator
wrote to the Lincoln Laboratory to express his support of the project in contrast to the
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vocal opposition among the professional radio astronomers in his country. Curious about
how the Lincoln Laboratory and ham operators might mutually support each other, the
letter writer requested information about how amateurs like him might use the belt in
order to attain the prestige of long-distance communication. The chief designer of West
Ford personally responded with the requested information, but noted that ham operators
likely would not transmit at the correct frequency, or with enough power, to be able to
use the dipoles.146
Of course, as with Sputnik’s rocket core, the primary designated use of orbiting
artifacts was not always the sole, or even most important, use in practice. Particularly
during the early years of the Cold War Space Race, a satellite that could be clearly seen
from the ground served important political purposes. Unlike West Ford, which designers
planned to install in an orbit so far away and diffusely dispersed as to be all but invisible
even through powerful telescopes, Echo’s designers built them to be seen from the
ground. One of the primary goals of Project Echo was to put an American satellite into
orbit that would demonstrate to even the least educated citizens of the world that the
United States had reached outer space.147 An object so large and shiny could be seen with
the naked eye, by anyone who knew when and where to look. Journalists who had viewed
Echo with their own eyes described the satellite as “a tiny traveling star” or a “small
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bright starlet.”148 Regional newspapers published schedules listing when local viewers
might see Echo passing overhead, and when Echo would be invisible while in the Earth’s
shadow.149 Echo watchers buzzed about a mysterious “companion” to the satellite later
attributed to Air Force pilots attempting to get a better look at the satellite while in
flight.150 Three years into the orbital lifetime of the first mission, one American journalist
likened Echo-watching to other popular trends like hula hoops, 3D movies, and the twist.
NASA reported receiving twenty to thirty calls per week about Echo in 1963, and those
who regularly followed its path through the sky described it as a mathematical puzzle,
backyard science game, and evidence of American ingenuity visible from anywhere in
the world, from American backyards to the Nile River. Echo took on an anthropomorphic
identity to some, who described the satelloon as a “sentimental friend.”151 One Echowatcher wrote a letter to the SAO upon Echo I’s demise, lamenting: “I shall greatly miss
seeing ‘him’ float by.” By the time Echo I reentered the atmosphere in 1968, the New
York Times claimed that more people in more countries had seen the satelloon than any
other human-made spacecraft.152 The exact opposite could be said of the West Ford
dipoles. Even long-exposure photographs taken by the highly sensitive Baker-Nunn
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camera space tracking system could only detect the dispenser mechanism and the faintest
fuzzy band inclined approximately three degrees to the surrounding star field.153

Figure 1.5: This long-exposure photograph demonstrates the faintness of the West Ford
system. Taken on September 17, 1963 at the San Fernando station of the Smithsonian
Astrophysical Observatory in Spain using a 20-inch Baker-Nunn satellite tracking
camera, the dipole field barely appears as a faint, fuzzy line extending from either side of
the dispenser (circled), inclined several degrees relative to the star field.154
Echo and West Ford also diverged in material composition. While both satellite forms
represented innovative products of the Space Age in function and design, they were not
both “Space-Age” in construction. In order to attain the enormous size and reflectivity
necessary for the proposed satelloon, Echo’s designers chose to build the body of the
spacecraft out of Mylar, an aluminized polyester compound newly developed by DuPont
for use in the manufacture of recording tape and food packaging.155 Mylar provided the
requisite combination of strength and incredible thinness—about half as thick as the
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cellophane wrapper on a pack of cigarettes, extolled a NASA press release and
promotional film distributed in advance of the first Echo launch.156 Project Echo yielded
the first use of Mylar in the spaceflight industry. Soon, the compound would become
culturally bound to the space program, as NASA engineers incorporated Mylar into the
construction of all Apollo-era spacecraft, as well as the enduringly popular outdoor
product spinoff known as the “space blanket.”157 Touted as a miracle product of space-age
chemistry, Mylar soon became a fixture in the silver, streamlined fashion design of the
late 1960s.158
In contrast, the West Ford dipoles were made out of an ancient, mundane element:
copper. If aluminum alloys and shiny silvery materials typified space-age design and
consumer culture, copper represented an earlier, bygone age. Space-age alloys were
innovative, high-tech, and post-industrial; copper a product of industrial production that
most Americans would recognize in their homes, businesses, and in the pennies in their
pockets. During the 1960s this industrial substance did not align with the silver, platinum,
and white symbols of modernity made most famous by fashion designer André
Courrèges.159
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Together, the shape, size, and composition of Echo and West Ford combined to
create a vastly divergent landscape of acceptance. Managers of both projects saw benefit
in sending samples of project components to those with the influence or power to lend
legitimacy to a new and potentially controversial technology. NASA sent samples of
Mylar to space program advocates in the federal government, demonstrating the
remarkable attributes of the new material and lauding Echo as a breakthrough in
materials and communication technology.160 The Lincoln Laboratory also circulated
material samples from West Ford to potential allies, but for a different purpose. When
John Kessler, the publicity manager of the West Ford project, sent around packets of
dipoles to journalists, diplomats, and lawmakers, he did not intend to demonstrate
anything revolutionary about plain old copper. Rather, he hoped to showcase its
banality—boring, ordinary, and inoffensive, copper was not the stuff of military
aggression or revolution.161
The Lincoln Laboratory often accompanied press releases and other informational
materials with a photo of several dipoles arranged next to cat whiskers, or on an
unidentified human finger. With the fingerprints as clearly visible as the dipoles
themselves, such an image demonstrated the short length and minute diameter of the
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copper fibers. By allowing individuals such as the delegates present at a United Nations
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space meeting held two days after the second
launch to see and handle dipoles directly, the circulation of West Ford samples provided
an unparalleled method to demonstrate objectively the size of the dipoles, and by
extension their harmlessness.162 Kessler also hoped that this material encounter might also
help spur a creative rebranding of the embattled Lincoln Laboratory endeavor.
Recognizing the damage that the enduring nickname “needles” seemed to be inflicting
upon public opinion of the project, Kessler circulated dipoles to journalists in order to
solicit suggestions for how to rename the project one more time, hoping that a softer
moniker would render its composite parts both popularly legible and rhetorically
innocuous. Suggestions such as “space fluff,” “space hair,” and “space halo” softened an
otherwise sharp intrusion into the outer space environment—though none of these
suggestions found official or popular traction.163 Those who did not encounter the dipoles
themselves had free range to imagine—they imagined needles raining from the sky, or
falling into their gardens.
Compared to the highly visible, widely celebrated Echo I and Echo II, West
Ford’s invisibility proved a double-edged sword. The fact that the belt could not be seen
by anyone, including professional astronomers who had vocally opposed its potential
effect on their research, was a triumph for the Lincoln Laboratory. However, the visibility
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of the Echo satellites made them familiar and even lovable to certain communities on the
ground. While astronomers opposed both Echo and West Ford, they did not raise an
international incident over Echo as they did with West Ford. In remarks that inverted
Western praise for 1957α1 years earlier, Soviet physicist Alla Massevitch publicly
thanked the United States for providing scientists around the world with a free scientific
instrument that could be used to study the effects of sunlight pressure of orbiting
objects—and at the end of the same remarks condemned West Ford.164 During the first
years of the Space Age, those artifacts that, like Sputnik’s rocket core, could be seen and
accessed around the world for multiple uses earned admiration, even from hostile
audiences, while invisible orbiting artifacts were not flexible enough to serve as global
boundary objects and thus earned fewer defenders. Visible artifacts like satelloons and
rocket cores could be interpreted as friendly and useful. Invisible artifacts could be
menacing matter out-of-place—in spite of the utility professed by their designers, objects
such as the West Ford dipoles could easily be interpreted as dangerous waste.
Conclusion
Whether space waste, satellite, political tool, scientific instrument, diplomatic olive
branch, test facility, or intelligence commodity, Sputnik’s rocket core played multiple
critical roles in the history of humankind’s first steps into outer space. When visible and
accessible to multiple communities, artifacts like 1957α1 and the Echo satelloons became
expansive boundary objects, bringing specialist and lay communities around the world
into contact across ideological, political, and geographic divides. West Ford’s largely
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invisible dipoles could not fulfill this mediating function. As a result, many communities
interpreted them as dangerous weapons or potentially disastrous waste, without
redemptive secondary uses. The strange mobility, remoteness, variable visibility, and
ephemerality of these flexibly defined objects undergird the elastic boundaries between
utility and waste, particularly in a technological system in which byproducts typically go
unnoticed by the majority of users. The divergent interpretations of these early space
artifacts suggests that on Earth and in space alike, one user’s tool is another user’s
garbage.
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CHAPTER 2
Under the Copper Curtain: Project West Ford and the Roots of Outer Space
Environmentalism, 1958-1964
Talking Over the Bomb
Thirteen minutes before midnight local time on July 31, 1958, an Army Redstone missile
carrying a nuclear device lifted off from Johnston Island in the South Pacific. Its intended
target was a patch of upper atmosphere 76.8 kilometers above and approximately 10
kilometers south of the launch site, but a programming error in the missile’s guidance
system led the missile straight up instead.165 Upon detonation three minutes after launch,
the weapon unleashed a 3.8 Megaton yield directly above the island and the roughly 175
souls that remained on site for the test. The resulting debris cloud rose one and a half
kilometers per second, spreading to a diameter of nearly 30 kilometers in three and a half
seconds. The night sky over Johnston Island turned bright as daylight for a few seconds,
and observers in Samoa reported spectacular aurora displays—a phenomenon rarely seen
in that region of the world.166
Sensors mounted on sounding rockets launched alongside the nuclear device
returned data that indicated the presence of a layer of fissile debris in the upper
atmosphere. This debris disrupted Earth’s ionosphere, the layer of the atmosphere used as
a reflector for long-distance middle and high frequency radio communications. For
several hours, radio operators could no longer use the ionosphere to transmit signals
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across the region below the blast zone. A blackout of trans-Pacific high-frequency
communications lasted for nine hours in Australia and two or more hours in Hawaii.167
Certain radio frequencies in Honolulu also went silent for several hours until the debris
dispersed and the ionosphere returned to its natural state. On Johnston Island itself,
communications systems shut down for the rest of the night. While civilian observers
1300 kilometers away in Honolulu remarked upon the stunning visual display as the
unannounced explosion turned the sky from black to yellow to orange to red, military
personnel on nearby ships desperately attempted to reach their colleagues at the test site.
The blast had so comprehensively disrupted Johnston Island’s communications systems
that outsiders worried the island itself had been obliterated. The first communication to
get through to island personnel in the morning hours following the event was a frantic
“Are you still there?”168
This nuclear test, codenamed Hardtack-Teak, was the second of three highaltitude blasts set off as part of the series of 35 nuclear demonstrations comprising
Operation Hardtack. Each detonation provided experimental data to test the hypothesis of
physicist Nicholas Constantine Christofilos that high-altitude electromagnetic pulses
(EMPs) might be used to black out communications and electronic systems over a large
area, a potentially valuable countermeasure against incoming missiles, enemy satellites,
or even hostile cosmonauts. A strategically placed nuclear detonation in the upper
atmosphere launched from the Indian Ocean might even cause Moscow to fall silent for a
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few hours without causing any material damage on the ground—an appealing tactical
advantage in the age of mutually assured destruction.169 Teak, and the subsequent
Operation Hardtack-Orange, clearly demonstrated the validity of Christofilos’s
hypothesis. A nuclear explosion in the upper atmosphere could critically disable local and
international communications over a particular geographical area. The tests not only
confirmed a potential weapon for the United States military, but also identified a possible
weakness in the American military communications infrastructure. What could be done if
the Soviet Union used this tactic against America in conjunction with cutting transatlantic
cable, destroying the president’s ability to maintain contact with forces and nuclear
arsenals deployed across the world should the Cold War turn hot?170 The demonstrated
vulnerability of the natural ionosphere motivated several branches of the United States
military to consider more robust alternatives to contemporary radio and cable
communications systems.
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Event Name

Location

Date

Altitude (km)

Yield

Hardtack-Yucca

Eniwetok

4/28/1958

26.2

Low

Hardtack-Teak

Johnston Island

8/1/1958

76.8

Megaton
range

HardtackOrange

Johnston Island

8/12/1958

43

Megaton
range

Argus I

South Atlantic

8/27/1958

200

1-2 kilotons

Argus II

South Atlantic

8/30/1958

240

1-2 kilotons

Argus III

South Atlantic

9/6/1958

540 ± 100

1-2 kilotons

Starfish Prime

Johnston Island

7/9/1962

400

1.4 Megatons

Checkmate

Johnston Island

10/20/1962

Tens

Low

Bluegill

Johnston Island

10/26/1962

Tens

Submegaton

Kingfish

Johnston Island

11/1/1962

Tens

Submegaton

Tightrope

Johnston Island

11/4/1962

Tens

Low

Table 2.1. American high-altitude nuclear tests, 1958-1962.171

Alongside the high-altitude nuclear tests conducted under Project Argus in 1958,
the spectacular Hardtack explosions incontrovertibly showed that the reach of the
American military and its weapons now extended to space—even as governments on
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either side of the Cold War debated how to define where space begins.172 Though cloaked
under a veil of scientific justification, these tests strained the definition of the
militarization of space that President Eisenhower condemned in speeches and national
security policy reports.173. However, these dramatic, catastrophic moments of martial
might did not inspire significant backlash among those who hoped to preserve near-Earth
space from human alteration. Rather, a seemingly benign attempt by the American
military to address this perceived weakness in communication infrastructure sparked the
first heated international discussions about what constituted environmentally dangerous
activity in outer space. Astronomers in particular spoke out about changes in the orbital
environment caused by military operations in space. Few responded during the first
volley of high altitude nuclear tests in 1958. Not until 1960, when the United States Air
Force announced the details of a space communications system that would come to be
known as Project West Ford, did astronomers on both sides of the Iron Curtain become
the first advocates for pollution control in orbit. Their response to Project West Ford
instigated a broad-reaching worldwide debate about what rules would ensure the safe,
long-term use of near-Earth space. This debate led to the codification of environmental
protection measures in incipient international space law. While Project West Ford and the
maelstrom of controversy that surrounded it have fallen out of popular memory, the
questions it inspired about how best to protect a strange, isolated, globally shared natural
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environment—and who should be the guardians of this environment—continue to inform
current policy discussions about orbital sustainability.
A Passive Solution: Project Needles, 1958-1960
On October 4, 1957, the Soviet Union launched the first artificial satellite, Sputnik, into
orbit around the planet, ushering in the cultural and aesthetic era known as the Space
Age, and the sociotechnical order more accurately called the Satellite Age.174 Space Age
visionaries predicted that once space became a place that humans could regularly reach,
albeit indirectly, satellites would become integral to societies on the ground as conveyers
of information. The idea of using high-orbiting satellites to enable nearly instantaneous
communications across the globe had been anticipated as early as 1945 by science fiction
author Arthur C. Clarke.175 Sputnik and America’s first satellite Explorer, however, were
not communications satellites. They contained radio transmitters that emitted signals, but
could not relay information sent from the ground to another point on the ground as
proposed by Clarke and other early satellite communications proponents.176 The iconic
beeping of Sputnik’s radio beacon could strike pride or terror into the hearts of
listeners—depending on their political affiliations—and anticipated the increasingly
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complex on-board electronics that became standard for satellites in the late twentieth
century. However, the design and function of communications satellites was anything but
predetermined. The first true communications satellite predated Sputnik, contained no
electronics, and had not even been fashioned by human hands. In 1946 the US Army
Signal Corps conducted the first radar astronomy experiment code named Project Diana,
during which they bounced radio signals off the Moon and set the stage for the so-called
“passive” artificial satellites that would follow in subsequent years.177 As the United
States and the Soviet Union launched greater numbers of satellites that incorporated new
technologies produced simultaneously by the electronics and synthetic materials
industries, satellite designers considered multiple potential forms that communications
spacecraft might take.178
By the summer of 1958, only six artificial satellites orbited the planet, and the
design of satellite technology remained subject to broad interpretive flexibility.179 The
vulnerability of ground-based communication systems revealed by the 1958 high-altitude
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weapons tests of Operation Hardtack led several branches of the U.S. military to push for
new, resilient ways to maintain open communication lines in case of nuclear war. Eight
months after the launch of Sputnik and two months after the first American high-altitude
nuclear test, the United States Army Signal Corps funded an MIT Lincoln Laboratory
summer study in Cape Cod. Participants in what came to be known as the Barnstable
Study considered how space technology could be used for military communications, and
discussed ways to make such critical remote infrastructure invulnerable to high-altitude
EMPs triggered by nuclear detonations—or at least to have an emergency system ready
to deploy in case of such an attack.180 They considered two main forms that a military
communications satellite might take, and debated the merits and disadvantages of each.181
The “active” satellite type incorporated electronics that could receive and store a signal
sent from the ground, then amplify that signal upon sending it to another point on the
ground. The “passive” satellite form—like its natural cousin the Moon—did not
incorporate onboard electronics. Instead, the body of the satellite itself served as a
resonant reflector for powerful signals tuned to the satellite’s shape and size.182
Two Barnstable study participants, Harold F. Meyer of the Ramo-Wooldridge
Corporation and Walter E. Morrow Jr. of the Lincoln Laboratory, devised a system based
on the latter, passive form of satellite. Morrow and Meyer’s design called for a simple but
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cost-effective method of radio communications that would reliably replicate the
properties of the natural ionosphere. Instead of a single, expensive active satellite with
EMP-vulnerable electronics on board, Morrow and Meyer’s model called for a ring of
simple copper dipole antennas, called “chaff” or “needles,” diffused into a an orbiting
ring. The dipoles would ideally be established in two belts—one polar, and one
equatorial—to ensure worldwide coverage. Such a system could be used to complete
multiple communications circuits from any point on the globe using no more than one
ground transfer point.183 The design specified that the dipoles should be cut into short,
thin, oblong threads tuned for use with a specific radio frequency, a technique rooted in
World War II radar countermeasures and tropospheric scatter telecommunications
already in use at remote military installations, including the United States Air Force’s
White Alice network within the DEW Line aircraft early warning system.184
After struggling to find financial support to build and test the Morrow and Meyer
model under the code name Project Needles, the Lincoln Laboratory found a funder in
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the U.S. Air Force.185 Under military sponsorship, MIT researchers revised the theoretical
plan presented at Barnstable and specified the material and spatial parameters of a test
system: a field of several hundred million dipoles orbiting in two diffuse rings at about
3600 kilometers above the Earth’s surface, positioned along polar and equatorial orbits.
Two large ground terminals—one in Camp Parks, California and one in Westford,
Massachusetts—would be constructed to send and receive signals using the belts. A
powerful microwave signal sent from one terminal would hit the charged dipoles and
scatter in multiple directions, enabling the receiver at the other terminal to intersect one
of the scattered signals. This mechanism mimicked the natural ionosphere that had
temporarily fallen prey to the first high-altitude nuclear tests, but with greater consistency
over longer distances. It also enabled the use of higher frequency transmissions than
could be reliably reflected by the natural ionosphere.186
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Figure 2.1: A diagram created by one of the original designers illustrates the simplicity
of the orbiting chaff model of microwave communications.187
By using dipole belts in space as an ionosphere-like scatter medium, Lincoln
Laboratory researchers envisioned an economical, durable communications system that
would span the globe. All complex, expensive technology would be constructed on the
ground, where repairs could be conducted—in stark contrast to the complex technology
of active satellites, which could not be retrieved and repaired once launched into orbit.
Space components would be made of simple industrial materials easily and cheaply
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installed as a secondary “piggyback” payload on a single Air Force rocket launch.188 A
1961 white paper on the model lauded its “singular nature of being the cheapest of all
communications satellite systems studied to date.”189 The redundancy of a field of tiny
reflectors made the system more resilient against direct or large-scale attack than active
satellites. At 3600 kilometers above the surface of the Earth, the belt would be situated
significantly higher than the highest recorded altitude of a nuclear explosion, protecting
the system from a known method of sabotage. Even if a high-altitude nuclear weapon
were to be detonated in the same orbit as the belt or belts, the remaining millions of
dipoles would coalesce and fill the gap in short order, rendering any communications
outages temporary.190 Such an open access system yielded additional promise in the form
of nearly unlimited circuits, a potentially valuable provision for military applications
around the planet.191 Although the dipoles would be placed in a relatively high orbit,
Irwin Shapiro of the Lincoln Laboratory calculated that sunlight pressure would bring
them down within a maximum period of five years. Shapiro emphasized that testing the
effect of sunlight pressure on low mass-to-area ratio objects—a primary purpose of
Project Needles in the minds of a few of those who designed the system—would yield
new, valuable information about the near-Earth space environment and the physical
forces at work between the Sun and the Earth.192 Researchers at the Lincoln Laboratory

188

Allen S. Richmond, "Orbital Scatter Communication", September 9, 1960, West Ford, NASA.
“Department of Defense White Paper on Project West Ford,” 5.
190
Ibid., 4.
191
R. Joyce Harman, “History of West Ford” (West Ford Project Office, MIT Lincoln
Laboratory, n.d.), MITLL.
192
I. I. Shapiro, “Last of the West Ford Dipoles,” Science, New Series, 154, no. 3755 (December
16, 1966): 1445–48.
189

86
believed that testing Project Needles in situ would contribute significantly to applied
physics, national security, and the American space industry. With the Air Force footing
the bill and providing passage to orbit, these contributions would come about in secret,
invisible to the majority of citizens on the planet below.
Sniffing Out a Watchdog: The Space Science Board and Risks to Astronomy
In September 1959, as plans for a test launch proceeded apace, Lincoln Laboratory
administrators determined that the project would benefit from external consultation on
the possible impact of the proposed project on space research. Given its classified status,
the Lincoln Laboratory requested assistance from the Space Science Board (SSB) of the
National Academy of Sciences in vetting the safety of the system, particularly to radio
astronomy, optical astronomy, and current and future orbiting spacecraft.193 In January
1960 the SSB convened a small group of astronomers and engineers from its ranks to
form an ad hoc committee that would weigh the potential outcomes and risks of the
proposed test belts.
The SSB charged the committee, chaired by radio engineer O. G. “Mike” Villard,
with the task of evaluating how Project Needles might alter and be altered by the outer
space environment at the proposed altitude, and to assess any danger of the proposed
experimental dipole belts to scientific research. The committee also planned to gauge
how information about the project as designed would be received by scientists and the
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public at home and abroad.194 In his initial invitation to a group of ten astronomers that he
hoped would join the committee, Villard enthused about the project that they would
shortly gather to evaluate, stating: "I am sure the view is shared by many that Project
"Needles" represents one of the most important developments in the communications
field which has come to hand in recent years." He closed with a promise that participation
on the committee would yield “an interesting and rewarding experience.”195
On April 14, 1960, after several months of collaboration, the SSB ad hoc
committee on Project Needles met with representatives of the Lincoln Laboratory and
liaisons from the National Science Foundation (NSF), the Advanced Research Projects
Agency (ARPA), and NASA. The following day, the SSB committee issued a
confidential report to the general board. In this report, committee members stated that
they were “deeply disturbed by the project…because of what appears to be a serious
threat to radio astronomy observations in the short-wave end of the radio spectrum.”196
While the committee predicted that the test system as proposed should not adversely
affect optical or radio astronomy in the long run, they anticipated that the success of a
prototype would likely spur the United States and the Soviet Union to each establish its
194
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own fully functional, denser, longer-lived set of dipole belts, thus crowding Earth orbit
with reflective material.197 Should other nations follow suit in the future, the night sky
could soon be replete with shimmery obstructions and errant radio signals, with dire,
inescapable consequences for practitioners of radio and optical astronomy.
The committee predicted widespread negative reaction to the proposed project
among scientists from around the world, particularly if it continued to be conducted under
a veil of secrecy. They recommended that the Air Force publicize some details of the
classified test through a series of articles published in an open academic journal and by
actively soliciting feedback from the international astronomy community. Most
importantly, they stressed that the Lincoln Laboratory must ensure that all dipoles would
safely reenter the atmosphere within two years so as to limit the duration of any
unforeseen negative effects to observational astronomy that might arise from their
presence in orbit.198 The committee also suggested that certain material details of the
project should be communicated to the general public through international news media
so as to ward off negative publicity. They contemplated possible reactions by everyday
American citizens, including protests that the dipoles would cause climate changes,
collide with spacecraft, or rain down on the heads of unsuspecting victims. While
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acknowledging that falling copper space needles posed no real threat to individuals on the
ground, the committee accounted for the possibility that some citizens might harbor fears
of personal injury or property damage and blame the Air Force for unintentionally
bombarding its own soil.199 Although several space artifacts had fallen back to Earth by
the time of this report, none had been recovered as would happen with some regularity in
subsequent years. The SSB committee’s prediction of fallout from falling space junk
shows that even before the first highly publicized reentries of the long 1970s, fear about
falling space junk among specialist and lay communities alike originated at a much
earlier, much quieter moment.200
The committee ended its report on an optimistic note. Although worried that the
project might be seen as a unilateral military invasion of the new global resource of nearEarth space, committee members suggested that such a blow might be tempered by
emphasizing the system’s universal accessibility to scientists, governments, and the lay
public. Scientists of any nationality could conceivably use the dipole belts, suggesting
possible international relations benefits. Beyond its use as a military system, Project
Needles might even yield public relations benefits as a tool for civilian space science
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research.201 However, these suggestions did not negate the report’s overall
recommendation that the Air Force put an end to Project Needles. The risks to optical and
radio astronomy appeared too grave to outweigh the military need and minimal secondary
benefits.
After the completion and initial general board review of this report, committee
astronomers including Fred Whipple of the Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory
demanded further analysis of the possible physical and material outcomes of the test
project. Whipple had missed the April 14 meeting, and wrote urgently to Leo Goldberg, a
prominent optical astronomer and chair of the SSB Committee on Astronomy, to inform
him of Whipple’s misunderstanding of the planned altitude for the dipoles—rather than
being satisfied that the dipoles would come down within the predicted two years, he now
expected them to stay up forever, diffused into a cloud that would in time cover the
whole sky.202 Over the following weeks, members of the committee prepared studies of
expected interactions between Needles components and the near-Earth space
environment, and how the physical properties of orbital space itself might affect the
structural integrity and longevity of the dipoles, individually and in aggregate.
Less than two months after the committee issued its first, explicitly negative set of
recommendations regarding Project Needles, a second version of the report dated June 6,
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1960 opened with a stark reversal. The introduction lauded the test project as an “exciting
and interesting…opportunity for doing important basic research in several scientific
fields.” The general recommendations of the previous report were preserved, including a
call for radio frequency allocation for astronomy, declassification and publication of
project details, and reassurances that an operational set of dipole belts would not be
launched. However, the change in overarching sentiment about Project Needles in the
report’s introduction from deeply wary to enthusiastic dramatically altered the overall
thrust of the committee’s recommendations from discouragement to outright support.203
Among members of the small committee, opinions on Project Needles ranged
from ambivalence to outright dissent, a reality unchanged, if not worsened, in the
intervening weeks between reports. The abrupt change of official position—from deep
opposition to support—for the Needles project as a whole did not accurately reflect the
convictions of the board membership in full. It did, however, comply with SSB Chairman
Lloyd V. Berkner’s belief that SSB astronomers ought to work with Lincoln Laboratory
to adjust the project so that it would not harm astronomy, rather than working against the
Lincoln Laboratory (and its powerful military funders) in an attempt to cancel the project
outright. Berkner, himself an ionospheric researcher, argued that taking a collegial
position would “go much farther in safeguarding the unquestionable rights of
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astronomers204.” Berkner brought several decades of experience in building relationships
between the United States military and the nation’s scientists to bear in adopting a newly
conciliatory approach.205 Berkner understood that the U. S. military would likely launch
the experiment regardless of scientific dissent, given its potential importance to national
security. Indeed, the Air Force had already set a date for a Needles launch in December
of that year. The second ad hoc committee report reflects Berkner’s strategy of
cooperation and critical support to ensure that astronomers would maintain some level of
control over the parameters of the project.
Adhering to the strategy meant expressing general support of Needles overall,
alongside more detailed analyses of potential dangers that the experiment might pose and
how best to avoid them. In addition to the newly added optimistic window dressings, the
June report differs from the April report in the inclusion of overviews of the committee
members’ studies of how the Needles belt might affect different areas of scientific
research, as well as how the dipole package would impact, and be impacted by, the
physical and material environment of Earth and near-Earth space.206 A brief study of how
Project Needles might affect radio astronomy merited a separate appendix, and included
projections of how the dipoles might be detected by radio sensors of different sizes and
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sensitivity; these calculations were completed by John W. Findlay of the National Radio
Astronomy Observatory (NRAO), who would remain an active participant in
international discussions of the project in the years to come. The committee predicted that
radar research would likely not be impacted by Needles, and the dipole belt’s effects on
optical observations would likely be variable—optical astronomers’ exposure times
might be limited by an increase in background illumination caused by the belts, but
auroral and air glow researchers could find the belt an interesting tool for studying
atmospheric phenomena. Mercury spacecraft would not be threatened by the
experimental belt, as the dipoles were expected to orbit at a much higher altitude than the
first astronauts’ spacecraft; however, the NASA researcher who contributed the
spacecraft collision analysis warned that future space stations and other high-flying
spacecraft could be threatened by speedily orbiting dipoles should Needles remain aloft
for a longer period than predicted. The committee’s analysis of the effects of the space
environment on the dipoles themselves was sunnier: The report suggests that meteorites
and micrometeorites would likely have negligible effects on the orientation of the
needles, as would corpuscular radiation, sputtering, and Van Allen radiation. Solar
radiation pressure, however, would likely reduce the perigee, or minimum altitude, of the
dipoles’ orbit by 1000 kilometers per year, resulting in a 1.5 year orbital lifetime, a
prediction that satisfied the committee’s demand that the belt come down within two
years.207
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The committee also evaluated the inverse of this environmental impact—noting
not only the ways that the space environment might affect the dipoles but anticipating the
ways in which Project Needles might alter Earth’s atmosphere and the near-Earth space
environment. This attention to how human actions could transform space represented an
early, novel shift in thinking about outer space: an explicit discussion of how
technologies change the space environment. The committee predicted that the effects of
decreased insolation—the obscuring of solar energy—would be insignificant because the
belt would only occupy a sliver of space covering a tiny fraction of Earth’s total area.
Ionization of the needles upon reentry would also likely have little to no effect upon the
total composition of the atmosphere: The 70 to 75 pounds of dipoles that would fall back
to Earth over the course of weeks or years paled in comparison to the 10,000 tons of
micrometeorites that reenter each day at far greater velocity. In a subsection titled
“contamination,” a group of four committee members suggested that the dipoles should
not make any significant changes to the chemical composition of the nearest regions of
space, given that the copper fibers would be essentially analogous to micrometeorite
material. They warned that the naphthalene binder material used to package and dispense
the dipoles would likely increase the amount of particulate matter at that altitude by
“many orders of magnitude” with possible photochemical results visible to those with
specialized equipment. However, they agreed that this effect would likely be short-lived,
and negligible against a background of heavy emissions produced by as-yet hypothetical
deep-space rockets or the thrusters of space probes.208
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In a landmark statement in the conceptualization of near-Earth space as a
vulnerable environment, the committee included a pointed statement about the likelihood
of “future contamination of space” in the June 1960 report. In spite of the overarching
recommendation that the project “should be done” as “a useful scientific experiment” that
would not in and of itself obstruct research or destroy the physical and chemical
environment in orbit, the committee issued a caveat. The committee evaluated the test
system as presented by the Lincoln Laboratory. However, the ever-present specter of an
operational system—denser, with a longer orbital lifetime, and possibly consisting of
multiple belts— prevented committee members from issuing what might otherwise have
been a net positive recommendation in favor of carrying out the test. This motivated the
committee to issue a pointed statement about the likelihood of “future contamination of
space” in the June 1960 revised report. Considering the possibility that, should Project
Needles prove successful, dipole belts might become the wave of the future, the
committee recommended that “the Board…consider whether it is desirable at this time to
urge the formation, at the international level, of what might be termed a ‘Space Pollution
Control Agency.’”209 Although such a formal group did not imminently form following
the publication of this report, this suggestion not only constituted one of the earliest
arguments for orbital preservation against pollutants. It also foreshadowed imminent
attempts by astronomers in America and Europe to appoint themselves as international
environmental watchdogs for outer space.
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Not all astronomers on the ad hoc committee were in favor—or even aware of—
the change from condemnation to support in the June 6, 1960 revised report. Some
appeared to be taken by surprise by the update. Fred Haddock, a radio astronomer serving
on the ad hoc committee, sent an urgent Telex to chairman Villard claiming that he and
the majority of other members of the committee strongly disagreed with the updated
position and asking that the top-level recommendations revert back to the April 15
version in which the committee refused to endorse Project Needles.210 Later that month
the committee drafted a third revised report for distribution to the SSB membership. Its
modified four-point position on Project Needles drew from both reports, and the overall
conclusion on the advisability of the experiment split the difference between the outright
condemnation of the April 15 version and the enthusiasm of the June 6 version. The first
point concluded that the initial Needles experiment should not adversely affect any
branch of science, followed by the caveat that any plans for an operational belt must
protect the interests of astronomical research and “science in general.” The remaining
points called for declassification and release of information through international
channels, the establishment of globally protected frequency bands for radio astronomy,
and the creation of a committee of radio astronomers who would serve as advisors to the
Lincoln Laboratory to prevent interference to radio astronomy.211
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A larger wave of dissent followed the delivery of this final version of the report to
SSB Chair Berkner and its distribution to the general board. Optical astronomers in
particular felt that their interests were inappropriately subsumed under the priorities of
radio astronomers. Leo Goldberg voiced some of most strident disapproval within the
SSB. While Goldberg did not serve on the ad hoc Needles committee, he conducted his
own independent calculations predicting the nature and lifetime of the belt and went
directly to Berkner to lodge his complaints. Goldberg argued that the committee’s report
had underestimated the myriad possible damages that the belt could inflict on optical
astronomy. He emphasized that the June 6 report that undergirded the final, cautiously
positive SSB position on Needles relied on the calculations and opinions of two
astronomers whose overall positive conclusions about the potential benefits of the dipole
belt only served a small subset of optical researchers. Goldberg complained that the
conclusions of two minority voices constituted “sheer nonsense as far as astronomers are
concerned” and did not faithfully represent the position of the entire SSB.212
Attempting to allay Goldberg’s concerns, Berkner reiterated his belief that a
positive approach would yield the best results for astronomers as a larger group,
supporting the conclusions and suggestions provided by the ad hoc committee and
arguing that most dissent by general SSB membership stemmed from “unsubstantiated
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fears of damage.”213 Since the participants in the ad hoc committee had carefully
determined the first experiment to be unobtrusive to astronomy, Berkner argued that the
burden of proof now shifted to those who disagreed with their collective conclusions. He
suggested that, as part of his preferred positive approach, apprehensive astronomers in
Goldberg’s camp should instead view Project Needles as a carefully controlled
experiment that could enable the United States to test and define the safe limits of such a
system and set international protocol to police those limits—before some other,
unscrupulous country tried it first. Berkner called for an end to what he considered to be
nothing more than bewildering “grumbling” by Needles dissenters, but hedged in his
commitment to the final committee report by suggesting to Goldberg that the opposition
engage in a “true scientific study”—whether or not said study would comply with the ad
hoc committee’s positive recommendation or result in the cancellation of the project.
Regardless of outcome such an endeavor, Berkner believed, would “go much farther in
safeguarding the unquestionable rights of astronomers.”214
While clearly irked by the accusation of baseless complaining, Goldberg agreed
that a broader study ought to be arranged—though this would require declassifying
sensitive information on Project Needles. Stating his doubt “that any single committee is
capable of supplying all of the answers to a problem that has so many unknowns,”
Goldberg called on the entire population of American astronomers to serve as watchdogs.
213

L. V. Berkner to Leo Goldberg, January 1, 1961, 1, NRAO - Director’s Office - Professional
Organizations/Committees - SSB West Ford, Box 1, NAS-SSB - Project West Ford - File 1,
NRAO.
214
L. V. Berkner to Leo Goldberg, January 1, 1961, 3, NRAO - Director’s Office - Professional
Organizations/Committees - SSB West Ford, Box 1, NAS-SSB - Project West Ford - File 1,
NRAO.

99
If Berkner wished the burden of proof to be placed on their shoulders, all relevant
Needles data must be widely published in the open scientific literature and astronomers
given enough time to evaluate every detail before a decision could be made on whether or
not the Air Force should be allowed to launch the project. Otherwise, Goldberg argued,
“astronomers have a right to grumble.”215 Berkner and Goldberg agreed that the time had
come to publish the ad hoc committee’s studies and information on Needles in the open
literature, in a journal that would be widely read by astronomers at home and abroad.216
In the meantime, the Secretary of the SSB met with several Lincoln Laboratory
officials—including Needles designer Morrow—to discuss the SSB’s position. They
eventually agreed that a more established SSB Needles committee could be useful “not
only in safeguarding the Needles experiment from unjustified criticism but also in
keeping the Board informed of significant aspects which may affect areas of basic
research as the Needles project develops.”217 The SSB disbanded the ad hoc Needles
committee and organized a formal “watchdog” committee composed of three radio
astronomers and one optical astronomer that would stand for the duration of the
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project.218 This committee would serve as a liaison between the SSB general board and
the Lincoln Laboratory, as well as an information conduit for members of the
international radio and optical astronomy communities once the journal articles detailing
Project Needles were published.219 The four astronomers came together in their new roles
for the first time in August 1960. In preparation to present the project publicly to
potentially hostile audiences, the Lincoln Laboratory changed the experiment’s name
from Project Needles to the less-provocative “Project West Ford,” after the town in which
the Lincoln Laboratory built one of the ground terminals to be used to communicate
using the dipole belt.220
Lincoln Laboratory staff and members of the SSB committee moved forward with
a program of public information about the upcoming experiment. In September 1960,
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Walter Morrow presented his brainchild to the general assembly of the International
Union of Radio Science.221 Subsequently, researchers from the Lincoln Laboratory and
the SSB published a series of papers in the April 1961 issue of the Astronomical Journal
describing the projected properties of West Ford, though some details, such as the launch
date and design of the dispenser mechanism, remained classified.222 The Astronomical
Journal articles predicted dipole lifetimes of one to two years before reentry. Although
they would be placed in a relatively high orbit, the low mass-to-area ratio of the dipoles
meant that sunlight pressure would in theory bring them all down within five years at
maximum. In his article, Morrow insisted that the ethereal dipoles—less than an inch
long and thinner than a human hair—would cause only minor surface scratches in the
highly unlikely event that any of them should collide with other objects in space.223
Hoping that this unusually high level of transparency for a military project would
foster good will, West Ford’s managers and the SSB West Ford Committee awaited
response from the broader scientific community.
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Figure 2.2: Several West Ford dipoles displayed against an unidentified finger for
scale.224
Expanding the Industrial Exosphere: West Ford and the Astronomers, 1961
On October 22, 1961, a New York Times article conveyed a dire prediction by Dr. Harold
Weaver, founder and director of the Radio Astronomy Laboratory at the University of
California, Berkeley. Weaver did not mince words in criticizing Project West Ford. “This
is a very bad omen for the future of astronomical research,” he prophesied. “It could
mean the start of the demise of one branch of knowledge—astronomy.” Dr. Weaver’s
opinion echoed that of a large number of optical and radio astronomers the world over
who concurred with what they saw as, in Weaver’s play on Cold War political imagery,
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the act of “drawing a copper curtain over the Earth.”225 The day before, the Air Force had
made its first attempt to deploy Project West Ford.
In the months between the publication of the special issue of the Astronomical
Journal in April and the West Ford launch in October, similarly apocalyptic visions of
the end of an ancient discipline reverberated in local and international presses, in
epistolary exchanges between individual astronomers, and among memberships of
national and international scientific organizations determined to put a stop to the Air
Force’s space needles project—or at least delay it until they were satisfied that the project
would be safe for astronomy in the present and into what many astronomers predicted
would be an imminent revolutionary future.
As one of the most prominent dissenters within the SSB, Leo Goldberg welcomed
critique from a broadening scope of specialists from different astronomical disciplines,
anticipating that the distribution of the heavy burden of proof assigned to him by Berkner
across thousands of shoulders like Weaver’s would reinforce his position that West Ford
should be prohibited. He bristled at the thought that the SSB had adorned West Ford with
“a cloak of scientific respectability” in spite of the beliefs held by Goldberg and his
optical astronomer associates that dipole belts would be “a menace to science.” In the
interim between the final SSB report and the publication of the April 1961 Astronomical
Journal, Goldberg issued a grave warning to Berkner on the likely outcome of the search
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for proof outside the ranks of the SSB, noting: “The reaction from the scientific
community we represent is sure to be adverse and angry.”226
This prediction proved prescient. Almost immediately following the publication
of the special issue of The Astronomical Journal, irate responses from astronomers began
to roll in, both to the SSB and to the Lincoln Laboratory. The SSB general board’s
imperative to publish details in a scientific journal yielded two concrete outcomes:
Astronomers from around the world were indeed not adequately convinced that West
Ford would not adversely affect their research; and the SSB ad hoc committee’s
suggestion that transparency could yield international relations benefits proved almost
comically over-optimistic. In the following months, individual astronomers and
memberships of American and international scientific organizations united behind the
collective opinion that the Air Force’s space needles project must be stopped, or at least
delayed until those most likely to be impacted by the dipole belts were satisfied that the
project would be entirely safe for current and future astronomical practices.227
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In the second half of 1961, a flood of resolutions against the project issued forth
from scientific organizations around the world. The International Union of Radio
Science, the French and Belgian National Academies of Science, the Royal Astronomical
Society, the American Astronomical Society, the Committee on Space Research of the
International Council of Scientific Unions, and the International Astronomical Union
(IAU) adopted resolutions against what the IAU unequivocally called the “contamination
of space.” The IAU resolution framed orbital space as part of “Earth’s environment,”
charging that no individual group or entity had the right to alter the conditions of what
amounted to an international common pool resource without multilateral scientific
consultation.228 The same organization would reiterate its resolution a year later,
employing similar rhetoric, following the resumption of high-altitude nuclear tests on
both sides of the Iron Curtain. Renowned American and European astronomers such as
Fred Whipple, Jan Oort, Lyman Spitzer, and Bernard Lovell registered their concern
about West Ford through correspondence with the Kennedy Administration, the SSB, and
the popular presses of their respective countries.229 Many requested delays to the project
so that apprehensive astronomers might better predict negative effects of the project and
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suggest changes.230 The volume and intensity of these reactions prompted the Presidential
Science Advisory Committee and the State Department to enter the fray in order to
mediate the dispute, with one State Department official observing in private
bewilderment: “Astronomers seem to be a remarkably noisy and parochial group!”231
Astronomers had several reasons for raising their voices against West Ford in
1961. One reason concerned the possibility that new types and quantities of industrial
products and byproducts would further overtake and obscure the night sky, to an even
greater extent than had already occurred over decades of burgeoning industrialization.
Optical astronomers as a group were historically no strangers to environmental conflict,
engaged as they were in what historian David Aubin has characterized as a century-long
effort to preserve the skyward gaze in the face of instrument-disrupting vibrations and
what we now call light pollution resulting from urbanization and industrialization.232
Optical astronomers feared that the reflective dipoles could raise the brightness of the sky
in a “Milky Way effect,” impeding their ability to obtain images of celestial objects even
on the clearest nights.233 Radio astronomers, practitioners of a relatively new discipline
operating at a wavelength unencumbered by the natural and artificial obscuring properties
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of the atmosphere, struggled with a different kind of pollution—that of the radio
spectrum. Radio astronomers had already begun to agitate for legal allocation of specific
frequencies for observation—a proposed panacea that came up in many of the anti-West
Ford resolutions.234 For radio astronomers, the dipoles could raise the background noise
of the night sky, making it difficult to differentiate their objects of study from an excess
of surrounding information. Worse yet, radio astronomers anticipated that a high volume
of reflective copper could yield a spectacular rise in false signals, which might indicate
the existence of a distant celestial object when in reality the signal came from a
proximate anthropogenic object. A permanent, dense set of belts—ostensibly the end
game of a successful Project West Ford in astronomers’ understanding—would
drastically compound the concealing qualities of the industrial atmosphere with dire
consequences for both extant forms of observational astronomy.
Plans for new observational tools and practices that promised to revolutionize the
discipline of astronomy as a whole were also at stake. At roughly the same time that the
West Ford controversy raged, the initiative led by prominent American astrophysicist
Lyman Spitzer to develop the first generation of Orbiting Astronomical Observatories to
observe the cosmos in ultraviolet wavelengths began to gain favor within the ranks of the
National Academy of Sciences.235 Spitzer led the American Astronomical Society in its
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anti-West Ford resolution, which specifically condemned the project as a threat to
orbiting space observatories scheduled to be operational within two to three years.236 The
IAU resolution similarly emphasized the risk to future astronomical practices both
anticipated and as yet undetermined, indicating an international expectation that
collecting astronomical data from outer space would become an indispensible practice in
the coming decades.237
Aspiring space astronomers anticipated that space telescopes would open entire
unseen parts of the electromagnetic spectrum that could not be observed from the ground,
including light in gamma ray, X-ray, and ultraviolet wavelengths. At such an early stage
of planning, advocates of space astronomy were unsure which orbital altitudes or
inclinations different types of space observatories might occupy. Should the West Ford
belt (or future West Ford-type belts) inhabit the same environs as a space telescope, the
dipoles might collide with and damage the spacecraft. More importantly, some
astronomers expressed concern about the high altitude of the proposed West Ford belt. At
3600 kilometers above the ground, a cloud of dipoles would be above the supposed
altitude limit for exoatmospheric nuclear weapons; but it could also effectively extend the
obstructive effects of the atmosphere so high as to force future orbiting observatories to
be launched to even higher—and thus more expensive and riskier—altitudes. Optical
astronomer William Liller of the SSB West Ford committee, one of a small number of
West Ford moderates in 1961, noted these concerns as his ultimate apprehension about
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the project, warning that the opportunity to observe extremely faint objects from the
unparalleled darkness above the atmosphere might be permanently destroyed by a fully
functional dipole system.238 Astronomers opposed to West Ford anticipated the latest
environmental threat to their practices in a new form of pollution made of a common
industrial material, redolent of the changes that had plagued previous generations of their
profession. However, unlike the Industrial Age atmosphere, the Space Age atmosphere
could not be escaped by observing from an isolated, high-elevation location. Space Age
industry would be truly global, and therefore unavoidable. These formal resolutions
highlighted the possibility that the foreseen revolution in astronomy would die before it
could take off. Given the highly charged anxiety about threats to both ground-based and
space-based astronomy evidenced in these official collective pronouncements, it is
perhaps no wonder that some astronomers believed West Ford to be, in the words of
British astronomer Fred Hoyle, an “intellectual crime” committed by the United States
government against science as a whole.239
However, not all American astronomers were united in favor of space telescopes.
In the midst of the post-war surge in federal funding for scientific research, a longstanding rivalry between astronomers living in the American West and those living on the
Eastern seaboard sparked anew. Many on the West Coast argued that federal funds
allocated to a space telescope could be better spent building more telescopes in regions of
the American west that had the high, dry conditions necessary for optical and radio
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observation—known as “good seeing.” No big telescopes had been built on the east coast
for decades, and some astronomers on the West coast claimed that the embrace of federal
funding and plans for a space telescope among East coast astronomers was part of a plan
to wrest power and capital from western research institutions, many of which continued
to receive private funding. In 1963 Allan Sandage of the Palomar Observatory
vehemently rejected calls by his East Coast colleagues for an orbiting observatory,
calling support for such a project “space propaganda.”240
However, even Sandage united with his east coast rivals and space telescope
advocates in condemning West Ford. Irwin Shapiro, one of West Ford’s chief designers
at the Lincoln Laboratory, recalls receiving a phone call from Sandage during which he
argued that the artificial ionosphere was a conspiracy by East Coast astronomers to put
West Coast astronomers—and their mountaintop observatories—out of business. Should
the West Ford needles block the view from the ground, federally funded space telescopes
would be the only legitimate sensors available to astronomers, and leadership in
American astronomy would shift back east to space telescope control rooms in
Washington. According to Sandage, his colleagues on the East Coast could even be
conspiring with the Lincoln Laboratory to force this power shift, their protests a
deliberate, Janus-faced act to obscure their true support for West Ford.241 In this mindset,
a cloud of copper fibers in orbit would serve an insidious political purpose beyond those
stated by the American military, promoting a shift in the power hierarchy of American
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astronomy. Whether for or against space telescopes, many American astronomers
expected West Ford to change their professional lives for the worse.
Western astronomers who opposed West Ford in its design phases expressed their
dissent as self-defense against a looming disciplinary crisis over which they appeared to
have little authority or sway. Unsurprisingly, the reaction of Soviet scientists revealed
similar resistance. Academician Mstislav Keldysh, president of the Soviet Academy of
Sciences, wrote a letter to the president of the American National Academy of Sciences
that took the language of space contamination perpetuated in other anti-West Ford
pronouncements a step further, admonishing what he called a precedent that could lead to
“serious pollution of space near the Earth.”242 These rhetorical characterizations of outer
space as an environment at risk in late 1961 mirror the language of the lab—“pollution”
and “contamination” reflect multiple, context-bound connotations. However, the choice
of these words in particular would later serve a different purpose in the hands of the
mainstream press in America and overseas under a different cultural context. For the time
being, most popular newspapers across the world that picked up the story in 1961 focused
on astronomers’ disciplinary complaints, the growing number of American government
and diplomatic mediators brought into the fray, and the inflammatory response of Soviet
presses to what they characterized as unacceptable military activity in orbit. For the time
being, the potential destruction of a site of real or imagined scientific practice represented
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a compelling enough story to transmit to lay audiences in media markets from Brussels to
Bombay.
Days in advance of the classified launch date, John Findlay of the SSB West Ford
committee visited Europe in an attempt to gauge the general feelings about the project
among astronomers across the Atlantic. After discussing the expected properties of the
belt and its estimated lifetime, Findlay reported back to the SSB that the majority of
British astronomers that he met were in agreement that the impact of the project as
proposed on radio and optical astronomy would be negligible. He noted that the biggest
concern among astronomers continued to be a long orbital lifetime for the dipoles and
future dense belts. Findlay concluded that the best solution to allay these concerns would
be to conduct the experiment and solicit in situ test feedback from the larger international
scientific community.243
The Air Force moved ahead with the launch on the strength of Findlay’s
recommendation and the advice of the Presidential Science Advisory Committee’s panel
on Project West Ford.244 A West Ford package launched on October 21, 1961,
piggybacked atop an Atlas-Agena expendable rocket alongside a classified military
reconnaissance satellite.245 However, the dispenser mechanism failed to operate as
designed, emitting clumps of dipoles in nonfunctional clusters. The SSB distributed data
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on the failure of the project, and the expected orbital properties of the dipole clumps,
although neither the Lincoln Laboratory nor outside astronomers could establish visual or
radio contact with the deployed objects.246
West Ford appeared to be only temporarily grounded by this setback. The Air
Force immediately began working on a new dispenser that would not only disperse the
dipoles as directed, but would incorporate concerned astronomers’ requests that the
mechanism be activated manually by a signal from the ground rather than deploy
automatically. With these modifications, the dipoles would only dispense if the package
reached a “resonant” orbit—one that ensured that solar pressure would force the dipoles
to reenter the atmosphere after a short orbital lifetime.247 To all outward appearances, the
Air Force and Lincoln Laboratory had catered to astronomers’ demands, altering the
West Ford mission accordingly in the lead up to a second launch attempt.
However, a new wave of controversy would surround West Ford before and after
this second launch. A pronounced shift in worldwide popular media coverage of the
second West Ford attempt took radio and optical astronomers’ 1961 resolutions and
refashioned their invocations of celestial contamination in proto-environmentalist terms.
By referring to the dipoles as invisible waste, these journalists rendered the threat
identified by astronomers recognizable to a broad lay audience increasingly aware of, and
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concerned about, local terrestrial pollution. The “space pollution” feared by some
astronomers in 1961 represented a new kind of hidden environmental hazard imposed by
the United States government, military, and industry upon a nonconsenting society. In
newspapers and radio programs, dipoles fit neatly alongside chemical pesticides and
nuclear fallout into an increasingly publicly maligned category of invisible dangers to life
and property. Rather than an esoteric threat to astronomers’ present and future practices,
the real threat of West Ford transformed in the hands of mainstream journalists and
newspapers editors into a global environmental crisis with moral ramifications for all
humankind.
Litterbugging Space: West Ford and Emerging Environmentalism, 1963
Both the United States and the Soviet Union resumed conducting atmospheric nuclear
tests after a brief moratorium collapsed in 1961. The 1962 American exoatmospheric
nuclear test codenamed Starfish Prime exploded at an altitude of 400 kilometers, well
beyond the 100-kilometer high Karman line widely, if unofficially, considered to be the
boundary between the terrestrial atmosphere and outer space. Not only did Starfish Prime
disable radio and television systems 700 miles away in Hawaii; it also damaged or
permanently disabled eight of the twenty-four active communications satellites in orbit at
the time of detonation. The groundbreaking, iconic telecommunications satellite Telstar
eventually went silent due to the Starfish Prime blast. The grave results of this test meant
that the conditions that initially suggested using a field of passive reflectors for a nuclearproof military communications backup in 1962 had become even more serious, and
justified the need for a second West Ford test.
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The Air Force moved forward with plans for a second launch in late 1962. As
urged by the SSB committee, details of changes to the experiment were released to
astronomers, largely through the SSB committee and major scientific unions. By this
time, many individual astronomers who had once protested the project as dangerous and
shortsighted had tempered their tone. In early May of 1962, the IAU committee on West
Ford overwhelmingly voted to stand down. After further study of the first test launch, and
continuing research on the effects of reflective satellites on astronomical research,
members of the committee were satisfied that the test project itself would not pose an
immediate threat to optical or radio astronomy. They were also encouraged by ongoing
communication from the Air Force and the Presidential Science Advisory Committee
about changes to the payload that would safeguard against a long orbital lifetime for the
dipoles, such as the inclusion of a device that would only deploy the dispenser upon a
signal from the ground, thus assuring that the dipoles would not dispense unless they had
reached the correct orbit from which they would decay on the proposed 2-year schedule.
The IAU as a group elected to adopt a wait-and-see approach to West Ford and agreed to
conduct tests on the belt should the second launch attempt succeed, and committed to
sharing collected data with the Lincoln Laboratory and the SSB after the dipoles
deployed.248
However, some individual astronomers, particularly in the United Kingdom,
remained vocal in their opposition. British radio astronomers, who saw themselves as
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leaders in their nascent field, were notably vociferous.249 A few short months after
publishing multiple journal articles criticizing Soviet and American high-altitude nuclear
tests, the newly knighted radio astronomer Bernard Lovell once again loudly voiced
opposition to what he saw as the “unforgiveable contamination of space.”250 When asked
about his opinion towards West Ford in the intervening time between the 1961 failed
launch and the anticipated second attempt, Lovell stated: “My attitude to this experiment
has not changed one scrap. I deplore it.”251 He interpreted the test as a unilateral incursion
into space by the United States military without adequate consultation with the
international astronomical community—an opinion shared by Lovell’s British comrades
in radio astronomy but not the majority of astronomers represented by the IAU who had
reacted favorably to the information shared by the SSB before and after the first launch.
Lovell and his allies dominated press coverage of the second West Ford launch attempt.
While the 1961 launch had spurred a flurry of press critical of the project’s potential
impact on astronomy research—an issue of romantic if not urgent interest to
nonspecialists—the imminent second launch transformed in the hands of a vocal minority
of astronomers and mainstream journalists into much larger problems of appropriate
consultation, consent, and contamination of a delicate natural environment.
The minority opinion that the Air Force had insufficiently solicited astronomers’
advice about space pollution resonated with an international mainstream population
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increasingly aware of invisible contamination of ecosystems and bodies. The “almost
invisible” needles that had caused such uproar among scientists in the preceding years
corresponded with growing cultural anxiety about unseen pollutants following the
publication of Rachel Carson’s bestselling book Silent Spring during the 1962 leadup to
the planned second launch.252 Popular outrage over nuclear fallout increased in the United
States and abroad as atmospheric nuclear tests resumed following the end of a short
moratorium. 1962 saw the highest number of nuclear weapons tests in history, including
several record-breaking high altitude and exoatmospheric tests that damaged active
satellites and generated new global fallout patterns.253 With the increasing regularity of
nuclear detonations and evidence of radiation sickness in those proximate to weapons
tests, anxiety over nuclear fallout—a largely invisible, insidious bodily threat—had
already worked its way into American popular consciousness and culture. Themes of
bodily contamination from an unseen source, imposed upon millions of people who had
not sanctioned or consented to its use, showed up in a wide array of popular media from
movies to novels.254
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In Silent Spring, Rachel Carson used nuclear fallout as a clarifying metaphor to
reify the invisible threat of chemical pesticides to a general readership.255 As this
groundbreaking book rose to cultural currency, fallout and pesticides together came to
serve as a convenient referent for any unseen military or industrial threat—space
experiments included. Political cartoons satirically featuring umbrellas as protection
against nuclear fallout and copper space needles alike suggest continuity between popular
responses to the atmospheric nuclear tests of the late 1950s and early 1960s and the
specter of mismanagement of near-Earth space. Through the symbol of an umbrella as
meager localized shelter, these images illustrated the futility of individual defense against
the global actions of a faceless military-industrial complex that appeared to operate
against the moral guidance of scientists and the consent of citizens. The ascendance of
Silent Spring between the two West Ford missions likely eased the way for a shift in
journalistic focus during the second launch.256

255

Ralph H. Lutts, “Chemical Fallout: Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring, Radioactive Fallout, and
the Environmental Movement,” Environmental Review: ER 9 (October 1, 1985): 211–225.
256
Ralph H. Lutts, “Chemical Fallout: Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring, Radioactive Fallout, and
the Environmental Movement,” Environmental Review: ER 9 (October 1, 1985): 211–225.

119

Figure 2.3: Political cartoons about nuclear fallout (left) and West Ford (right) both use
an umbrella to signify the futility of resistance against global-scale military pollution. 257
Unlike Cold War physicists, whom Ron Doel and Alison Kraft have described as
taking on “outsider” roles to combat the moral and environmental impacts of nuclear
weapons in the mid-1950s, astronomers at first did not deliberately attempt to translate
their political concerns into moral imperatives that would resonate with environmentally
aware lay communities.258 While they might not have explicitly agitated for the
environmental protection of outer space in their exchanges with popular media outlets,
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American astronomers serving on the SSB internally expressed firm belief in the great
esteem in which the lay public held scientists in general, and astronomers in particular—
especially in the Soviet Union, where the SSB West Ford committee claimed that
astronomy has “great stature in the public mind.” These astronomers suggested that a lay
populace would side with rebelling astronomers, even if it did not fully understand the
purpose of their protest.259 The language of their concern about correct and conservative
activities in space found traction with journalists and newspaper editors across the world.
The cultural archetype of the moral American scientist as celebrated by Rachel Carson
clashed with shifting postwar public opinions about the integrity of physical scientists;
however, astronomers actively fashioned a professional identity entirely separate from
their physicist counterparts.260 Conflated with growing public awareness of invisible
large-scale contamination and backlash against unilateral military action on Earth and
beyond, astronomers’ words against Project West Ford—processed through the writings
of mainstream journalists—provided damning arguments against the Air Force in foreign
and domestic popular presses.261
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When the Air Force launched a second West Ford package on May 8, 1963, the
dipoles successfully dispersed into a single polar-orbiting belt. The SSB West Ford
Committee solicited feedback from interested astronomers about whether or not they had
been able to detect any of the dipoles, or whether the experiment had negatively affected
their research.262 When the Air Force announced the launch, this particular detail of
information sharing went unremarked in mainstream news reports. Instead, a firestorm of
criticism surrounded the announcement, with some American and European newspaper
editorials arguing that the United States military had willfully ignored the advice of
morally engaged, environmentally conscious astronomers to cancel the launch.263
The Soviet government saw this clash as an opportunity. Academician Keldysh,
who had called West Ford “unscientific” in 1961, saw his criticism amplified by the more
famous and charismatic voice of cosmonaut Gherman Titov, the second person to orbit
the Earth. Titov publicly lambasted the experiment as a subversive capitalist act of
sabotage against progress and science—a cynical attempt by “American monopolists” to
wrest access to Earth orbit from superior Soviet engineers. He suggested that the
American government would rather use copper needles to make space impassable—a
place where no man, including an American, could go—than allow cosmonauts to claim
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near-Earth space for Communism.264 The ongoing, highly publicized international
condemnation of West Ford sparked terse interactions between the United States and
foreign delegations at the United Nations, and led American Ambassador Adlai
Stevenson to go before the UN General Assembly less than a month after the second
launch to defend the United States’ decision to move forward with the test.265
While some news items of this period mention astronomers’ concerns about their
research, the majority of critical articles and editorials from 1963 represent scientific
dissent to West Ford as more concerned with preventing the “serious pollution” in space
predicted by Academician Keldysh two years prior.266 One such editorial, published in the
New York Times on the day of the second launch and cited by newspapers across the
world, declared “there is no United States right unilaterally to make changes in the space
environment of this planet.” The editorial does not mention the change in IAU policy
regarding West Ford, arguing instead that the project had not received sufficient scientific
vetting.267 This editorial and many more of its kind published worldwide characterized
West Ford within the same military lineage as Rachel Carson’s chemical pesticides and
the high-altitude nuclear tests that created new radiation belts and threatened the bodies
of non-consenting citizens below. Each of these developments came about with the
assurances of an unreliable government public relations machine that they would be safe;
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and each came to be seen as the potential source of unintended, catastrophic
environmental change. In these critical articles, West Ford set a “dangerous precedent”
by allowing the American military to embark on unilateral activity in space.268 Should
projects like West Ford continue unchecked, these journalists argued that the United
States government would proceed with unmitigated power. The military could
subsequently unleash forces of environmental destruction that would go beyond the
dramatic spectacle of nuclear bombs. Though West Ford involved relatively mundane
copper filaments they, like fallout, could quickly and easily prove a destructive problem
too difficult to solve.
This journalistic narrative of local and global pollution from West Ford
supplanted astronomers’ disciplinary anxieties as the primary focus of popular news
outlets. Whereas articles on West Ford at the time of the first launch took a neutral
position on the project, focusing mainly on the existential crisis anticipated by
astronomers, by the time the second launch attempt came around, American and foreign
newspapers referred to the project as “rubbish,” “litter” and “cluttering;” the dispersal of
dipoles as “dumping” in space.269 An editorial in the Providence Rhode Island Journal
accused the Air Force of “litterbugging the sky” and the San Francisco Chronicle issued
a jeremiad mourning a “space environment cluttered with litter.”270
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Many popular news reports of West Ford clung to the “needle” pejorative in
describing waste that was not only dangerous in aggregate, but individually perilous,
imbued with a sharp shape with commonplace analogs familiar from suburban mothers’
sewing kits—a pollutant more easily visualized than the contemporary invisible menaces
of pesticides and nuclear fallout.271 Tiny copper filaments in space might not otherwise
seem like much of an environmental threat on the ground. Translating the shape of the
project rendered the dipoles material and therefore more easily comprehended by a range
of non-scientist audiences. Although the Lincoln Lab attempted to comply with the
SSB’s suggestion of a thorough public information campaign three years prior, the series
of press releases distributed in advance of each launch apparently did not ward off all
fears of the dipoles coming home to roost. For instance, a columnist with a local British
paper pondered if metallic debris recovered from his neighborhood cabbage gardens
might have fallen from space, and invited anyone with relevant expertise to examine and
authenticate the artifacts.272
In contrast, Lincoln Laboratory staff sought to use the same material attributes of
the dipoles to combat their portrayal in the popular press as environmental pollutants. As
mentioned in Chapter 1, John Kessler of the Lincoln Laboratory Office of the Director
circulated samples of the dipoles to American journalists, foreign diplomats, and others
who might help change the mainstream conversation about West Ford. Packets of dipoles
that could be seen and handled directly confirmed their minute size, familiar composition,
and apparent harmlessness. Unlike chemical pesticides or nuclear fallout, a person could
271
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safely and repeatedly encounter a copper dipole. The dipoles themselves resembled fine
hair, lending them natural, almost human qualities. Kessler’s attempts to solicit a kinder,
gentler name and material identity for the project found little official or popular traction
in the spring of 1963.273
Those who directly worked on the design of Project West Ford had an entirely
different view of the same minute copper fibers. Rather than penetrating needles,
nonthreatening “fluff,” or careless cosmic clutter, these individuals perceived the West
Ford dipoles as innovative space technology, individually and collectively. In the words
of one West Ford engineer, each dipole represented a discrete spacecraft—performing a
defined function in the space environment for which it was designed. From this
perspective, those who worked on Project West Ford had the distinction of designing and
manufacturing the largest number of satellites in orbit, a record that they still hold.274 Yet
another community interpreted the dipoles differently: Amateur radio operators expressed
interest in using the open-access dipole belt for long-distance transmissions—a hallmark
of prestige for many ham radio enthusiasts. Although the high-powered transmitters
needed to utilize the dipoles presented a cost obstacle to most operators, at least one
active amateur community in the United Kingdom enthusiastically solicited data on the
West Ford belt from Lincoln Laboratory and celebrated the 1963 launch as a boon to
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radio research.275 The interpretive flexibility surrounding the design of communications
satellites at the time of West Ford’s genesis persisted even as active satellites settled into
the current standard form by the mid-1960s. Questions of interpretation in play in 1963
concerned not what a communications satellite should be, but rather, what constituted a
functional satellite and what constituted dangerous space debris. Even a minute, hairlike
copper fiber, when placed in orbit and the subject of intense, worldwide public debate
over its safety, could be categorized anywhere within a range of ontological possibilities
that depended on the political, institutional, and disciplinary location of the interpreter.
In summary, during the months leading up to the first, failed attempt to launch
West Ford into orbit, astronomers expressed their concern in terms of disciplinary crisis.
Fearing the loss of their contemporary and anticipated future observational practices,
West Ford detractors spoke out through professional society resolutions and direct
correspondence with the Space Science Board and the Lincoln Laboratory, and in doing
so instigated a discourse of contamination and environmental risk that would eventually
prove both volatile and enduring. As the second, successful launch attempt neared, fewer
astronomers raised their voices in dissent. However, a vocal minority upheld the original
collective complaint and, in some cases, amplified their disapproval to a fever pitch—one
American astronomer likened non-action on West Ford by the IAU to Chamberlain’s
policy of appeasement towards Hitler during World War II, and anticipated an inevitable
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build up of space garbage that would soon make the dipoles look trivial by comparison.276
In transmitting their disapproval to the public, these lingering dissidents found purchase
for their case within a burgeoning, proto-environmentalist ethos spreading throughout the
world in the years immediately following the publication of Silent Spring. By changing
the terms of the debate to resonate with emerging mainstream environmental values,
popular news writers brought the West Ford controversy into view of a broader public
that had begun to pay attention to and challenge the hegemony of the military-industrialacademic complex of Cold War America. The allegorical umbrella, already opened
against nuclear fallout and the chemical industries, pointed spaceward to the as-yet
unknown consequences of the military’s latest attempt to alter Earth’s natural
environment.
West Ford’s Legacy
One week after the second launch, West Ford operators successfully transmitted teletype
and voice data between the two terminals located in Massachusetts and California.
Meanwhile, the SSB West Ford committee solicited observational data from optical and
radio astronomers provided with the proper ephemerides to test the belt’s reflectivity. In a
special issue of the Proceedings of the IEEE published in 1964, Lincoln Laboratory and
SSB scientists announced their conclusion that, as originally predicted, the West Ford
dipoles had not caused any significant interference to radio or optical astronomy. The
internationally organized Committee on Space Research (COSPAR) agreed with this
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conclusion.277 The practice of astronomy would continue unchecked, the anticipated
space telescopes safe from heavenly needles. However, the preservationist arguments
initially employed by astronomers and reinterpreted by journalists in the public fight
against West Ford yielded concrete political outcomes that extended beyond the lifetime
of the project itself. When the UN Outer Space Treaty entered into force in 1967, it
included a provision requiring full international consultation prior to any activities that
might lead to “harmful contamination” of space, emphasizing that scientists must be
made aware of the “nature, conduct, locations, and results of such activities.”278 As a
growing club of spacefaring and aspiring spacefaring nations negotiated a new model of
international governance for outer space, astronomers successfully ensured that the final
frontier would also be a site of scientific moral authority.
Additionally, the controversy surrounding West Ford led to the creation of a new
working group within COSPAR dedicated to vetting the safety of scientific research in
outer space. COSPAR formed in 1958, the same year that the dipole scatter model was
initially proposed at the Lincoln Laboratory and the Department of Defense conducted
the first high-altitude and exoatmospheric nuclear tests. COSPAR established the
Consultative Group on Potentially Harmful Effects of Space Experiments in 1962, in
direct response to calls from astronomers to protect the space environment from further
experiments like West Ford.279 This group would eventually transform into what is now
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the Panel on Potentially Environmentally Detrimental Activities in Space (PEDAS).
PEDAS provides a forum for COSPAR members to discuss matters relating to the
creation and mitigation of orbital debris and the environmental impact of space
technologies, both in space and within the atmosphere.280
In an undated press release following the successful second launch, Lincoln
Laboratory referred to the “practical objective” of the project as a test to determine if the
orbiting dipole scatter communications model could be instituted without damage to
science or space activities.281 In retrospect, project managers have represented West Ford
as a feasible method of testing the resilience of the space environment, in particular
whether solar radiation and the Earth’s outer atmosphere could be relied upon to remove
objects of a certain mass-to-area ratio.282 Lincoln Laboratory saw this objective as having
been perfectly fulfilled, in addition to more widely broadcast mission objectives. West
Ford enabled cheap, reliable, easily accessible radio communications between two points
using a scattering medium in orbit, without the obstruction to optical and radio astronomy
predicted by its fiercest opponents. By these measures, West Ford was a resounding
success.
And yet, the Air Force terminated West Ford eight months after its successful
second deployment, and a fully operational system was never implemented. Depending
on the source, the reason for this concurrent success and failure could have been the more
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general trend in space communications toward active satellites rather than passive
reflectors, as suggested in a 1989 Lincoln Laboratory retrospective.283 The Partial Nuclear
Test Ban Treaty of October 1963 outlawing the testing of atomic weaponry in the
atmosphere and in outer space may have lessened the urgency for such a system.284 Or, as
suggested in a 1966 report by astrophysicist Irwin Shapiro of the Lincoln Laboratory, the
project may have been doomed by little more than a bad reputation. Claiming that all the
dipoles had reentered, with the exception of a few that would fall to Earth within two
years, Shapiro lamented the end of West Ford, saying:

Our gratification at having seen experimental results in agreement with
predictions is tempered by the realization that little can be done to clear the
clouded reputation of Project West Ford. For, as was observed long ago, the
(alleged) evil that projects do lives after them; the good is oft interred with their
bones. So let it be with West Ford.285

In Shapiro’s eulogy, the experimental success of dipole scatter communications, and
confirmation of his theory of the decaying effect of sunlight pressure on low mass-to-area
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space objects, had been sunk under a reactionary rhetoric of astronomy-killing needles,
heavenly litter, and invisible environmental pollution.286
Shapiro’s claim that all West Ford dipoles had reentered turned out to be
premature: Ground-based space surveillance sensors have identified and currently track
several clumps of needles from both West Ford launches that remain in orbit—and these
represent only those clusters large enough to be detected from the ground.287 Individual
needles themselves may in fact remain in orbit, “almost invisible” indeed to current space
surveillance technology that cannot easily detect objects of such small size.288 Shapiro
was perhaps right to mourn a bad reputation, however. In 1985, journalists and orbital
dynamics researchers claimed that a clump of dipoles collided with the PAGEOS 1
geodesy satellite in 1975.289 However, the fragments of PAGEOS and West Ford occupy
similar orbital paths and have occasionally been mixed up and cross-tagged in the
cataloging process, such that blame for the incident remains disputed.290 Two of the
greatest fears of West Ford’s opponents—a long orbital lifetime of fibers from the test
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and a threat to spacecraft—have at least partly come to pass. The negative reputation the
test acquired in the early 1960s persists into the present, as evidenced by the 2012 IMAX
film Space Junk 3D, in which the filmmakers feature a bundle of “West Ford Needles”
among common sources of small space debris such as microchips and screws shed from
orbiting satellites and rocket bodies.291 In 2013, on the fiftieth anniversary of the second,
successful West Ford launch, several American news outlets published retrospectives on
the project, some of which characterized the dipole scatter model as part of a poorly
planned and poorly executed scheme to put a Saturn-like ring around the Earth. An echo
of Shapiro’s lament appears to have lingered decades beyond the functional lifetime and
popular memory of the test itself.292
While the project did not impede ground-based observing as some astronomers
feared, the concerns of would-be space astronomers about West Ford’s effects on their
future practices turned out to be well founded. Optical and radio astronomers spoke out
against the contamination of outer space, which has become, as advocates of the first
space telescopes predicted, a crucial site of astronomical practice in certain wavelengths.
The remnants of West Ford that continue to circle the planet form part of an evergrowing body of speeding orbital debris that indeed threatens space observatories. In
2012, operators of the Fermi Gamma-ray Space Telescope executed a risky maneuver to
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nudge the spacecraft out of the intersecting path of a defunct Soviet-era satellite.293 The
Hubble Space Telescope has been bombarded by micrometeoroids and human-made
debris over its quarter century in orbit. A small object punched a hole in one of Hubble’s
antennas, through which the tube of the telescope can be clearly discerned in
photographs.294 The Hubble Wide-Field Planetary Camera 2, retrieved from orbit by
astronauts during the final repair mission in 2009 and placed on exhibit at the
Smithsonian National Air and Space Museum in 2014, sports a radiator cover that
resembles a giant slice of Swiss cheese.295 Although none of these impacts or close calls
ultimately impeded telescope operation, they provide material evidence of the
environmental conditions anticipated by astronomers and journalists fifty years earlier
during the first debates over what space policy analysts now call the sustainable use of
outer space.296
This first recognition of near-Earth space as a pollutable environment connected
what many communities might have otherwise dismissed as a remote, invisible void to
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terrestrial environments susceptible to destruction by human activity. The debate over
Project West Ford gave rise to a new but persistent perception of outer space as an
environment at risk, in need of international safekeeping. It also situated scientists—
astronomers in particular—as the appropriate stewards to provide the necessary
environmental oversight. The breadth and legacy of the West Ford controversy reveals an
expansive transnational consciousness of pollution in outer space during the early years
of both the Space Age and mainstream environmentalism. A ring of minute, mundane
metal fibers brought lasting worldwide attention to a strange, illegible natural
environment that rapidly came to be understood as fragile and worthy of protection.
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CHAPTER 3
“Terror in the Skies:” Falling Space Junk, Space Weather, and International
Environmental Liability During the Long 1970s
Cows Over Cuba
On Sunday, December 4, 1960, approximately 300 protesters, six cows, and one bull
paraded past the United States Embassy in Havana in the first government-organized
rally since Prime Minister Fidel Castro’s ascent to power. The assembled humans
chanted anti-American slogans and demanded that the United States cease its imperialist
assault on Cuban sovereignty. The cows wore sandwich board-style placards painted with
messages such as “We condemn the use of atomic arms to kill defenseless cows” and
“Killing cows will not stop our revolution.”297 American newspapers reported that the
rally lasted about forty-five minutes, and that the bovine contingent left the ground in
front of the embassy “thoroughly soiled.”298
Four days earlier, on November 30, the United States Navy launched a Thor
rocket from Cape Canaveral, Florida. It carried three satellites destined for orbit around
the planet. Following an anomaly at the end of the flight, the range safety officer sent a
self-destruct signal that destroyed the rocket and its payload. However, several large
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fragments survived the explosion and fell through the atmosphere back to Earth.299 The
Cuban government broadcasted reports of shrapnel raining from the sky, striking and
killing an unlucky cow in Oriente Province. American sources claimed that the cow had
merely been injured.300 In the weeks that followed, the U.S. Department of State agreed to
pay the Cuban government damages to the tune of two million dollars—quite a lot of
money to replace a cow. This inspired critics to call the event “the Cuban Cash Cow” and
the “herd shot round the world.”301 Castro threatened to hand the rocket fragments over to
the Kremlin for intelligence use.302 The cow is said to have received a state burial.303
The destroyed spacecraft did not contain nuclear weapons or radioactive material.
However, the protesters denounced what they believed to be an act of nuclear aggression
by Cuba’s neighboring superpower, in this case destroying a living symbol of pastoral
domesticity. Radioactive or not, falling pieces of space hardware materialized a pervasive
form of Cold War nuclear anxiety in an increasingly volatile region. The rocket shards
delivered fiery, indiscriminate destruction from the sky, sent by a foreign enemy but—
depending on the politics of the observer—without the malicious intent behind a nuclear
warhead. Whether the cow lived, died, was slightly injured, or never existed in the first
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place, the event came to worldwide public attention as one of the first of a new kind of
envirotechnical disaster that would test emergent space liability law.304 It heralded an era
in which the geophysical forces that draw space artifacts back to Earth from orbit—in an
event known as “reentry”—would come under international scrutiny as geopolitical
actors. Scientific understanding of the physical topography of near-Earth space
transformed as in situ data from satellites and the uncontrolled movement of
anthropogenic objects revealed a near-Earth environment that was as active and resilient.
Near-Earth space could heal itself of human interventions as thoroughly as could the
terrestrial ecosystems that the burgeoning mainstream environmentalist movement sought
to protect. During the long 1970s several reentry events collapsed geography and brought
geographically and politically disparate states into unexpected, sometimes dangerous,
often contentious proximity. During this critical time period, the orbital environment
itself became a culpable, uncooperative actor in the legal and environmental history of an
increasingly messy, increasingly global Space Age.
The passage of the first international space treaties in the late 1960s and early
1970s, particularly the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, established a common legal language to
support the transnational governance of a global environment. However, 91 nations,
representing a plethora of languages, cultures, and legal traditions, initially signed a
treaty meant to govern a remote, illegible ecosystem that followed its own set of arcane,
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strict laws. In such a messy mix, the issue of responsibility—in the legal language of the
United Nations, the issue of fault—became even more contingent and controversial than
the concept of utility at play during the years of West Ford and Echo. Even the addition
of the more explicit and expansive Liability Convention of 1972 could not, in advance,
fully articulate the complexities of damages wrought by objects passing through, and
coming back to Earth from, outer space. This fraught scaffolding of outer space
governance was put to the test during the long 1970s, when a confluence of natural and
social factors brought about an unprecedented rate of reentry of large space artifacts—
including some that did in fact contain radioactive materials.305 These reentries forced all
Outer Space Treaty signatory nations, spacefaring and non-spacefaring alike, to consider
who should be at fault for nuclear damage, not through human intent but via the vagaries
of the geophysical world. During the long 1970s, questions of how to ascribe culpability
to states and the natural world came to the forefront of international political debate when
the sky began to fall.
Controlling the Reentry Message
In the years before the first spate of large reentries, NASA officials sought to keep
information about reentering debris as unpublicized as possible—even within the lower
ranks of the NASA bureaucracy and among space technology contractors.306 In 1964,
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NASA policy regarding the agency’s response to inquiries about potential or actual land
impact by space fragments required a great deal of evasion. A confidential memo
distributed among top NASA officials offered stock responses that personnel should use
to address hypothetical public inquiries about the threat of falling debris. The memo
instructed officials to dismiss the possible endangerment of human life from reentering
hardware fragments as “remote” and “conjectural,” and to actively restrict any public
discussion of reported debris impacts before the country of origin could be identified.307
NASA responded to inquiries from citizens that claimed to have found space hardware
with a standardized form requesting more information about the landing site, object, and
conditions of observation. NASA would arrange to retrieve such objects in the event that
the information provided by the individual citizen on the form suggested that the
fragment might yield “some scientific or technological value”—a euphemistic way of
denoting the intelligence value of recovered space hardware, which could be exploited to
learn about Soviet engineering and manufacturing.308
By 1966, following the recovery that year of several pieces of reentered American
hardware from the Rio Negro district of Brazil, Apollo program administrators suggested
developing a public information plan.309 However, the internal debate within NASA over
the benefits and dangers of public education about falling space debris continued into the
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1970s. A classified 1972 NASA Office of Policy Analysis memo reveals that some in the
administration harbored “questions of morality”—specifically whether or not NASA was
justified in taking the chance that someone might someday be hit by a piece of one of the
ever growing number of satellites that would eventually fall to Earth, while NASA also
withheld information about this danger from the public. The memo suggests that, by
providing useful, modernizing services to the nation and world, NASA had “assumed the
moral right to impose that incremental risk on society.”310 However, recent milestones in
national and international policy tempered this recommendation. The 1970 enactment of
the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA) indicated that the United States
federal government had begun to take certain environmentalist priorities seriously.
Additionally, the 1971 Liability Convention clarified extant rules of responsibility for
damage caused by space artifacts in the UN Outer Space Treaty, meaning that any future
reentries would be subject to stricter rules and recourse procedures than had previously
been in force. Given these recent changes to relevant environmental and space policy, the
same memo predicts widespread political fallout—especially among an increasingly
environmentally conscious American public and international diplomatic networks—
should space debris cause bodily harm to people or animals, or contaminate the soil,
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water, or atmosphere.311 By this time, NASA policy explicitly stated that the movement
of fragments from orbit to Earth endangered the “quality of the human environment” as
set forth in NEPA, and officials began developing an official national policy on the
matter of reentry control and public awareness.312
The Sky is Falling: Space Junk Comes Back to Earth
“What goes up must come down”—an adage used to describe everything from fly balls to
the stock exchange—also applies to objects that humankind sends into orbit. In his
famous cannon thought experiment, Isaac Newton described what would happen to a
projectile shot with enough velocity to “escape” the invisible forces that would otherwise
bring the projectile back to the ground. A cannonball that reaches this velocity continues
to be gravitationally attracted towards the massive planet Earth. However, with no land
below to stop it, and therefore no way to land, the projectile will continue to plummet in a
path around the planet—a perpetual free fall known as orbiting.313 Unless the object gains
enough velocity to escape from Earth’s gravitational field and move into interplanetary
space, gravity continually pulls the object into this cycle of free fall.
What goes up can stay up—but only temporarily.
All objects that human beings have launched into orbit will one day come back
down to Earth. When they return depends on a combination of factors including the mass
and area of the object, and external conditions including altitude, atmospheric density,
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and solar activity. The higher an object orbits, the thinner the atmospheric density—and
therefore the fewer particles to impart drag upon the object. The orbital altitude directly
correlates to the length of time it takes for an object to fall back into the atmosphere—in
the parlance of orbital mechanics, for its orbit to decay. Some objects’ orbits decay at
rates so slow as to defy geological scale. Objects in orbits higher than 1,000 kilometers
will take centuries to reenter, and objects in geosynchronous orbit 35,786 kilometers
above the ground will take millennia to decay.314 Unless humankind moves elsewhere
into the cosmos, or devises a way to bring high altitude objects back to Earth, the orbital
lifetimes of these artifacts will far outlast the human species and the majority of the
changes it has wrought on the geophysical world.
However, the vast majority of anthropogenic hardware and debris orbit at lower
altitudes, where the atmosphere (although thin) still exerts significant drag. Objects in
low-Earth orbit reenter on shorter time scales. Subjected to punishing friction and heatgenerating air pressure as it moves through denser and denser layers of the atmosphere,
any object—natural or human-made—begins to fall apart. Most objects that fall through
the atmosphere without special heat shielding either dissipate entirely or break into
fragments that fall into the oceans that cover the vast majority of the planet. NASA, the
North American Air Defense Command (now the North American Aerospace Defense
Command, or NORAD), and the international mainstream media have long represented
marine disposal or atmospheric absorption of reentering artifacts as ideal outcomes,
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portraying these global terrestrial environments as consequence-free sinks for space
debris.315
However, on occasion, as in Havana, a piece of space junk will hit terra firma,
spurring political, diplomatic, financial, and environmental complications. The
repercussions of such events do not remain localized at the landing site, but also among a
range of geographically dispersed state actors and international organizations with legal,
financial, or political stakes in the outcome of a real or potential space junk disaster. The
physical properties of the most valuable orbits (and the geographical orientation of launch
sites required to send satellites to these orbits using minimal resources) often result in
uncontrolled space junk landing far from the state of origin, often in regions of the Global
South.316 The first few such reentries included the Cuban cow incident and the survival of
several large pieces of American space hardware retrieved from South Africa following
John Glenn’s historic orbital spaceflight a year and a half later. Following these events,
many more state parties than the Cold Warring superpowers became invested in securing
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a guarantee of recourse in the event that a piece of falling space junk should strike
sovereign ground.
The advent of the satellite age was inextricably entwined with the development of
the intercontinental ballistic missile, or ICBM. These missiles descended from V-2
missiles designed by German engineers and built by prison camp labor during World War
II. At the end of the conflict, the Soviet Union and United States scrambled to claim both
rocket technologies and rocket specialists from Germany in order to build their own
rocket programs—a clandestine expertise grab known in the United States as Operation
Paperclip.317 When the Soviet Union launched Sputnik into space aboard an R-7 rocket—
the world’s first operational ICBM in one of its first successful flights—the nation
demonstrated its powerful, unprecedented ability to access outer space. It also signaled to
the rest of the world that the Soviet Union was ahead of everyone in ICBM technology,
suggesting that a Soviet missile could, in the near future, deliver nuclear weapons nearly
anywhere in the world at the push of a button.318 Soon, the militaries of both superpower
nations developed and maintained arsenals of ICBMs for use in spaceflight, and in
anticipation of warfare.
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The ICBM marked a sea change in munitions technology, shrinking the spatial
and temporal scope of warfare. Whereas before the development of the ICBM a largescale attack would have required mobilization of forces and implementation of invasion
and withdrawal strategy, a single disposable long-range missile with a warhead could
cross the globe in minutes. Even the relatively recent advances in long-range bomber
technology appeared to be destined for imminent obsolescence, replaced by a quicker (if
initially less accurate) delivery system that did not rely on an onboard human pilot for
success.319 Warfare became truly global when ICBMs shortened geographical distance
and facilitated the ability to launch quick retaliation in case of attack—a major lynchpin
upholding the Cold War version of the global military strategy known as mutually
assured destruction.320
As an integral part of large-scale weapons systems, ICBMs enabled the controlled
delivery of destructive materials from the sky above the intended target. As launch
vehicles for non-armament space technology, these rockets facilitated a similar
outcome—without the control and, in many cases, the synchronicity typified by advanced
nuclear ICBMs. Even in the absence of a warhead, ICBMs made it possible for a nation
to drop dangerous projectiles onto faraway lands without intent, control, or accuracy, as
illustrated by the fate of the hapless Cuban cow.321 In the first decades in which ICBMs
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were used to launch spacecraft, both expired satellites and pieces of these rockets fell
from orbit, generating different kinds of threats to both the state in which the fragments
landed and the launching state. Beyond the physical danger of high-speed objects falling
from high altitudes, if any fragments were to survive the fall they could be used as
valuable currency in the intelligence community on either side of the Iron Curtain.
Should fragments land in enemy territory, or in a region within a particular sphere of
influence, that fragment could be recovered, examined, and exploited by hostile operators
and used against the launching state. The ICBM thus facilitated an expansion of the
material and virtual scope of space technology, but also a new way to gather information
about the technical knowledge of the enemy’s space industry.322 As much as these
technologies collapsed time and space by delivering bombs and then spacecraft further
and more quickly than previously imaginable, the unprecedented mobility of byproducts
and wastes of the space industry confirmed that the Cold War Space Race had become a
truly global phenomenon.323
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Stormy Space Weather: Solar Maximum in the Space Age
In early October 1957, as the rest of the world reacted to the stunning launch of the first
artificial satellite by the Soviet Union atop a modified ICBM, physicists at the Royal
Aircraft Establishment (RAE) found themselves deeply enthralled by the motion of
Sputnik’s rocket core as it tumbled through space. RAE physicists’ research revealed that
atmospheric particles exerted drag on moving objects at unexpected altitudes, causing its
orbit to “decay,” or dwindle in altitude. The group of RAE physicists who would soon
come to self-identify as “orbital analysts” tracked the motion of the rocket core over the
course of its eight weeks in orbit to reveal entirely new information about the wind
currents and density of the upper atmosphere.324 This early orbital research, conducted
using the rocket core as a scientific instrument, changed contemporary understanding of
the orbital environment that would continue to shift as humankind sent greater numbers
of artifacts into orbit around the planet.325
This research, as well as newly acquired data about the regions just beyond
Earth’s atmosphere, shattered physicists’ previous perception that a “vast region of
emptiness” enveloped our isolated planet.326 Within five years after the launch of Sputnik,
a rapidly coalescing international community of space scientists discovered a complex
topography of magnetism, radiation, energy, dust, and transiting plasmas, alongside
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atmospheric and trapped solar particles extending tens of thousands of kilometers from
Earth’s atmosphere into space. Although the effects of sunspots on terrestrial systems had
been a subject of formal study since the mid-19th century, the discovery of a web of
magnetic and radiation fields above the atmosphere pointed to the likelihood that Earth’s
geophysical influence extended far further into space than previously imagined.327 The
Sun did not exert its influence upon a wholly passive third planet. Almost overnight Earth
had become a power player in a physically and materially interactive solar system.328
As the space age progressed, evidence of Sun-Earth interactions manifested most
spectacularly within the region of near-Earth space into which humankind sent its first
technological envoys. The Sun entered solar maximum—the active peak of its roughly
eleven-year-long solar cycle—three times between the launch of Sputnik in 1957 and the
mid-1980s.329 During solar maximum, the Sun’s energy output increases to its highest
levels. Ultraviolet emissions increase by more than a factor of two, heating the Earth’s
atmosphere and causing it to expand several hundred kilometers further into outer
space.330 The first solar maximum of the Space Age peaked in early 1958, when only five
artificial satellites circled the globe. Over the course of the next two solar cycles,
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spacefaring nations accelerated the manufacture of the satellite infrastructure and the
concurrent production of space junk. At the time of the solar maximum of 1968-1970 and
the following solar maximum of 1978-1982, humankind had launched several thousand
anthropogenic objects into orbit, including both satellites and the uncontrolled detritus of
this construction project.331

Figure 3.1: The blue area graph illustrates the number of uncontrolled, non-deliberate,
“natural” reentries of payloads and empty rocket stages. The red line graph shows the
mean number of sunspots per year after Sputnik, with peaks denoting solar maxima. A
clear correlation exists between periods of high solar activity and the orbital decay of
space debris.332
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The second and third Space Age solar maxima demonstrated what happens to
objects orbiting at low altitudes during periods of stormy space weather: As the layer of
the atmosphere known as the thermosphere expands due to ultraviolet heating,
atmospheric particles extend further into space and exert drag on a broader subsection of
orbiting artifacts, causing their orbits to decay, or decrease in altitude. Eventually, gravity
takes hold and the object falls back to Earth through the punishing friction and pressure
of the upper atmosphere. This cyclical expansion and contraction of the atmosphere acts
as a self-cleaning mechanism, sweeping lower orbital altitudes clear of uncontrolled junk.
Like terrestrial ecosystems, the near-Earth space environment demonstrated mechanisms
of natural resilience that are both shaped by and resist the effects of anthropogenic
activity.333 The effects of these first Space Age solar maxima on early space hardware
reinforced Cold War physicists’ claims of an interactive solar system and confirmed that
Earth’s environment did not stop at an arbitrary layer of the atmosphere.
The combination of turbulent solar activity and the steadily increasing number of
satellites sent into space during the long 1970s resulted in some of the biggest pieces of
orbital debris to return to Earth. Of the sixteen most massive artifacts to reenter the
atmosphere from space since 1957, ten fell to Earth during the period of time from 1969
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to 1984.334 This included the fall of the Cosmos 954 satellite over a remote part of Canada
in 1978 and the infamous 1979 reentry of the American space station Skylab over rural
Australia. Both events received significant attention in the international press. They
mobilized both state space programs and State departments to determine the best way to
reduce risk from falling objects. They also sought ways to appropriately inform a general
public, which reacted along a spectrum of responses ranging from terror to macabre
acceptance of an inevitably falling sky.
In addition to an increasing number and size of reentering artifacts, many of the
artifacts themselves had changed in a significant way by the 1970s. Starting in 1965 the
Soviet Union and the United States began installing nuclear power devices on
spacecraft—and continue to do so today, especially on deep space probes. These ranged
from simple generators that draw heat energy from the decay of a radioactive isotope to
small nuclear generators deriving power from enriched uranium, the latter being more
common on Soviet era satellites.335 Since then, several nuclear-powered satellites have
slipped beyond the control of their human operators and fallen to Earth with their
generators intact. Nearly all of them have disappeared from view, either in the
atmosphere or in water. However, in 1978, a nuclear powered satellite fell to solid
ground, with local and international ramifications that would reverberate well after the
end of the Cold War conflict that bore it into space. While this was neither the first nor
334
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the last of what I call “nuclear reentries,” a confluence of material, legal, and ecological
factors amplified the ways in which this particular kind of accident uniquely reified and
materialized extant nuclear anxiety in the midst of the Cold War arms race.
The Nuclear Reentry of Cosmos 954
In September 1977, the Soviet Union launched an ocean reconnaissance satellite named
Cosmos 954 into orbit. By December of that year, the North American Aerospace
Defense Command noticed that the satellite had begun to behave erratically, indicating
that it was no longer under control. American intelligence efforts suggested that the
Cosmos satellites drew power from onboard nuclear reactors. Whether this particular
satellite contained a reactor (and if so what kind of reactor), and what kind of emergency
failsafes Soviet satellite engineers might have installed, could only be extrapolated from
older data. Should a live reactor fall into a populated area, the Defense Intelligence
Agency could not fully predict the extent or scale of potential damage. When briefed on
the issue, some senior American government officials even wondered if the satellite
might detonate upon impact like a nuclear weapon.336
When pressed in secret, the recalcitrant Soviet government provided few details
beyond admitting that the satellite contained a reactor fueled by uranium-235. The
Kremlin insisted that the reactor core would not go critical upon reentry—that it had been
designed to fully disintegrate and dissipate into the upper atmosphere. They allowed the
faint possibility that pieces of the satellite might survive, arguing that any fragments
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would fall in a localized area and therefore pose no risk to communities or environments
below following “limited usual measures of cleaning up”—a confusing suggestion given
that the impact of a nuclear powered spacecraft on land had no precedent, and therefore
no “usual measures” existed. American trackers predicted that Cosmos would fall
somewhere over North America, but could give no more specifics about the margin of
impact. Under cover of secrecy, the United States government informed allies who might
be affected by the reentry, especially the Canadian government. None of the notified
nations chose to inform their citizenry of the potential threat. 337
In the early morning of January 24, 1978, Mounties and night janitors in the
Northwest Territories of Canada reported seeing a bright meteor falling over the Great
Slave Lake in the vicinity of Yellowknife.338 Other eyewitnesses determined that some
pieces of the satellite had survived and landed in a stretch of mostly frozen tundra in a
region commonly known as “the Barren Lands” or simply “the Barrens”—a region that
exemplified the definition of wilderness put forth in the American 1964 Wilderness Act:
“a place where man himself is but a visitor.”339 First responders remarked that only those
hardy individuals seeking a return to nature braved the elements of the Barrens.
Subsequent reports characterized the region as “a most inhospitable place…where flora
and fauna must be tough to survive.”340 In January 1978, the landscape of the Barrens
appeared uniformly white under a thick, impenetrable cover of snow and ice—
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inhospitable, tough, and yet potentially endangered by a nuclear reactor inadvertently
dropped from above by a foreign, hostile government.
A coalition of American and Canadian nuclear experts and intelligence personnel
scrambled an ad hoc search and containment project code-named Project Morning Light.
After eight and a half months of careful work, often under survival conditions, the
Morning Light team recovered approximately 65 kilograms of debris from a well-defined
600-kilometer path across Great Slave Lake and its vicinity. All but two of the hundreds
of pieces of collected debris turned out to be radioactive. The rest of the massive satellite
dissipated in the upper atmosphere as predicted by the Soviet engineers. The falling
debris didn’t hit any people or animals, and nobody witnessed the impact, but six
naturalists that stumbled upon one of the largest pieces of debris were promptly
evacuated and eventually given a clean bill of health. The more difficult task lay in
determining what to do about the dispersal of tiny particulate nuclear fuel over a 100,000
square kilometer area. Some of these particles reached Alberta and Saskatchewan, as well
as regions where the 1978 Arctic Winter Games were shortly to be held. Particulate
nuclear material posed a significant risk to humans through inhalation or digestion, either
directly or by consumption of contaminated flora or fauna. However, after chemical
testing revealed the particles to be insoluble, Morning Light managers concluded that no
more needed to be done; the particulate matter would be absorbed in lakebeds and
permafrost, where the isotopes would decay in safety, peace, and isolation.341 Those
responsible for cleanup assigned the harsh arctic environment itself a crucial role in the
341
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cleanup. After two search phases to account for the spring thaw, Operation Morning
Light ended on October 14, 1978. The American and Canadian teams dispersed, satisfied
that they had returned the Great Slave Lake area to an adequate semblance of its preCosmos state of nature.

Figure 3.2: A radioactive particle shed during the Kosmos 954 crash, next to a penny for
scale.
Once word got out about the accident after the fact, the details dominated
mainstream international news for several days. Because it had already happened and was
not an impending threat, updates in the American press quickly tapered off as news about
the Panama Canal, Anwar Sadat, and welfare reform reclaimed center stage. Reactions
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among lay citizens in America and Canada varied. A Canadian government official
assured a group of 250 concerned Inuit that they were in no danger of ingesting
contaminated caribou meat.342 American editorials lauded the quick work of the
international response team, reserving their most pointed critique for the sloppy, nuclearhappy Soviet space program—conveniently neglecting to mention the radioisotope
thermal generators regularly used by NASA. Soviet news outlets accused the “bourgeois
press” of embellishment, comparing Cosmos 954 favorably to American nuclear weapons
accidents on its own soil.343 Of course, a few public reactions by civilian observers
reflected greater alarm.344 The back cover copy of a journalist’s memoir of the cleanup
effort published immediately afterward compared the Cosmos 954 reentry to “all our
nightmarish memories of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.”345 For the most part, those who
responded publicly about the accident expressed relief that it had happened in a place
seemingly devoid of life—human or otherwise.346
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In the months after Cosmos 954’s plunge, several space objects fell to Earth.
Many made American news in advance—to the public puzzlement of at least one NASA
spokesperson who noted that space junk had been falling for years with similar nonoutcomes, and nobody had said a word.347 This public performance of openness and
surprise obscured decades of classified NASA policy on containing and concealing
instances of reentering debris and the potential for damage at the site of impact. Private
citizens were actively aware of reentering space junk before the rash of late 1970s
reentries, most notably members of the Smithsonian-sponsored Operation Moonwatch.348
Moonwatch enlisted amateur astronomers to track satellites as well as participate in what
the Smithsonian called “death watches”—tracking falling debris and aiding in the
recovery of fragments that survived.349 By the late 1960s, reentering space junk became
the star of major novels and films. The Michael Crichton novel The Andromeda Strain,
published in 1969 and adapted into a film of the same name in 1971, features a fallen
satellite that has transported a deadly microorganism to a small American town, where
officials must contain it before it decimates the entirety of human civilization.350 The
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groundbreaking 1968 horror film Night of the Living Dead portrays a group of civilian
and military bureaucrats arguing over whether radiation from a destroyed space probe
should be publicly held responsible for an epidemic of reanimated corpses.351
Ground Testing Liability
The Cosmos 954 incident briefly influenced broader nuclear negotiations between the
Cold War superpowers. On January 30, 1978, President Jimmy Carter held a press
conference in which he praised the United States’ cooperation with Canada in the
Cosmos 954 tracking and cleanup efforts. In his remarks, Carter called for the Soviet
Union to join the United States in a bilateral ban on nuclear powered spacecraft, citing
the newly demonstrated threat of damage by reentry accidents.352 The Soviet government
roundly rejected this call, as did American space scientists and engineers who understood
the utility of nuclear energy on spacecraft with certain energy requirements, or those that
cannot use solar energy efficiently due to distance from the sun and other physical
obstacles.353 However, at the international level, the United Nations created a space
nuclear power working group within the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee in the
summer of 1978.
351
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By 1979, the Canadian government put the United Nations’ relatively new rules
on space liability to the test for the very first time.354 Recalling the exorbitant payout of
the Cuban Cash Cow, national liability in the case of damage by space junk, particularly
between two opposite sides of an era-defining geopolitical divide, can be an extremely
messy affair. On January 23 1979, exactly within the 1-year limit imposed by the 1972
Liability Convention, Canada filed a claim against the Soviet Union for an amount of
$6,041,174.70 to cover the cleanup expenses alone.355 The total costs of Operation
Morning Light would climb to an excess of $14 million, but at the time of the claim
deadline the full extent of damages were not yet fully known.356 The claim called for
compensation of what the Canadian government had spent so far in order to return the
affected region back to the condition in which it had been before the accident occurred—
the required outcome for efforts to rectify reentry damage stipulated in the Liability
Convention. The Canadian government argued that the introduction of radioactive debris
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into the Barrens rendered a part of Canadian territory unfit for use, which qualified as
“damage to property” in the Convention.357
As part of this claim, two members of the Dene nation submitted affidavits
speaking to the particular utility of the environment in which the Cosmos satellite fell.
Georges Erasmus, president of the Dene Nation of the Northwest Territories, contributed
sworn testimony in which he expressed deep concern that the radioactive effects of the
debris field, as yet unknown, could “cause injury to the Dene and their way of life.”
Erasmus described meetings held among the Dene in which many citizens worried about
the uncertainty of contamination even after the cleanup—that fishing and hunting, as well
as water and land use, could be negatively affected for years.358 John Marlowe, also of the
Dene Nation, obliquely suggested in his affidavit that the cleanup effort might not have
taken place with the best interests of First Nations at heart. In relaying his memories of
the reentry, Marlowe recalls that the “army” came to clean up, and forced Dene residents
to remain in their homes for a day and prevented them from visiting the lake for a week.
Noting the importance of fishing in his family for winter subsistence, Marlowe related his
habit of visiting his lake fishing nets every two days, yielding over ten trout and whitefish
in each haul. During the period of cleanup, no Dene residents of nearby Snowdrift could
procure food, even as Marlowe claims they found pieces of satellite debris in town.359
Erasmus concluded his testimony by noting that the Dene “fish and trap in almost every
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square mile of [the] area” in which the debris landed, concluding that “therefore, there is
no place where the debris fell which is not used by the Dene.”360
Indeed, an official with the Canadian Atomic Energy Control Board concurred in
separate testimony that radioactive particles had been found in Snowdrift and other
nearby towns, supporting the concerns put forth by Dene citizens.361 In spite of this
supporting evidence from local communities, the idea of utility was just one point of
translation difficulty that had plagued the UN space treaties for decades. For example, the
French term “responsibilité” contains the English meanings of both “responsibility” and
“liability”—very different concepts, particularly in a case like the Cosmos 954 crash in
which one of the responsible parties was not human, but rather the natural environment of
near-Earth space that brought the satellite down in the first place.362 The translation was
not just linguistic, but also cultural: In the case of the Northwest Territories, the damaged
“property” amounted to a seemingly empty snowscape described by its own citizens as
barren, lifeless, and inhospitable—arguably a perfect picture of uselessness, even as
defined by a defendant nation that governed vast areas marked by similarly extreme
arctic conditions. Soviet representatives noted that the small debris had been determined
by the claimants themselves to not be a threat to the environment or bodies of humans or
animals in the region. The large pieces of radioactive debris represented the only real
sources of damage subject to liability, and those had been safely contained and removed
360
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from the environment by the time the Canadian government filed its claim with the
United Nations.
In a chapter titled ““When Satellites Fall: On the Trails of Cosmos 954 and USA
193,” in Down to Earth: Satellite Technologies, Industries, and Cultures, cultural theorist
Lisa Parks argues that Soviet officials pushed back against Canada’s claim by stating that
Cosmos 954 had, upon reentry, ceased to be a Soviet satellite. Parks contends that the
Kremlin took the official position that Cosmos 954 had transformed into an assortment of
undifferentiated metals and substances and, since this diffuse conglomeration could no
longer perform the functions of a satellite, it could therefore not be held to the absolute
terms of the Liability Convention.363 This argument suggests that Soviet legal officials
imbued the borderlands between Earth and outer space with unique powers of ontological
transformation. However, the earliest international space law, which predates Cosmos
954 by fifteen years, declares that passage through the atmosphere does not negate basic
liability for damage caused by space objects.
After over two years of wrangling with these translational issues, the Soviet
Union relinquished a tidy and even settlement of $3 million, which the Canadian
government accepted.364 This was the first, and to date the only invocation of the Liability
Convention by two signatory nations. Canada would go on to play a leading role in
subsequent international negotiations of nuclear space power source regulation. These
negotiations snowballed into a decades-long debate in the United Nations as space
363
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industries developed, evaluated, and adopted new power technologies for rockets, probes,
and satellites, and as nuclear energy crises unfolded on the Earth below.365
While Canada was the third nation to launch an artificial satellite into outer space,
it did not have its own launching capabilities and relied on an alliance with America as its
launching state. The encounter with hazardous fallen space debris forced the Canadian
government into the combative aspects of the Space Race without warning, on the side of
its neighbor and ally. The legal fight over the remains of Cosmos 954 highlighted the
necessity of further elaboration and codification of an expansive definition of space
debris at the international level. Beginning in the 1980s, most state space programs, the
United Nations, and international space policy organizations issued formal statements
defining “fragments” of space technologies as falling within the legal realm of space
debris. This strengthened the legal foundation of space liability law should a future piece
of falling space debris cause similar sparring as occurred over Cosmos 954.
Cosmos 954 was not the first object to reenter the atmosphere. It was not the first
piece of space junk to hit land, nor was it the first radioactive artifact to fall from orbit.
However, it was the first of this kind of phenomenon to happen at the exact confluence of
circumstances to create a minor maelstrom: the right space weather, the right antagonists,
the right material attributes (i.e. nuclear), and the right location—just safe enough to be a
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test and not a conflict. The Great Slave Lake area where the visible debris landed
occupied a perfect sliver of Western cultural space between empty wasteland and Fragile
Arctic at a time when such liminal spaces were only beginning to become visible and
precious to mainstream communities around the world.366 By 1978, a broad Western
public was already aware of the potential dangers of nuclear energy production, and as
influential space law scholar Eileen Galloway put it at the time, these dangers would soon
provide a dependable source of international momentum towards environmental
protection in cases of nuclear reentry.367 Galloway maintained that a mainstream
international public had grown increasingly acclimated to the burgeoning discourses of
environmentalism, grounded in early resistance to invisible contamination forced upon a
non-consenting society by faceless authoritarians. She anticipated that from that point
forward an educated populace would demand to be made aware of the sources of said
contamination, whether within the atmosphere or hundreds of kilometers overhead.368
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While the social and political ramifications of a nuclear reactor-powered satellite
crash-landing on solid ground may have been unprecedented, at the atmospheric level the
Cosmos 954 accident barely left a mark. If the United States Department of Energy had
not detected unique aerosol signatures of 90% enriched uranium-235 in stratospheric
samples gathered in the months following reentry, the existence of fissile material from
the satellite would have been all but invisible against the mixing and remixing of over
thirty years of atmospheric nuclear fallout from weapons tests.369 Like the caribou that
could have transported uranium across the tundra and into human bodies, the biological,
geochemical, and geophysical world played an incontrovertible role in rendering
humankind’s nuclear presence into a uniform continuum from underground to outer
space.
Skylab Falling
Mere days after Cosmos 954 fell from the sky, Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans
and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs Patsy Mink sent a letter to NASA
Administrator Robert Frosch. Mink noted that the recent impact of the nuclear satellite
had brought the hazards of satellite reentry to the attention of the international press—
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which had recently switched its focus to another potential reentry disaster. This time, the
feared object contained no nuclear fuel, but was several times more massive than Cosmos
954, and American in origin. The American space station, Skylab, had been drifting in
orbit for some time since its last crew of astronauts departed in 1974. Mink related a deep
concern about what might happen if NASA did not interfere: “It is said that about 50 tons
of metal can be expected to survive the Skylab reentry and impact the earth’s surface.
This appears to represent a substantial hazard to life.” Fearing the potential international
implications and detrimental effect on US foreign policy, Mink concluded by offering the
services of her office to NASA in devising both a plan to avoid catastrophe and to
address the seemingly inevitable international pressure as Skylab’s orbit continued to
decay.370
The 1979 reentry of Skylab inspired worldwide space junk mania, and remains
the best-known and most-repeated story of falling anthropogenic debris.371 Launched in
May 1973, Skylab was America’s first space station—a spacecraft that remains in orbit
for extended periods of time. It hosted three different mission crews from 1974 to 1975,
who used Apollo-era spacecraft to arrive and depart from orbit. At the end of the first
Skylab program, NASA developed intermediate plans to continue use of the space station
in conjunction with the upcoming Space Shuttle program, which was then still in the
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early design and study stage. However, two converging obstacles interfered with these
plans—one social and one environmental.
As part of the complex, years-long series of deliberations and decisions that went
into the construction of Skylab, engineers compromised on whether to include a rocket
engine on the space station. Such an engine would enable astronauts or ground controllers
to move the spacecraft to a different orbit or bring it back to Earth in a controlled fashion
in the event of orbital decay or other incident; however, it would also require greater
spending on this final application of the cash-strapped Apollo program. NASA
researchers reasoned that a native engine would not be necessary, considering that a new
spacecraft then under development could do the job just as well at no additional upfront
cost.372 The Space Transportation System, of which the Space Shuttle program was to be
the keystone technology, had been designed with the retrieval and rescue of satellites in
mind as a primary mission. As NASA administrators and engineers struggled against
ongoing design conflict, political gridlock, and budgetary overrun, the projected first
launch of the Shuttle slipped until it became clear that the spacecraft would not fly until
the early 1980s.373 Before returning the Earth, the final Skylab crew used the propulsion
system of the Apollo command-service module, which was docked to the station, to
carefully nudge the space station to a higher altitude. At such heights, NASA predicted
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that Skylab would safely orbit for approximately ten years, until 1983, by which time
NASA leadership pledged that the Shuttle program would be well underway.374
By whim of chance and nature, the Sun entered a period of solar maximum as the
end of the decade neared, reaching its peak month of sunspot activity in December
1979.375 Given the regularity of the solar cycle, NASA researchers and administrators
anticipated that the increase in solar activity would likely affect the orbit of the dormant
space station. However, the peak of the 21st solar cycle turned out to yield a stronger
surge in sunspot activity than predicted by astronomers and accounted for by NASA in
planning Skylab’s orbital lifetime. All objects in low-Earth orbit were affected by the
expanded, denser veil of atmospheric particles, but Skylab was one of the most massive
objects to succumb to the encroaching sky. By the middle of the decade, NASA and
NOAA officials determined that the space station’s orbit had already begun a rapid decay
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into the upper atmosphere, starting a downward plunge earlier than expected.376 Had the
sun produced energy at average solar maximum levels, the space station likely would
have remained aloft for the entirety of its initial ten-year predicted orbital lifetime, well
beyond the Space Shuttle program’s first launch in April, 1981.
The physical realities of the stormy Solar Maximum meant that Skylab would
reenter before a Shuttle orbiter—as well as the retrieval and repair spacecraft needed to
rendezvous and capture the rapidly moving station—could be mobilized to boost it to a
higher orbit. The space station would undergo an uncontrolled reentry—that is, ground
controllers could not alter its orbit to ensure that it would fall over a specific part of the
Earth below. As it stood, the combination of natural and social obstacles led NASA
administrators to concede that Skylab would reenter the atmosphere anywhere from mid1979 to early 1980.377
The problems associated with uncontrolled reentry had concerned program
officials before Skylab even reached orbit. In 1970, Skylab mission operators at the
Johnson Space Center (JSC) circulated a memo noting the need to take the end of the
space station’s life into account in the years leading up to its launch. Three years in
advance of Skylab’s ascent to orbit, JSC commissioned a study of risks presented by
reentering debris generated by the Skylab mission, and called for the creation of a public
information plan to be released in the event that any such debris threatened populated
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areas in the future.378 The report that resulted included the probability that each major
component of the planned station might hit a human being on the ground upon reentry,
focusing on objects massive enough to survive the fall more or less intact. The authors of
the study calculated the likelihood of at least one human casualty resulting from the
reentry of Skylab at 0.018—or, as one reviewer of the study scribbled in marginalia, one
in 55.379 After detailing potential changes to the Skylab mission that could reduce the risk,
the authors of the report concluded that these steps would only take place at great
expense and could very well be technically unfeasible. They also noted a low likelihood
that such labor and expense would be recouped in subsequent missions. They concluded
with a set of simple recommendations for future large unshielded spacecraft that echoed
NASA policy on reentry risk from the earliest days of the space program:

We therefore recommend: That NASA accept the Skylab orbital debris risks. That
NASA establish orbital debris criteria for future programs. These criteria, for
example, may specify acceptable levels of risk and may require that the risks be
assessed early in the programs.380

Acting NASA Administrator George Low concurred with these conclusions. Upon
assessing the report, Low relayed to his staff his decision that NASA should accept the
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risk associated with reentering Skylab debris. He shifted responsibility for preparation for
such an outcome from JSC to the NASA Office of Public Affairs and Office of
International Affairs, from whom he requested a comprehensive plan for how to manage
public information before reentry three months in advance of the Skylab launch.381
By the following year, however, as Space Shuttle engineers contemplated the
survivability of the expendable external fuel tank—designed to be discarded over the
ocean after each launch—Low reconsidered his stance. In calling for the establishment of
predictive protocols to account for fragments of the ET that might survive the fall from
orbit, a group of NASA technical officers advised Low that similar studies ought to be
undertaken for objects of a certain size and mass that were either slated for launch or
already in orbit. In addition to recommending that “all future flight projects…should take
into account methods for defending against returning debris,” the group of technical
officers also advised Low that the 1971 decision to accept the risk for orbital debris
generated by Skylab could yield material hazards down the line.382 First among the “open
issues” that concluded the official memorandum for the record on orbital debris was the
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requirement that NASA take steps to notify an unidentified audience of the approximate
time and location of space debris impact.383
NASA subsequently supported several studies intended to address the potential
debris hazard from Skylab as a special case.384 From this initial effort, NASA researchers
and administrators assembled criteria on risk, how to assess the odds of casualty, and
reentry assessment protocols for all future massive spacecraft.385 While other large
artifacts had reentered the atmosphere in the preceding two and a half decades, the size
and inclination of Skylab’s orbit made it different. Researchers calculated that the total
weight of Skylab debris that could be expected to survive reentry would likely equal the
debris generated by the entirety of the Gemini and Apollo missions; additionally, Skylab
would produce half the total fragments that either Gemini or Apollo flights produced in
aggregate. However, the size and weight of Skylab fragments would vastly outweigh any
single piece of Apollo or Gemini debris, and the inclination of Skylab’s orbit meant it
covered a much broader area of the ground below. The orbits of the previous program
spacecraft constrained the range of a potential debris impact to areas in South Asia,
Africa, South and Central America, and Australia. Skylab, as the author of one briefing
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pointed out, could fall over these regions as well as parts of the continental United States,
Europe, and Russia.386

Figure 3.3: This map shows the breadth of latitude over which orbital debris from
Gemini and Apollo could land, and the significantly larger corresponding area of
potential impact for the Skylab program.387
The physical properties of the orbit chosen for Skylab meant that the station
would cross over a greater total area of land, though the probability that any debris from
its reentry would hit terra firma remained minuscule compared to the likelihood that it
would land in an ocean. Orbital mechanics affected the potential range of impact, as did
386
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other environmental factors such as atmospheric wind currents and the rotation of the
Earth, some of which proved either difficult or impossible to calculate in reentry
models.388 The combination of these natural factors with unknowns such as the
aerodynamic properties, velocity, attitude, and path of surviving fragments exceeded
researchers’ abilities to precisely predict when and where fragments would land—known
as the “boundary of dispersion” or “footprint.”389 Determining hazard to human life
required the consideration of yet another factor that had begun to be featured in other
assessments of global environmental risk—namely, population growth. In determining
whether boosting a potentially dangerous object to a higher orbit could provide an
acceptable alternative to hazardous reentry, researchers argued that such a procedure
could have the opposite effect. As time goes on and the world population increases, it
becomes more likely it becomes that a piece of debris will hit someone. Therefore,
boosting the object to a higher orbit from which it would eventually still fall back to
Earth could be more likely to yield casualties in a more population-dense future.390
In determining the thresholds for human risk, researchers attempted to model
debris footprints using different object and environmental variables, including a so-called
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“man-radius” that ranged from one foot to one meter.391 However, one study also
suggested that the best way to assess the risk of human casualty from falling debris came
from a natural analogy—namely the casualty rates from falling meteoroids. Although the
authors of this study recommended a controlled reentry experiment in place of the extant
theoretical studies, they argued that the behavior and low casualty rates of meteor impacts
suggested that space junk would be similarly benign to human beings. The simple
conclusion: "The risk of casualties due to meteorite impact appears to be low. (To date,
there have been no verified human fatalities due to meteorite impacts.) Therefore, the risk
from NASA activities should also be low."392 Authors of the study included an overview
of meteorite-caused casualties that included interpretations of Biblical passages that
suggested a meteor strike. Such a wide stretch of time perhaps best illustrated the rarity of
casualties caused by objects falling from space—compared to the mere decades of the
space age, in which no people had been struck by space debris, the long term low rate of
meteorite casualties provided a hopeful comparison point. An appendix table at the end of
the report lists only twenty incidents, each labeled with a “provisional rating” regarding
the likelihood that the event happened as recorded, ranging from “doubtful” to “possible”
to “probable” to “certain.” Until an in situ test of a reentry experiment, these natural
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analogs provided the only logical source of data on what might be expected to happen
with the reentry of artifacts—and the expectation proved optimistic.393
When program parameters changed and Skylab’s weight ballooned from 138,743
pounds to 169,635 pounds in the leadup to launch, the possible “lethal area” of reentry
footprint increased by 11.7 percent and raised the probability of casualty to 0.0273, above
the 0.001 casualty probability threshold designated as “unacceptable” by the Air Force.394
When NASA officials decided that the program should keep to its planned launch date
anyway, program technical researchers contemplated different contingency plans—
instead of changing the station before launch to reduce the risk upon reentry, the
parameters of reentry itself could be changed or precluded entirely. Before Skylab even
reached orbit, one group of researchers proposed sending a crew of astronauts aboard an
Apollo spacecraft to dock with Skylab and draw it back to Earth in a carefully planned
manner to ensure that it would fall over water. The astronauts would separate their craft
from the station before its final plunge and return through the atmosphere themselves,
protected from Skylab’s fate by the Apollo command module’s heat shield. However,
such a plan would require changing the structure of Skylab in such a way that could
possibly force out valuable components of the program’s science mission and cause the
launch date to slip further into the future. Risk to the astronauts, expense, labor, limited
payload space, and scheduling all doomed the crew-controlled deorbit scenario.395
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With direct human intervention off the table, in April, 1973, one month before
launch, the Skylab program manager commissioned structural testing to determine
whether certain components of the station could be manipulated so that larger fragments
would be less likely to survive the eventual reentry.396 Should the station break into small
enough pieces, the possibility that large fragments would remain intact decreased.
However, once again, changing critical components of the mission so close to the
planned May launch proved to be a dead end due to the political and budgetary necessity
of keeping to the launch schedule.397 In 1974, after Skylab had reached orbit, researchers
from the Battelle Institute suggested three categories of reentry damage countermeasures
for future spacecraft of similar size and mass. The first, “destructive systems,” involved
destroying the station before it began its eventual Earthward plunge. On-board explosives
could be triggered from the ground at an optimal moment of decay, breaking large
structures into smaller, less resilient pieces. Battelle researchers even suggested that a
small nuclear device would do this job well, though perhaps such a method would not be
a practical choice due to safety and political concerns.398 By 1977, after the final crew of
astronauts had departed, this idea resurfaced, this time with conventional chemical
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explosives launched in a separate vehicle to destroy Skylab while it remained in orbit.399
A second category of countermeasure, “protective systems,” involved building
components of spacecraft to survive not only reentry, but impact as well—particularly
those components that house hazardous materials, as had been done on spacecraft
equipped with radioisotope thermal generators (RTGs).
The final category of reentry countermeasure proposed in 1974 gained favor
among Skylab officials as the likely reentry date drew closer. “Orbital control systems”
required using a native or external propulsion system to boost the spacecraft to a higher
orbit.400 The first and best option from this category involved using the underdevelopment Space Shuttle to do the job. As an additional perk to this plan, Skylab
program managers developed embryonic ideas for ways to reuse the space station. In an
attempt to save money as the Space Transportation System development rapidly ran over
budget and schedule, researchers at MSFC advocated turning the extant space station into
the basis of a much larger, longer-lived orbital outpost and platform for the future Space
Shuttle. Reusing the orbital workshop and the Apollo Telescope Mount (ATM), perhaps
with the addition of a discarded Space Shuttle external tank, such a system would be
made almost entirely out of free materials and scientific apparatus, and could even
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eventually serve as a servicing station to repair failing satellites.401 In 1977, after the last
astronauts departed and the first shuttle had yet to launch, the reuse of Skylab seemed to
be an ideal way to both reduce costs for the next generation space infrastructure and
diminish the risk of the station causing damage or casualties on the ground upon
reentry.402 However, as the Solar Maximum became more intense and Skylab’s decay
accelerated, the feasibility of such a solution also declined. As noted earlier, although the
final crew had boosted the station to an orbit that, under normal solar conditions should
have kept it aloft into the mid-1980s, new estimates suggested it would come down
before the end of the 1970s, well before the Shuttle would be operational. One more lastditch effort to assemble an orbital control method to save Skylab involved sending an
uncrewed, automated expendable rocket armed with a teleoperator retrieval system
(TRS). However, the TRS had not yet been fully developed and tested by spring 1978.403
The chief forecaster for the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
claimed that NASA had not used the most accurate model for sunspot activity, and
predicted that none of these methods would be ready before the station began to
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tumble.404 With the TRS still at an early stage of development, launched atop an
automated rocket without a “man in the loop” to facilitate any last-minute changes
needed to ensure mission success, the ELV-TRS plan could not continue as a viable
rescue option.405 By December 1978, NASA cancelled the planned orbiter rendezvous
mission with Skylab, and with it the possibility of recycling the venerable space
station.406
With no way to break up the spacecraft into smaller pieces, nor money and time to
scramble a rescue mission to move it to a higher, safer orbit, NASA had to determine
how best to gain control over a potentially dangerous situation. In the summer of 1978,
NASA joined forces with the Department of State, the DOD, and NORAD in forming a
Skylab Contingency Working Group (SCWG).407 Another victim of the active solar
maximum provided a test run a few months before Skylab’s predicted reentry. The
Pegasus program launched three satellites during the mid-1960s to study the
micrometeoroid environment in orbit, yielding early information about what NASA
currently calls the Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris environment (MMOD), the natural
and artificial objects that can degrade or destroy functioning payloads.408 Pegasus 1 fell
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from orbit in September 1978, and SCWG used the opportunity to fine-tune their models
for estimating reentry footprints and protocols for alerting diplomatic agencies of any
potential danger. Shortly after the Pegasus reentry, the working group released its first
general Q & A package about the impending Skylab reentry, and sent an accompanying
telegram to all American diplomatic posts.409
SCWG researchers eventually decided to attempt to change the attitude of the
station using dormant thrusters and moveable external components. By changing the
orientation of Skylab relative to the rapidly encroaching atmosphere, controllers could
influence the amount of drag and friction exerted upon the station and thereby slow or
accelerate decay as needed.410 At the same time that SCWG contemplated potential ways
to reduce the debris impact, members also worked to reduce the likelihood of a negative
social impact. With the controversy and cleanup of the nuclear-powered Cosmos 954 in
recent memory, SCWG began providing information to interested state governments
ranging from orbital elements and prediction maps to Q & A documents regarding
nuclear power sources aboard Skylab—which, unlike the Soviet satellite, drew power
only from solar panels and fuel cells and contained no radioactive materials.411 While
some elements of the reentry plan remained classified, and the SCWG fielded FOIA
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requests from a handful of newspapers and individuals, the group regularly updated its
diplomatic materials during the first half of 1979.
Skylab hysteria hit the entire world before the debris itself hit the ground. The
prospect of getting hit by a piece of a former space habitat struck a chord of macabre
humor among many communities across the globe. In a media spectacle since repeated,
but at smaller scales, individuals speculated about the likelihood of being hit by space
hardware falling back to Earth. An undercurrent of jaded acceptance of the reentry as the
inevitable result of technological hubris ran through the popular discourse regarding the
reentry of Skylab. Vendors hawked shirts and other memorabilia emblazoned with
targets, local news outlets held reentry prediction contests, and a San Francisco
newspaper offered a $10,000 reward to the first person to deliver a verifiable piece of
Skylab debris.412 The Massachusetts-based Brookline Psychoenergetics Institute held a
“think-in” on May 25 to try boosting Skylab by meditation and telekinesis.413 Former
astronaut John Glenn, by that time a United States Senator, brought a piece of his
reentered rocket to his office to demonstrate that while Skylab may have been unusually
large, this reentry would be neither new nor something to fear.414
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Two computer programmers started a consulting firm called “Chicken Little
Associates” that provided localized Skylab viewing times and predictions of where and
when the station would land to media and municipal clients who believed that NASA’s
predictions about a safe reentry seemed too sanguine.415 The head of the interagency task
group charged with handling mission support and public information about the Skylab
reentry blamed Chicken Little Associates for much of what he considered to be a larger
than warranted level of international interest in where and when the space station would
fall.416 But it wasn’t just aerospace outsiders who received the blame for inflating Skylab
mania. The introductory memo prefacing a NASA-sponsored compilation and
bibliography of Skylab debris studies conducted before the reentry critiqued aerospace
companies such as Lockheed for using language that some at NASA considered to be
inappropriately inflammatory—such as using “lethal” rather than “hazardous” or
“capable of causing injury”—and suggesting that the Skylab reentry posed “a very high
risk to human life.”417
On July 11th 1979, Skylab began its final plunge. The trajectory of reentry brought
it over land—specifically, a large island in the middle of the Pacific Ocean: Australia.
Because Skylab was made up of two main components, the orbital workshop and the
ATM, trackers were surprised to observe that the station remained intact throughout most
of its plunge through the atmosphere. It finally broke into several fragments that hit the
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ground in remote areas in and around the municipalities of Balladonia and Esperance. No
casualties—human or animal—were reported. However, in the days after citizens in Perth
reported seeing hundreds of glowing pieces falling from the sky, Australian citizens
began to recover pieces of hardware that appeared to have been part of the American
space station.418 One resident of Esperance took the American radio station up on its
posted bounty, flying to America with a few small pieces of blackened debris in his
luggage. Local governments recovered the larger fragments, the largest of which was an
intact oxygen tank. 419 A team from MSFC traveled to Australia to observe and collect
debris, as per stipulation in the Outer Space Treaty regarding the return of space objects
to the launching state.420 Several pieces of debris remained behind, however. One
fragment of the orbital workshop component of Skylab made a publicity circuit around
the country, even being featured in the Miss Universe pageant that took place in Perth a
few days after it was recovered.421
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Figure 3.4: Skylab debris on display at the Miss Universe Pageant 1979 in Perth,
Australia.422
Comparing the reentry of Skylab to the reentry of Cosmos 954 a year and a half
prior reveals some similarities and some stark differences. Like Cosmos 954, Skylab fell
over land, into a remote part of a country geographically removed from the launching
state. The natural environment of each landing site provided a sink for each field of
debris: the muddy lake bed and frigid waters of the Great Slave Lake covered the
insoluble particulate matter shed by the Cosmos nuclear reactor, and several pieces of
422
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Skylab debris likely remained undiscovered in the Australian outback and ranch land.423
However, following the reentry of Cosmos 954 the Canadian government mobilized an
international search and cleanup team, for which Canada invoked the Liability Treaty
against the Soviet Union to recover money dedicated to the effort; whereas the Australian
government opted to waive any claims against the United States. NASA reported that by
August of that year, some 13 claims had been filed against Skylab, none of which
originated in Australia.424 The local government in Esperance charged NASA a $400
fine—for littering. This fine went unpaid until 2009 when a radio disc jockey serving
California and Nevada raised money from his listeners and paid the fine on NASA’s
behalf. A giant novelty check marked “paid in full” now hangs on the wall of the
Esperance Municipal Museum, above display cases housing some of the largest
fragments of Skylab collected from the surrounding area.425
In the midst of the Cold War, the fall of a nuclear powered Soviet satellite over a
sovereign Western nation reified the nuclear threat feared but never realized in the form
of atomic weapons use in warfare. Australia and the United States—two nations on the
same side of the Iron Curtain with open lines of communication and information—did
not have the same substrate of animosity pushing them to invoke legal recourse. The
difference between in the two spacecrafts’ nuclearity—a category that Gabrielle Hecht
has argued emerges from a complex web of material and social realities—also factored
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into the difference in legal action.426 The nuclear reentry, seemingly the result of an
uncontrolled accident (with neither effort nor information provided by the Soviet space
program to the regions threatened by Cosmos debris) stood in stark contrast to the
publicized attempts by NASA to prevent, delay, and eventually direct the reentry of the
non-nuclear Skylab. Finally, the differences between the two environments—one seen by
many in Canada as part of a fragile, critical natural resource, the other as empty land
traversed only by the occasional livestock—also factored into the drastic differences in
subsequent legal and financial action. These stark contrasts in environmental value,
political affiliations, nuclearity, and perceptions of control yielded wholly divergent
outcomes in the days and months that followed each reentry.
While both the reentry of Skylab and Cosmos 954 tested new rules of space
governance and brought the geophysical world into legal negotiations of liability, the
reentry of Skylab also provided a fitting conclusion to a program intended to yield new
information about the near-Earth space environment. The Skylab science mission was
divided into three primary categories: the medical study of long-duration microgravity on
the human body, Earth resource monitoring, and observations of the Sun.427 The Apollo
Telescope Mount (ATM)—one of the two main, massive components of the station that
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program controllers feared might present a reentry hazard—constituted the first crewed
space observatory.428 It housed eight discrete instruments for studying different aspects of
solar activity in wavelengths spanning the electromagnetic spectrum, including
wavelengths that cannot be observed from the ground due to atmospheric absorption.429
Two scientist-astronauts flew aboard Skylab, and were chosen for these flights so that
astronomers on the ground might benefit from their expertise in ionospheric and solar
physics.430 Astronomers revised their models of the structure of the Sun’s corona after
definitively proving, using ATM-gathered data, that the stream of energetic particles
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known as the solar wind originates in phenomena known as “coronal holes.”431
Astronomers were astonished to learn just how active the Sun could be even during solar
minima. So perhaps when this activity accelerated, and the solar wind buffeted the nearEarth environment, expanding the exosphere and bringing the ATM crashing back to
Earth, it provided a fitting end to the study of the Earth-Sun environment. While in
operation, Skylab had revealed new information about our star; on its death, it revealed
just how much we had yet to learn—both about the Sun and about its interactions with
the near-Earth environment and the artifacts transiting through it.
Global Fallout: Space Junk in the Anthropocene
Following the reentry of Skylab, the Chief of International Program Support International
Affairs at NASA expressed his fervent hope that “we will not have to repeat such an
exercise in the foreseeable future.”432 Yet, the Sun continues to shine, it continues its
cyclical energetic pulsing—and it continues to push our out-of-control technologies back
home to roost. Two solar cycles have passed since the fall of Cosmos 954 and Skylab at
the peak of cycle 21. During each subsequent solar maximum, massive Cold War era
artifacts have fallen back to Earth, with varying degrees of popular attention. In the
spring of 2001, during the 23rd solar maximum, the 140-ton Soviet Mir space station
began a slow tumble into the atmosphere when funding ran out to maintain its place on
orbit. While the Kremlin emphasized that Russian engineers had carefully controlled the
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reentry to fall over the Pacific Ocean, some echoes of Skylab reverberated through
popular culture worldwide.433 Not only did early estimates indicate a landing near
Australia, but displays of macabre humor conveyed a similar popular response, ranging
from targets mowed into golf courses to an advertising ploy by the fast food chain Taco
Bell. The company deployed a 40-foot-square floating target within the predicted reentry
footprint and promised a free taco to every American should the main body of Mir hit the
bull’s eye.434 The debris missed the target, instead streaking massive plumes of smoke
through the skies over Fiji and landing far off shore.435 Taco Bell offered a “consolation”
deal of two tacos for 99 cents.436
The most recent solar cycle, which reached a relatively benign maximum in 2014,
brought several artifacts into the atmosphere. In June 2016, denizens of the Canadian
arctic once again found themselves asking questions about a reentering spacecraft of
Soviet origin with hazardous fuel aboard. Local officials from the Inuit hamlet of Grise
Ford—considered one of the coldest inhabited places on Earth—expressed fear that a
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falling hydrazine-laden rocket body could contaminate a valuable cod fishery and refuge
for beluga whales, narwhals, walrus, seals, polar bears, and seabirds.437 While the
government of Nunavut released a public service announcement reassuring citizens that
the falling rocket would be a “very low risk event” and that the debris would land outside
Canadian territorial waters, locals reacted with indignation that a foreign power would
use sensitive Arctic waters as a toxic space junk dump, as characterized by University of
British Columbia political scientist Michael Byers.438 A World Wildlife Fund official
working in the region defended the Baffin Bay region as "the most productive…in the
Arctic,” and “not an empty wasteland. It's a place that Inuit have lived around and use."439
An Arctic campaigner from Greenpeace raised a legal analogy, claiming that “dumping
these chemicals from a ship would be a clear violation of international and Canadian law,
and it is no more acceptable when it is dumped from the air.”440 In sharp contrast,
Nunavut Minister of Community and Government Services Joe Savikataaq expressed a
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healthy measure of defeat in contemplating potential environmental disaster. “It’s a
Russian rocket,” he opined to the local press. “We have very little control over it.”441
As these parallel events demonstrate, reentry of space junk has become a regular,
material attribute of the solar cycle, as reliable as an increase in energetic activity at Solar
Maximum. They also demonstrate that questions of consent, control, responsibility, and
even the definition of toxic waste continue decades after the first tests of space liability.442
The most optimistic predictions of low casualty rates from falling debris generated by
Skylab personnel endure; to date, only one person has been struck by a piece of space
debris, a light piece of mesh that did not cause injury. However, the seemingly random,
dangerous contact between sea, space, sky, and land facilitated by falling space junk
continues to raise alarm among those concerned about human health and environmental
integrity alike. Ancient principles of terra nullius endure into the Space Age, when even
ultimate sinks turn into political flashpoints in the face of a falling sky. The movement of
space junk continues to break down geographical boundaries, with waste from one
extraterritorial region transforming upon arrival in other extraterritorial and sovereign
places.
The history of reentering space junk during the long 1970s demonstrates the
expanding role of the geophysical world of near-Earth space on Cold War geopolitics. It
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also destabilizes the common historiographical narrative of the Space Race as a binary
battle between super powers and their spheres of influence. Rather, in being unwillingly
and unintentionally conscripted into legal, political, and diplomatic exchanges over space
junk reentries, even the governments and citizens of countries that had not yet or barely
become spacefaring themselves were drawn by conditions within the orbital environment
into early debates over safe environmental governance in and through near-Earth space.
This was one of the first instances in which, as an assistant to the Secretary of Defense
during the Carter Administration put it in the spring of 1978:

The ‘opposition’ was Newton’s Law of Gravitation, later compounded by
Bernoulli and the physical effects of aerodynamic drag on the satellite. The game
was against nature rather than against conscious intelligence.443

An expanded definition of the natural world had become a player in a spatially
broadening Space Race. Exceeding Cold War binaries, nature inhabited the roles of both
primary antagonist and primary victim, both in the guise of familiar and strange terrestrial
environments and in the alien ecosystem of near-Earth space. There, the circulating
products and byproducts of the space industry inspired new questions of utility and
liability on the ground as well as in orbit. From Cuban cows to Canadian cleanups, falling
space junk opened a different extraterritorial front in the Cold War: not among human
antagonists but with the strange material and physical ecosystem of orbital space.
443
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CHAPTER 4
Salvaging Space: Refuse, Reuse, and the Pursuit of
Orbital Economy, 1968-1986
Introduction: The Rarest of Beasts
On a clear day in November 2015, commercial aerospace company Blue Origin launched
its reusable New Shepard rocket. The rocket dipped into the nearest reaches of outer
space before safely nailing a vertical landing at the Blue Origin test facility in the plains
of West Texas. Blue Origin’s owner, Amazon founder Jeff Bezos, celebrated the
accomplishment by breaking his seven-year silence on Twitter with his very first tweet:

The rarest of beasts – a used rocket. Controlled landing not easy, but done right,
can look easy.444

A used rocket is a rare beast indeed—until 2015 all standalone space rockets could only
be used once. Since the end of the space shuttle program in 2011, single-use rockets have
provided the only way off the planet. After sending people or satellites into space, these
massive artifacts effectively disappear. They are large, complex, expensive, and strangely
ephemeral. In order to reach orbit, large rockets fly in stages. As each stage runs out of
fuel, it detaches, yielding a lighter, more manageable load for the remaining stages to
propel. After delivering their payloads into space, these stages of so-called expendable
launch vehicles (ELVs) either remain in orbit or fall back to Earth and burn up in the
444
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intense heat and pressure of the atmosphere. In some cases, pieces of these artifacts
survive the fall, typically landing in the oceans that cover the majority of the planet.445
Whether in orbit or falling back to Earth, these objects become invisible to the
majority of those who consume information products from outer space—whether this
information materializes in the form of advanced weather reports, time-sensitive banking
transactions, air travel, or a myriad other technological practices involving satellite
technology. This impermanence and invisibility connects the consumption practices of
the American space program to broader cultural patterns of discard. Susan Strasser has
argued that a conspicuous, even joyous culture of disposability defined postwar American
modernity. Once primarily the domain of the rich, single-use products marketed towards
the growing middle class became symbols of freedom from the drudgery of reuse.446 By
the beginning of the Space Age, an increasing number of Americans—particularly white
Americans—regularly exercised their right to a life physically and visually separated
from the trash they produced.447 Early Cold War space technologies could be seen as the
high-tech pinnacles of this postwar culture of disposability. With the exception of the
very occasionally visible space artifact that survives the fall from orbit—such as, perhaps
most famously, the reentry of the Skylab space station in 1979 which shed several
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retrievable fragments—single-use satellites and rockets disappear from the view of those
who use space information facilitated by these objects.448 Even the enormous, expensive
Saturn V moon rocket all but vanished after each single-serve flight—the emptied hulks
of the multi-stage rocket either burned up in the atmosphere, fell into the ocean, hit the
moon, or went into orbit around the Earth or around the Sun. Reusable rockets have been
considered a possibility for decades, from as early as the 1920s. Rocket engineering
pioneers such as Robert Goddard, Konstantin Tisolkovsky, and Wernher von Braun each
recorded ideas for a rocket that could be safely landed and relaunched.449 However, the
industry standard from the beginning of the Space Age embraced multistage, single-use
rockets for reasons of physical and economic expediency.450
The current private industry initiative to construct a reusable spaceflight paradigm
distantly follows on the heels of a period during the Cold War Space Race during which
reusability and recycling became key goals of an increasingly austere public American
space industry.451 After the spectacular success and economic excess of the Apollo moon
program, three presidential administrations alongside leadership in civilian and military
space programs set out to normalize spaceflight as a common form of transportation. For
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a prolonged but limited time the vanguard of the American space industry focused on rematerializing a deeply illegible, ephemeral form of waste into a key component of a
tangible reuse economy. Rather than designing old rockets and satellites to disappear into
space, atmosphere, or ocean after use or failure, NASA made efforts to invest in
developing new technologies that would save money in the long term. However, in order
to achieve true economy, Cold War advocates of reusability advocated the reuse of all
components of the space infrastructure, not just launch and landing vehicles. The primary
means of savings would come through comprehensive revision of spacecraft design that
privileged the three Rs: not reduce, reuse, recycle; but retrieve, refuel, repair. The unique
environment of orbital space presented challenges that forced space policymakers and
engineers to rethink and retool an entire technological system already in place and in use.
During the long 1970s, Presidents and NASA engineers alike envisioned near-Earth
space becoming part of the human environment. As Senator Adlai E. Stephenson put it in
1979, “the United States plan[ned] to make space an extension of life on the Earth’s
surface.452 In contrast to the high adventure of 1960s frontier exploration, space would
become a place where people would live and work, a place of industry, and perhaps as
importantly, a place where we clean up after ourselves; a place that we ought to keep
clean.
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“Very Much Like a Modern Airplane"
Less than a month after the Blue Origin success, Elon Musk’s aerospace company
SpaceX accomplished a similar feat, returning the first stage of a Falcon 9 rocket from
orbital space to land in Cape Canaveral, Florida. A media ruckus unfolded around which
tech millionaire had first achieved true reusability first: whether the launch and landing of
New Shepard or of Falcon 9 would go down in history as the revolutionary moment, after
which spaceflight would become as cheap and commonplace as commercial air travel.453
The SpaceX website uses just this analogy to assert the necessity of its rocketry labors:
SpaceX rockets costs as much to manufacture as a 747 jumbo jet airplane, but a 747 can
be used multiple times a day, for tens of thousands of flights. On the company website,
SpaceX asks readers to imagine the cost of air travel if each transatlantic aircraft could
only be used once before being destroyed, and a new jet manufactured for each
subsequent flight.454
At the beginning of 1972, then-NASA Administrator James Fletcher asked
American citizens to consider the same question. Fletcher released a statement supporting
President Nixon’s announcement that NASA would begin developing a next generation
of human spacecraft that would be the first of its kind to be used more than once. He
employed a broadly recognizable analog, noting that in air transportation “we don't throw
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away an airplane after its first trip from Washington to Los Angeles.”455 The next year, a
final group of American astronauts visited the moon aboard a massive, disposable Saturn
V rocket that weighed the same as a C-5A military aircraft and cost twice as much to
manufacture.456 A few months later, Fletcher persuaded the US Senate Committee on
Aeronautical and Space Sciences to consider plans for the reusable space shuttle, a craft
that he believed would change the space industry in the same way that the DC-3 had
revolutionized civil aviation.457 In 1976, the editors of the New York Times predicted a
new age of reusable spacecraft that would open the way to an economic and
technological revolution, rendering spaceflight as routine, affordable, and accessible as a
ride on a modern jumbo jet.458 An even more optimistic journalist suggested that perhaps
even space junk could someday be designed to land in the same manner as commercial
airlines.459 The Space Age had followed closely on the heels of the Jet Age, and to
Fletcher and supporters of the American space program it seemed likely that the space
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industry might continue to follow to the same trajectory to eventual normalization and
economy.460
This veneer of technological enthusiasm obscured the grittier realities of an
increasingly squeezed federal spaceflight budget during and after project Apollo. The
desire expressed by Fletcher and Nixon to set the US space program on the path to build
a reusable spacecraft largely grew out of a changing political climate, as legislative
support for the space program waned following the successful first moon landing in July
1969.461 Indeed, beginning that same year, NASA consulted with airline companies while
developing the initial designs for what would become the space shuttle, with the explicit
aim of emulating the volume, quick turnaround, and most importantly, the economy that
the American commercial air industry had achieved in a short half-century since the first
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powered flight.462 The form that the space shuttle took in 1972 not only looked like an
airplane, in stark contrast to the blunt, small capsule-shaped human spacecraft of the
Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo programs. George Mueller, then the NASA Associate
Administrator for Manned Space Flight, also called for the next generation of spacecraft
to be integrated into the existing air control and maintenance infrastructure, sharing
launch and landing facilities with the civil aviation industry.463 In 1968, well before
NASA officials agreed upon a final design of the Shuttle, Mueller predicted that the new
spacecraft would eventually even fly out of major American airports, generating savings
through volume of flights and using a system already in regular, reliable operation. “By
building a launch-vehicle shuttle for multiple usage,” he argued in a speech before the
British Interplanetary Society that year, “we can achieve a breakthrough in costs.”464
However, Mueller noted that the launch vehicles would not be the sole path to making
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spaceflight affordable; rather, a multicomponent space transportation system made up of
a reusable shuttle, space station, and reusable satellites would be key to making orbital
space truly airline-like in efficiency and price.465
In this sense, the current race to a reusable rocket waged between billionaire
entrepreneurs only partially recapitulates the earlier effort to make spaceflight more like
air flight.466 Air infrastructure does not simply consist of airplanes and runways, but
requires sustainable fueling supply lines, communications networks, maintenance
facilities, and storage at key points of departure and arrival.467 During the long 1970s,
those who advocated a reusable space industry paradigm promoted practices that required
not only a reusable launch vehicle but also the infrastructure necessary to reuse, refuel,
and repurpose the satellites these rockets launched into space. Given the range of
altitudes at which America operated its satellites—from low orbits of several hundred
kilometers to high orbits of tens of thousands kilometers above the planet’s surface—
building this infrastructure would require comprehensive changes beyond simply
building a new human spacecraft that could reach low-Earth orbit (LEO) over and over
again. Beginning in the late 1960s, NASA commissioned studies that reached the overall
conclusion that, for the economics of reuse to yield concrete benefits in the post-Apollo
465
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era, all of orbital space—not just the nearest reaches—would need to be governed under
an ethos of recycling and salvage.468 In order to attain a truly austere, sustainable
economy of reuse into the 1980s and 1990s, all parts of the space infrastructure would
need to be designed with reuse in mind from the outset—from design and construction
through launch, use, and reuse.

Imagining Reuse
I believe that the exploitation of space is limited in concept and extent by the very high
cost of putting payload into orbit, and the inaccessibility of objects after they have been
launched.
—NASA Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight George E. Mueller, 1968469

As more and more countries and private industries sought information services provided
by orbiting satellites, the American and Soviet space industries produced a burgeoning
supply of spaceworthy rockets during the first two decades of the Space Age. Many of
these vehicles started out as ICBMs, and in America the different branches of the armed
468

Ad Hoc Subpanel on Reusable Launch Vehicle Technology, “Report for Presentation to the
Supporting Space Research and Technology Panel” (Aeronautics and Astronautics Coordinating
Board, September 14, 1966), NASA Headquarters Historical Reference Collection, Washington,
DC; Supporting Space Research and Technology Panel, “Final Report, Ad Hoc Subpanel on
Reusable Launch Vehicle Technology” (Aeronautics and Astronautics Coordinating Board,
September 22, 1966), NASA Headquarters Historical Reference Collection, Washington, DC;
“America’s next Decades in Space: A Report for the Space Task Group” (NASA, September 1,
1969), http://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19710002945.
469
George E. Mueller, “Address by Dr George E Mueller, Associate Administrator for Manned
Space Flight, National Aeronautics and Space Administration before the British Interplanetary
Society, University College London, England.”

204
services modified them to carry benign payloads and human spacecraft aloft. From a very
early moment, these rockets became known as expendable launch vehicles, their single
use-ness built into the name of the technology itself.
The payloads launched atop these ELVs, however, do not factor significantly into
the current NewSpace race as they once did during the 1970s.470 Each satellite was (and
is, with some notable exceptions) purpose built to a specific set of specialized functions,
carefully tested to ensure functionality, and then launched at a high premium per pound
into orbits ranging from a few hundred kilometers above the surface of the earth to
several thousand kilometers high.471 When satellites malfunctioned, ran out of fuel, or
became obsolete, they could not be revived or upgraded. Without the ability to send
astronauts to each satellite to safely repair or refuel these technologies, spacefaring
entities had to replace satellites wholesale and at high cost should any of the above
conditions render it unusable for the designated purpose. Once they ran out of fuel
necessary to maneuver or lost contact with operators on the ground, satellites would
essentially become waste—objects discarded, invisible, and useless.
From soda bottles to diapers, the luxury of single use consumption and living out
of sight of waste has signified wealth over centuries of American history. Those with
disposable income dispose of the products they buy, never to see their discarded waste
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again; those who do not must use and reuse.472 As Carl Zimring has demonstrated,
recycling in America grew from the nineteenth-century networks of scrappers, collectors,
and brokers—many of them immigrants—who transformed the landscape of
consumption and set the stage for current large-scale recycling systems.473 Before the
1890s, discarded things represented not waste, but the potential for future value through
reuse and remaking.474 However, as Donald Worster has noted, the frugality of reuse and
the value of consumption have not cohabited well under the capitalism of the past halfcentury.475 Although space infrastructure, as a publicly funded project, did not arise from
individual consumer choice in the same direct manner as the purchase of a newspaper or
glass jar, this uneasy tension of postwar American capitalism was evident even in the
high technology industry of space technology over the political transitions from the
Nixon to Reagan eras.476 Those who imagined the next steps in space as crafting near-
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Earth orbit into “an extension of life on the Earth's surface” echoed these terrestrial
politics in reimagining a future in space based on reuse.477
Squeezed from all sides by legislative and popular pressure to do more with less
as Apollo wrapped up, NASA leadership looked to reuse as a way of making ends
meet.478 At the height of its funding support in 1965, NASA enjoyed an annual operating
budget of $5.25 billion. This windfall covered the costs of developing new spacecraft,
purchasing expendable launch vehicles from the US Air Force, Army, and Navy for
crewed and uncrewed spacecraft, and constructing a proprietary moon rocket. With the
ongoing conflict in Vietnam bleeding the US budget into a $29 billion deficit by 1967,
the Johnson administration repeatedly cut funding to NASA during the years leading up
to the first moon landing.479 By the autumn of 1968, the NASA budget lost more than
$1.25 billion from its 1965 peak, spurring the standing NASA administrator to resign.480
Polls showed that the American public continued to support the space program, but also
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demanded that NASA operate on a greatly diminished share of public funding.481 When
Richard Nixon ascended to the presidency at the height of Apollo, he immediately set his
administration to work establishing a future direction for the space program that would
reflect his agenda. Nixon prioritized the creation of a plan for future space activity that
emphasized cooperation, rather than competition, with the Soviet Union, and, above all,
economic austerity.482 Nixon established a Space Task Group, to be chaired by Vice
President Spiro T. Agnew, upon which he bestowed the responsibility of assessing the
next directions that the civilian space sector should take in order to move towards the
goal of achieving a kinder, cheaper American space program.483
With the knowledge that the windfall of the mid-1960s would not return,
particularly under the new administration and growing public resistance to government
spending on big technology projects, NASA commissioned its own series of studies to
determine how best to reduce costs and keep the American space program competitive
among the growing roster of spacefaring nations.484 One such report, issued by Nixon’s
Space Task Group mere weeks after Neil Armstrong and Buzz Aldrin rode a disposable
$185 million Saturn V to land on the lunar surface, argued that developing a new multi481
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vehicle system of transportation would constitute “the next natural step for us to take in
space.”485 The report laid out a three-pronged set of priorities that its authors believed
should govern the development of the new space transportation infrastructure:
commonality, or the use of only a small number of flexible technologies for a wide
variety of missions; reusability, or the ability to use the same systems over multiple
missions and a long time period; and economy, particularly through the simplification of
hardware and the reduction of “throw away” technologies used in any given mission.
These priorities would, the study’s authors argued, facilitate vastly cheaper operating
costs for spaceflight than the contemporary use of non-reusable launch vehicles and
satellites, and eventually lead to the hoped-for acquisition of airline-level efficiency in
transporting people and materials between the surface of the Earth and outer space.486
These three priorities—commonality, reusability, and economy—would become
central to a new ethos in the American space industry that persisted through three
presidential administrations and two new large-scale space vehicle projects. These three
terms made up a refrain that punctuated discussions of how best to develop a more robust
orbiting infrastructure, particularly one that would also incorporate astronauts as
necessary participants in recycling outer space technology Human astronauts’ flexibility,
adaptability, and bodily dexterity would allow them to puzzle out potentially complex
repair problems. Including humans as a central component of the next generation space
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program served an additional political purpose, however.487 Although some studies of
remote and robotic repair technologies took place during this time, few in American
space policy circles argued against including astronauts in this new age of reusable
spaceflight.488 As Joan Hoff has argued, the astronaut in orbit represented the only truly
compassionate symbol of space exploration, and provided a legible point of reference for
the average American of the 1970s whom Nixon and his Space Task Group hoped to
gratify with these changes.489 By investing in the development of a large, maneuverable,
reusable spacecraft to shuttle people and cargo to and from orbit alongside a permanent
orbiting outpost and agile orbital maneuvering vehicles, the authors of the 1969 Space
Task Group report expected a large, stable return on an admittedly substantial initial
investment. By standardizing the size of satellite payloads to fit the parameters of such a
system, and allowing astronauts to return to faltering or failed satellites to make repairs or
bring them back to Earth for salvage, NASA saw the potential for an expanded customer
base that would also save money in the long run by launching and maintaining longerlived space assets that could be reliably maintained by human hands.490
The shape and scale of proposed standardized, reusable space vehicle systems
varied, and different NASA centers favored different approaches to the challenge of
487
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coming up with the next grand space endeavor. Nixon’s ambitions for reelection in 1972
motivated him to balance two contradictory campaign initiatives: to scale back funding
for military and big technology projects in favor of domestic programs, while also
maintaining large-scale space program planning in several key battleground states. He
hoped to leverage support with local space industries that would stand to benefit
economically from the development of a post-Apollo human space project.491
With the Apollo program winding down and the election looming, the Nixon
administration called on NASA to devise a next generation launch vehicle which would
set a new tone for America’s future in space in accordance with the 1969 task group
report.492 Shepherding the goal set by John F. Kennedy through the finish line would not
be the legacy of President Nixon, whose interest in outer space policy was limited
compared to his two Democratic predecessors.493 Instead of announcing a race to a new
finish line—such as Mars, as suggested by some of his contemporaries—President Nixon
planned to focus his administration’s space policy on making near-Earth space into a site
of commerce. Supporters of this approach, including George Mueller, argued that in
order to make space an extension of the human environment, the cost of transportation to
491
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orbit must be reduced through an initial upfront investment in new technologies of reuse
yielding substantial savings over time and regular use.494 Such a commonplace presence
in outer space would not only yield industrial benefits, but would also foster the first
steps towards humankind achieving a true understanding of what Mueller called “the
nature of space.”495
Technological [Angular] Momentum
The nature of space that Mueller hoped to know by way of normalizing the nearest
reaches of the cosmos included both the “first nature” and “second nature” that together
made up the orbital infrastructure. As put forward by Bill Cronon, these two terms
describe the enmeshed networks of human and non-human entities, structures, and
processes that together become equally invisible and inevitable to the societies that
encounter them.496 In order to reshape the second nature of near-Earth space, Mueller and
his colleagues faced an uphill battle.
The state of the orbital infrastructure during the early 1970s represents a
remarkable example of a large technological system that has reached what Thomas
Hughes calls “technological momentum.” A compromise between technological
determinism and the social construction of technology (SCOT) approaches to
understanding the development of technological systems, the concept of technological
momentum takes additional factors such as environmental forces and time into account to
494
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consider the ways in which society and technology mutually shape one another. Although
human beings fashion technology and continue to do so through early stages of
interpretive flexibility, with time, use, and integration into larger technological systems,
artifacts can become so deeply settled into a particular form that they become “black
boxed.” Human beings may more easily adapt to black boxed technologies rather than
change the material characteristics of the technology Itself.497 Those who sought to create
an affordable, economically sustainable reuse paradigm in outer space believed such a
massive shift would require more than simply changing the ways we get to orbit. Rather,
America would have to take the lead in refashioning nearly all aspects of the vast,
expensive, complex technological system already in place.498
During the early days of the Space Age, engineers built satellites that ranged in
form from passive satellites like the Echo satelloon and West Ford dipoles, to the active
satellites that we think of today as the standard form of space communications
technology.499 As a web of social conditions led to the prevalence of the active form of
satellite in the Soviet and American space programs, each national industry
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simultaneously constructed additional components of a vast technological system to
further grow the new space-facilitated globalism of the late twentieth century.
Expendable launch vehicles carried satellites and human spacecraft into orbit. The
satellites themselves, destined for altitudes ranging from a few hundred to thousands of
miles above the surface of the planet, would never be seen or touched by human hands
again. Engineers did not design them with the expectation that they could be retrieved
once they left the atmosphere. Whether through anomaly, fuel depletion, or eventual
orbital or material decay, these artifacts could not be reused. The considerable
momentum of expendability permeated all aspects of the space infrastructure from
Sputnik through the early 1970s.500
The attempt by Nixon, his advisors, and leadership at NASA to push a change in
momentum—and the subsequent challenges faced by those who attempted to fulfill the
initial charge—represents a unique case study in technological momentum. The
idiosyncratic attributes of the orbital environment further complicate the interplay
between social and technological forces that make change difficult to enact once
momentum builds. The combination of physical and temporal illegibility and remoteness
of the space environment itself, the extreme mobility of orbiting objects, as well as the
highly visible risk to human life required for substantial change to occur, intensified the
500
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momentum at an early stage of technological system-building. Without the ability to
materially modify components of the system already in space, and with the high cost
associated with launching new spacecraft generating resistance among funding decision
makers, enforcing a shift would require monumental change among all stakeholders in
the space industry. Given the paramount role of the geophysical world of outer space in
stabilizing the initial paradigm, the attempt to strong-arm a change from expendability to
reusability could perhaps be stylized as a fight to overcome “technological angular
momentum.”
When nonhuman nature occupies a position of such dominance—even a
dominance that lacks the intentionality that critics of actor-network theory defend as
unique attributes of human beings—it becomes a force on par with, or even stronger than,
social construction and technological determinism.501 When human actors, from Nixon to
NASA administrators to engineers, attempted to change the direction of the technological
momentum of the space system, the strangeness, inaccessibility, and intractability of the
orbital environment presented obstacles to reuse that arguably equaled political factors
and the economic climate on the ground below. As the history of the space shuttle
program demonstrates, changing one component of the system in space does not
accomplish enough to foster comprehensive change in the infrastructure as a whole.
Interested social groups that wished to change one or more components of a
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technological system must change the entire system and create an entirely new vector of
momentum.
NASA would make several attempts to foster a change in momentum by changing
one major component of the infrastructure, namely the shift from using ELVs to using the
reusable space shuttle to launch all American space technologies. Political coalitions
driven by the promise of a reuse economy supported this drastic change in protocol. For
example, in 1971, the US Air Force agreed to cease design and production of new ELVs
in deference to using the space shuttle to launch DOD payloads.502 Buying into the new
reusable civilian spacecraft in advance promised to yield savings in the long run,
particularly if the high cost of development could be shared between government
agencies. With such a complex system, developed over the course of decades, the forces
undergirding these political coalitions shifted. As the Air Force used up its store of extant
ELVs and the Shuttle schedule slipped into the early 1980s, President Ronald Reagan
stepped in to ensure the enduring solidity of the DOD-NASA partnership. In a November
1981 National Security Directive, the Reagan administration designated the Shuttle—
which was in the midst of its second crewed test flight—as the exclusive delivery
mechanism for all spacecraft, by all space users. Any exceptions to this policy would
have to be made directly through the president’s office.503
However, the continuous motion of satellites through space and the complexities
of operating in a microgravity vacuum meant that single-use technology would be
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difficult to replace. During the long 1970s, as the typical form of communications
satellites firmly settled into complex multifunction units with active electronics on board,
those at NASA who advocated the adoption of reusable spacecraft attempted to introduce
some flexibility into this momentum. NASA and its contractors proposed—and in a few
rare cases designed, built, and launched—a radically new form of satellite: one that we
could see, touch, and alter after its initial ascent into orbit. NASA and its contracted
organizations attempted to redirect industry priorities in such a way as to predict the
afterlives of products and reanimate them. Instead of building new satellites at great
expense, with the possibility that failure or accident would mean a complete loss of
investment, the change in momentum would mean long-lived satellites that could be
repaired, refueled, or even salvaged to make new technologies. In addition to saving
money in the long run, this would also minimize the impact on the near-Earth space
environment by reducing the amount of non-functioning material in orbit—a priority that
Fletcher emphasized as an important benefit towards investing in a wholesale shift in the
way that humans occupied the nearest regions of outer space.504
As the movement towards a paradigm of reuse in space gained ground, the
environment of outer space remained simultaneously a central problem and resource to
those who hoped to relinquish single-use technology. In a yearly report on national
aeronautics and astronautics activity put out by the Ford administration, the phrase
“unique environment of outer space” occurs some five times, denoting its value for
scientific research and commercial and industrial production, particularly with respect to
504
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microgravity conditions that cannot be replicated on the ground.505 The strange
environment itself was laden with value due to its unique gravitational properties;
however, these same properties also generated greater technological momentum that
would deeply hinder incremental steps towards reuse. In combination with intransigent
political forces and the ever-present priority of austerity after Apollo, the strange space
environment presented an enormous obstacle to those who sought to change the direction
of an entrenched technological angular momentum.
Building A Reusable Space Transportation System
Space historians have spilled plenty of ink on the development of the space shuttle and
the different reusable designs considered before NASA settled on the partially reusable
(and therefore cheaper to build) spaceplane and booster system.506 However, few have
illuminated the extent and scope of the reuse paradigm heralded by the late 1960s flurry
of studies, speeches, and articles that preceded the Shuttle program. In addition to
designing a vehicle that could move people and payloads to and from orbit over and over
again, many within NASA believed that the space infrastructure in its entirety must
undergo a comprehensive redesign that would include reusable satellites. NASA
Administrators from James C. Fletcher in the early 1970s to James Beggs in the mid
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1980s emphasized the economic and political necessity of fostering a new way of
building standardized, repairable satellites that met the commonality, reusability, and
economy criteria of NASA’s 1969 Space Task Group study.
The space shuttle represented only the most visible part of a much larger system
that American space leadership hoped would make outer space accessible and affordable.
As a launch and landing vehicle, the space shuttle orbiter would provide the critical link
between Earth and space. The full Space Transportation System (STS), as it came to be
known moving into the 1970s, included several components that most Americans would
never have a chance to see should the various proposals come to fruition. From plans for
a reusable Space Tug, space-based nuclear shuttle, Spacelab, upper stage rockets, and
space stations, the early, ideal STS required multiple vehicles that would remain in space
for the entirety of the technologies’ useful lives.
In its earliest design iterations, the space shuttle was intended to be fully reusable.
More than that, it was meant to facilitate the launch and operation of reusable, long-lived
satellites. Shuttle supporters argued that the shape of the vehicle itself would yield greater
economy in satellite production and performance. Should satellite builders be constrained
to the spatial dimensions of a shuttle payload bay, NASA engineers predicted that a
standard satellite form would emerge. Instead of a fleet of satellites built to individual
specifications and matched to the appropriately sized expendable rocket, a standardized
satellite form would enable mass production and economy of scale. If standardization
also included uniform handholds, docking apparatus, and other features necessary for
capture, refueling, and refurbishing, the space program would save time and money that
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would otherwise be spent training astronauts for specific, non-generalizable repair
missions. Additionally, if satellite companies designed their products with the possibility
of cheap servicing and repair, they might be able to eschew some measure of expensive
pre-launch ground testing.507
The shuttle would serve as a garbage truck and salvager, both directly and
indirectly. By removing the need for disposable rockets, fewer rocket bodies and other
mission debris would litter near-Earth space. And by bringing back dead satellites and
other payloads that could not be refurbished in space, the Shuttle would remove more
potentially dangerous large debris and safely transport the satellite through the heat and
pressure of the upper atmosphere, potentially to be refurbished and used again. Fewer
large pieces of debris would be left to reenter the atmosphere and potentially threaten
people, property, and environments on the ground—a threat that increased as the Solar
Maximum of the late 1970s drew large dead spacecraft back to Earth to the chagrin of
concerned publics and governments alike.508 Rather than littering near-Earth space with
pieces of empty single-use rockets and dead satellites, NASA and its contractors
attempted to build a vehicle that would allow the United States to clean up its own
messes in space, and perhaps even clean up after others.
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The space shuttle constituted “the major element,” or the “key element,” but
certainly not the only piece of the reuse-based Space Transportation System.509 In two
studies, produced for NASA in 1971 and 1972, Mathematica, Inc. projected significant
savings for state and commercial space customers, to the tune of nearly half the direct
costs of the expendable launch vehicle paradigm. However, Mathematica researchers
emphasized that this savings would not come about through the launch and successful
operation of the shuttle alone. Only with additional components and clearly defined reuse
objectives firmly in place would the STS yield the projected savings.510 Even as evolving
shuttle designs conducted by different organizations considered varying degrees of
reusability and partial expendability, the need for such additional components as a
reusable Space Tug and reusable satellites persisted throughout the design stages of what
would eventually become the partially reusable space shuttle that NASA and the DOD
would use from 1981 to 2011. STS designers planned that this combination would
facilitate the refurbishment and reuse of satellite payloads, both in space and by bringing
obsolete or complex systems back to Earth for repair via the Shuttle.511 By the mid-1970s,
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as engineers began to design the space shuttle vehicle, NASA continued to field studies
on how to implement satellite servicing using the proposed Space Transportation
System.512 Those who pitched the STS to lawmakers and the public emphasized that the
greatest cost of the system would come in upfront development expenses. The overall
system would see the most savings in implementation and operations.513 All of the pieces
would be necessary in order to get the American space industry to reach a sustainable
economy.
The most enduring proposed components of the Space Transportation System
included the space shuttle, the Space Tug, a Space Station, and satellites designed to be
retrieved, repaired, refueled, and redeployed. The economics, promise, and arguable
failure of the space shuttle may be gleaned from the significant historical and policy
literature. In the remainder of this section, I will examine each of the less well-known
components of the original plans for the STS, each of which would see some level of
implementation but not in a coordinated fashion that would yield the economy promised
by a fully reusable space infrastructure. For each of these components, the technological
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momentum resulting from political immobility, failed coalitions, and the intransigence of
the outer space environment impeded the implementation of each. Rather than
representing the vanguard of technological innovation, the Shuttle instead indicated the
limitations of changing only one part of a system in use.

Figure 4.1: An artist’s concept from 1970 shows an integrated system consisting of a
space shuttle, Nuclear Shuttle, and several Space Tugs that could expand humankind’s
access to space from low orbit to the lunar surface. Marshall Space Flight Center
engineers studied these concepts in response to the Space Task Force’s 1969 call for
commonality, reusability, and economy.514
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Space Tug
In January 1961, Joseph McGolrick of the NASA Office of Launch Vehicles privately
proposed an idea for a reusable orbital vehicle that he called the “space tug.” In a note to
self, McGolrick imagined a small, reusable craft, either crewed or uncrewed, whose
versatility would allow the United States to maintain a vast future infrastructure in outer
space over the next decade. McGolrick’s vision of the space tug supported several
different missions that, if implemented, would go a long way towards keeping space safe,
affordable, and clean:

One space tug mission would be to correct the orbit of earth satellities [sic]. This
could prolong the life of some satellites, which would otherwise prematurely enter
the earth's atmosphere. Satellities [sic] requiring precise positioning could be
made simpler, cheaper and more reliable if their final positioning was made by a
space tug. It could even come back from time to time to make minor corrections
or move the satellite to a new position. A space tug could afford a means of
cleaning junk out of space by directing it at the earth's atmosphere. It
could…bring friendly satellites to orbiting space stations for repair.515

Written when only a few dozen artificial satellites circled the planet, months before the
first human flew into space, and years before the cost overruns of the moon project and
the subsequent downturn in the American aerospace industry of the 1970s, this memo
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suggests that some at NASA had already considered the ramifications of the single-use
economy from an early moment in the Space Age. McGolrick primarily emphasized the
importance of developing space technology that could support longer-lived, lessexpensive satellites, which made up the largest percentage of the total cost of space
launches.516 The form of the tug itself does not matter much in this memo; what matters is
the ways in which it might enable a new way of saving money and maintaining order in a
forbidding environment that would not make such efforts easy. In closing, McGolrick
claims that human presence and space would not become routine until such satellite
servicing and removal practices became the norm.
The 1969 Space Task Group report specified that the next generation space
transportation system should include just such a vehicle. In April 1970, the NASA
Manned Space Center put out a request to the American aerospace industry for
preliminary studies of a reusable Space Tug, formalizing the name that McGolrick
speculated a decade earlier. The call for proposals specified that such a vehicle should be
versatile enough to operate from low-Earth orbit to the moon, and be capable of boosting
spacecraft to high altitudes, supporting construction projects, and rescuing and repairing
disabled spacecraft. It should be designed to operate autonomously or with an onboard
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crew. The Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) published a press release the following
month that highlighted the tug as an important component of a larger, multi-vehicle
Space Transportation System—relatively small and mundane in purpose but no less
crucial than the “larger and more publicized” shuttle and space station.517 The Space Tug
would also be at the core of STS self-maintenance, keeping all other components in
working order to preclude expensive replacements for any piece of the system that should
fail. Marshall engineers proposed that the tug would have particular value in its capacity
as a “satellite repair shop”:

Arriving at a satellite, for example, powered by a propulsion module, two
astronauts in a crew module could use manipulator arms to grasp and insert the
satellite into the cargo module. The module could then be pressurized, the crew
could enter it and repair or service the satellite (without going outside the craft).
The satellite could also be taken inside the cargo module to a space station for
extensive repair.518

The following year, North American Rockwell completed a preliminary, pre-Phase A
study for NASA that pitched significant savings based on a projected ten-year span of
Tug use. Noting that the failure rate of satellites after reaching orbit hovered between 5 to
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10 percent, Rockwell researchers claimed that retrieval, repair, and relaunch of
satellites—particularly those from GEO—would yield some $15000 per pound of
satellite in savings over wholesale replacement. They projected that over the course of ten
years, payload recovery and repair would eventually yield $250 million in savings, a
figure that would all but recoup the initial outlay to develop, test, and operate the Space
Tug.519 In addition to paying for itself, Marshall researchers argued the next year that the
Tug would make the difference in whether or not the STS project as a whole would meet
the primary goal of bringing down the cost of spaceflight. The Shuttle, while planned to
be maneuverable, would not be capable of reaching orbits beyond several hundred
kilometers in altitude. The ability to retrieve payloads from very high orbits, which could
only be achieved using a versatile hypothetical tug, would be the key to making the
shuttle itself “economically feasible.”520 Two other American companies, including
Boeing and the Aerospace Corporation, as well as the European Launcher Development
Organization, conducted pre-Phase A studies on the Space Tug in 1970 and 1971. Each
study inextricably tied the Tug to Shuttle costs: Both must be developed and used in
efficient conjunction for the economy of reuse to be truly successful over the course of a
decade of operations.521
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The Tug would effectively increase the diameter of space access on the order of
several thousand kilometers. Without the Tug to reach higher altitudes in order to launch
and retrieve malfunctioning satellites, the STS would fall far short of the economies
suggested by its advocates. The Mathematica studies of 1971 and 1972 also put forward
the necessity of a Space Tug to make the STS system cheaper than the extant expendable
launch regime.522 By April 1972, Marshall put out a call for a more intensive, nine-month
study of a Space Tug that would be “an efficient, compact system designed exclusively
for delivery and retrieval of space payloads” to and from the Shuttle, thus providing a
seamless transit link from high, geosynchronous orbits to the surface of the Earth.523 As
MSFC and the Johnson Space Center (JSC) generated in-house studies and solicited
external reviews of potential Tug design capabilities, each description and call for
proposals emphasized that any Space Tug must become available for use at the same time
as the space shuttle in order to ensure that the STS could be used immediately to retrieve
and service satellites—and by extension, to set the accumulation of savings in motion as
soon as possible. Although the Space Transportation System would go through several
conceptual design changes—dropping the nuclear shuttle, gaining a shuttle-based
Spacelab, the rise and fall of different space station concepts—the Space Tug remained a
constant requirement of STS proposals throughout the 1970s.524
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However, even as NASA studies compartmentalized the Tug and the Shuttle
together in co-development and readiness, the less flashy component of the STS did not
garner enough of a spotlight to merit the same level of steadfast internal and external
support in the midst of setbacks. From the outset of the Shuttle project in 1972, Fletcher
acknowledged that expendable orbital rocket stage would be necessary to fill any gaps in
development between Shuttle and Tug.525 By 1974, the DOD agreed to develop a “kick
motor” upper stage for use by both NASA and military projects that required payload
placement in high orbits.526 Called the “Interim Upper Stage” (IUS), this expendable
rocket would not have the capacity to retrieve payloads; it would simply provide a
stopgap until the NASA-developed reusable Tug could be called into service.527 After
over two years of competition, the DOD contracted Boeing to develop a solid rocket
concept for the IUS that could deploy from either the Shuttle or extant expendable
rockets to deliver payloads to high orbits, then maneuver into a different orbit for
disposal so as not to present a collision risk to the newly activated satellite.528 By 1975,
the DOD had committed to providing IUS units beginning in 1980, until the mid-80s
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when NASA projected that the tug would be ready for use.529 As the IUS development
also began to slip, McDonnell Douglas developed a similar single-use kick motor for use
on expendable rockets and modifiable for Shuttle use. Built by a private company for
primary use by commercial customers, the Spinning Solid Upper Stage (SSUS) would
not cost the federal government any development money, with the added benefit of
providing a unique ability to deploy spinning payloads.530 The SSUS would eventually
become known as the Payload Assist Module (PAM).531 Each of these technologies was
expendable—they could only be used once. In spite of being designed to deploy from a
partially reusable spacecraft, these kick motors reinforced the existing single-use
paradigm.
Because neither the IUS nor the PAM were being designed to retrieve payloads,
when the Skylab space station began to fall from orbit towards the end of the decade, the
Tug and an accompanying mechanism referred to as the Teleoperator Retrieval System
(TRS) once again became a top priority at NASA. Many at the agency hoped that the
imminent first launch of the space shuttle alongside completion of the Tug and TRS
would allow astronauts to either boost the station to a higher orbit, or bring it back to
Earth. However, as the development schedule for the Shuttle slipped, the Tug and TRS
project went over budget and had to be temporarily abandoned. Skylab fell from orbit as
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expected, and in the without the immediacy of a potential reentry disaster the focus on a
reusable high orbit booster solution shifted in short order. By 1981, the Space Tug was no
longer on the table, though space technology reports from that year onward continued to
gesture to “low level efforts” to build a Space Tug at some future date.532
The expendable rocket stages that served a smaller subset of the planned Tug’s
functions effectively extended the reach of the Shuttle from its low-Earth orbit
operational ceiling, boosting satellites to GEO and in some cases sending space probes
such as Galileo, Magellan, and Ulysses on their way to other planets and the Sun.533
Fifteen IUS units launched aboard space shuttles, including one that was destroyed
during the ill-fated Challenger’s final flight.534 An IUS unit that never launched currently
hangs above the payload bay of the Shuttle habitability trainer in the Boeing-sponsored
Museum of Flight in Seattle, Washington. An explanatory sign notes that Boeing
designed the stage only to fill in for the planned reusable Space Tug before it could enter
service, but after budget cuts the IUS became the “permanent solution” for high orbit
missions.535 At this point, the word “interim” no longer described this technology; to
preserve the in-use acronym, it became known as the “Inertial Upper Stage”—a less
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ethereal name for a less than ideal fix.536 The name shift along with the preserved
acronym illustrates another attribute of the unswayable technological momentum of space
technology: even as the intended use shifted in profound ways, the in-use acronym
proved so entrenched as to remain in place even as the underlying words changed.
As the STS program limped along in development and ran over budget, it became
more difficult to justify the price of developing such a reusable ancillary vehicle. As a
1982 study of potential orbital transfer vehicles indicated, none of the necessary
component technologies for such a vehicle existed yet. The procedures and technologies
would require extensive in situ development and testing at considerable cost and human
hours. Terrestrial testing could not provide the necessary conditions to fully test and
develop methods to construct, operate, and maintain such a vehicle. A particular
challenge came in the need to safely transfer and store fuel in a microgravity vacuum,
which would be necessary for a reusable Tug.537 By contrast, an expendable upper stage
like the IUS and PAM would not require refueling, and could be based largely on extant
rocket technologies that had already been extensively tested in space during the Apollo
program. While the reusable Space Tug promised to revolutionize the American satellite
infrastructure, the necessary wholesale overhaul of the rest of the transportation system
and the challenges of the space environment proved too big an obstacle for Tug designers
to bring their plans to fruition in the midst of the stable, settled single-use paradigm.
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Space Operations Center
SOC: We’ve got a bunch of satellites coming in for servicing close to your arrival time,
but we’ll hold them for you.
Tanker 3: Thanks….we have a full load of cry[ogenics] for you….an extra 11,500 pounds
from the ET. Looks like the boost engines were better than nominal on today’s run. That
ground crew is doing a great job!538
Relative to the small, agile Space Tug, plans for a continuously operated Space Station
inspired a more visible debate and controversy within and outside NASA.539 With the
space shuttle ferrying people and cargo from Earth to orbit and a versatile Space tug
providing the link to higher orbits, this third piece of infrastructure rounded out early
conceptions of the reusable Space Transportation System. Robert R. Gilruth, the first
director of the Manned Spacecraft Center (later renamed the Lyndon B. Johnson Space
Center) argued in 1968 that to achieve true economy in space flight, America would need
to first achieve a permanent presence in orbit.540 While a space station of some sort
featured in nearly every STS proposal from the late 1960s through the 1980s, the size,
shape, and purpose of such a station varied widely from person to person and among staff
at different NASA centers. The initiative to reuse space technology showed up in the
proposed form and function of several space station ideas studied by NASA and its
contractors during the 1970s and 1980s.
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At the time that the NASA centers began developing STS space station concepts,
they had a single reference point for permanent American presence on orbit. The Skylab
space station launched atop (and was made of pieces of) a spare Saturn V moon rocket.
For two years three different crews of three astronauts used Skylab as an orbital
laboratory, conducting mostly medical and astronomy experiments within the station and
undertaking spacewalks to fix the station itself when automated systems failed. In NASA
terminology, Skylab was a Space Laboratory. The station did not have the thrusters
necessary for maneuverability and could not be used as a base from which to construct or
retrieve satellites. At first, Skylab mission operators hoped to reuse the station after its
final crew departed, reviving the derelict vessel and repurposing it for use as an extension
of the Shuttle during missions that would require roomier accommodations.541 Plans for
such reuse imagined the second iteration of Skylab as extra laboratory space, relatively
spacious quarters for less hardy astronauts, and even eventually as the backbone to a
manufacturing and repair center in orbit.542 Once it became clear that the Shuttle would
not be ready in time to boost Skylab to a high enough orbit to prevent it from reentering
the atmosphere, NASA officials realized that they would need to start from scratch on a
new form of orbital platform. In exchanges between administrators and researchers, three
clearly delineated types of station emerged as the most appropriate applications of limited
funds and research resources during the upcoming STS era: a station that would support
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Space Industrialization, an Operational Base, or another Space Laboratory.543 Different
NASA centers, from Goddard Space Flight Center in Maryland to the Manned Space
Center in Texas, each backed one of these primary station functions depending on the
mission strengths of the institution. However, many Space Laboratory models such as
those advocated by NASA Goddard personnel during the mid 1970s included satellite
servicing and operations in the overall mission.544 Satellite servicing became a consistent
refrain in many station concepts as the most important factor in justifying and recouping
the cost of STS development.545
As part of an ideal Space Transportation System, a continuously occupied space
station would provide the on-demand access to space technology that the STS was
intended to facilitate. The form and purpose of the space station—and the degree of its
autonomy as a separate component of the larger STS—vacillated widely under the tenure
of different presidential administrations and NASA administrators.546 Regardless of the
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intended primary use of the space station, the role of the station to facilitate space
technology reuse showed up in several early proposals. One early idea for an orbiting
platform, proposed by Fletcher and later supported by Beggs, demonstrated the feasibility
and challenges of building a spacecraft quite literally upon reuse.547 This proposal
suggested using discarded space shuttle external tanks (ET) for purposes ranging from
equipment storage to crew quarters.548 Each large ET by design fell back into the
atmosphere after feeding liquid fuel to the orbiter’s main engines—a disposable
component of the otherwise reusable space shuttle system. What could be cheaper,
Fletcher’s space station team argued, than building the foundations of a necessary piece
of infrastructure using an expensive technology that otherwise immediately went to
waste?549 This plan would not move beyond an early, informal proposal, though it
recurred periodically throughout the Skylab and Shuttle programs, cropping up as part of
the Skylab reuse study of the mid-1970s and in studies conducted as recently as the early
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years of the International Space Station program.550 The authors of one such proposal
acknowledged the likely material difficulties of using an ET to build a space station,
noting: “The alchemists of the Middle Ages who sought to transform lead into gold
would feel quite at home with space designers seeking to transform expended rocket
propellant tanks into useful space payloads."551 In imagining a second life for expendable
launch technology, those who supported an ET-based space station took the reuse
initiative to the next level, transforming an artifact designed to be disposable into a
utility-laden object of value.
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Figure 4.2: This artistic conception portrays one potential reuse for the expendable
shuttle external tank, as part of an orbital construction facility.552
In another study sponsored by NASA and actively researched by aerospace
subcontractors from the late 70s to early 80s, the space station itself became a critical part
of the reuse economy, serving as the neighborhood salvage and recycling center for lowEarth to geosynchronous orbits. The Space Operations Center (SOC) station proposal
grew out of an idea by researchers at the Johnson Space Center in the late 1970s. Those at
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NASA, Rockwell, and Boeing that executed studies of the proposed SOC aimed to design
an orbiting depot where astronauts and automated vehicles could undertake satellite
repurposing, refurbishing, and salvage on a daily basis. Contributors to the planning of
the SOC did not intend the station to be a scientific lab like Skylab and the spacecraft that
would eventually become the International Space Station. As the name implies, its
primary purpose was to support operational missions—run-of-the-mill construction
projects, maintenance, and transportation that would keep the space infrastructure
running cleanly and cheaply for government and commercial space consumers.553 The
SOC model provided a permanent, consistently occupied, in situ berth for the space
shuttle, a Space Tug, and an orbital maneuvering vehicle like the ill-fated TRS. Using the
SOC as a home base, astronauts could manipulate satellites as high as geosynchronous
orbit or even the moon.554 As one NASA press release argued, the SOC would provide
the cheapest way to maintain the growing satellite infrastructure through upgrading and
repairing faltering satellites rather than the expensive contemporary—and continuing—
practice of launching replacement satellites in the event of failure or obsolescence.555
Johnson Space Center researchers rallied around the Operational Base model of
the space station at the end of the 1970s and the early 1980s, and the SOC became a
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favored option for implementing this mission.556 Sam H. Nassif of the Program
Development Office of the NASA Engineering and Development Directorate noted that
the SOC would provide “a logical extension of the operationally oriented space capability
that began with the space shuttle.”557 With the space shuttle providing space customers
with cheap, reliable ways to extend the functional lives of satellites, the SOC would
provide greater working and storage space, particularly for unfixable satellites that could
then be brought back to Earth for salvage upon the next returning Shuttle.558 With
retrievable satellites in service and an agile Space Tug, or even an expendable orbital
maneuvering vehicle, JSC personnel and affiliated researchers at Rockwell International
expected the SOC to provide the key to access to all orbital altitudes and the reduction of
necessary Shuttle flights, which had already become more expensive than initially
hoped.559 While none of the SOC designs made use of discarded Shuttle fuel tanks as part
of the material infrastructure, researchers sought to reduce the amount of waste generated
556
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with each jettisoned ET.560 For instance, in the Rockwell SOC study, each Shuttle flight
would end with the ET accompanying the orbiter to the station, whereupon any excess
fuel therein would be transferred to a holding tank. Instead of dissipating in atmosphere
or ocean with the rest of the disintegrating ET, this fuel could then be used to power the
orbital transfer vehicles, and perhaps even refuel satellites.561
By May 1981, acting NASA Administrator Alan Lovelace came out with his
support for the SOC, calling for an operational station by 1984.562 Astronauts John Young
and Robert Crippen, who flew the first space shuttle mission the previous month, also
supported the SOC concept, calling it “the next logical step to our exploration of
space.”563 The DOD concurred, with officials expressing their desire to save money
through regular refurbishing of defense payloads.564 The following month, Representative
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Bill Nelson publicly called for the Reagan Administration to commit to putting the SOC
in orbit by 1989.565 However, NASA never devoted funds to the development of the SOC
beyond the initial Phase A concept. The NASA budget for fiscal year 1982 allocated only
$1 million for continuing SOC studies.566 At the end of November 1981, Reagan’s
assistant director for national security at the Office of Science and Technology Policy
argued that the SOC should not be America’s next step in space, and that if such a
spacecraft should become necessary then the private sector would fill the void—a charge
that would prove prescient of future launch vehicle policy positions taken by Reagan in
subsequent years. Such directives would adversely shift the American space industry
away from reuse.567
By 1990, plans for Space Station Freedom (which would eventually turn into the
International Space Station program) were already in motion, with the station explicitly
defined as a laboratory for scientific research. Initially, Freedom would also be used as a
home base for the construction and servicing of spacecraft—but specifically human
spacecraft intended for Mars and the moon, rather than Earth-orbiting satellites.568 By the
time the first modules of the space station reached orbit, the construction and servicing
component fell away, and the International Space Station (ISS) of today primarily
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operates as a scientific research facility. The ISS’s shape was determined by the size of
the Shuttle’s payload bay, as anticipated by those who hoped that the payload bay would
shape a cheaper standardized satellite. The ISS does not have the facilities to serve as an
orbital repair shop, and for the most part its thrusters are only used to move it out of the
way of space junk that might have been cleaned up using the Space Transportation
System in its original form.
NASA and its international partners used the space shuttle as the primary
workhorse to build the ISS, which has been continuously occupied for a decade. The ISS
took a shape determined by the size of the Shuttle’s payload bay, and serves as an
orbiting science laboratory rather than an operations center.. Early cost projects of the
SOC and ISS suggested that a similar investment would be necessary to build a
permanent structure in space. In 1981, JSC staff estimated the cost of developing and
operating an SOC in conjunction with a Space Tug would come to some $1.5 billion per
year initially, tapering down after 3 years.569 A separate estimate brought the total SOC
cost to $6.99 billion including the cost of seven shuttle launches over the two years
budgeted for building the station.570 In 1993 NASA adjusted the American contribution to
ISS construction to around $1.3 billion per year from 1994 to 2005, rising to over $2
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billion during peak years of construction.571 While this figure parallels the projected costs
for the SOC, the ISS required 40 total construction launches, including 36 shuttle flights
over the course of twelve years.572
Although the actual costs of the SOC had it been approved cannot be calculated,
and the total costs of the ISS including Shuttle launches also cannot be easily determined,
in the planning stages the ISS and SOC models diverged in terms of cost recouping
through satellite recycling. As a laboratory with no equipment to capture or refurbish
satellites, cost estimates for the ISS did not incorporate any additional projected savings
through providing a platform for satellite repair and reuse. In contrast, 1981 budget
projections for the SOC included millions of dollars in savings by the year 2000,
particularly if the station operated in conjunction with an upgraded Shuttle and reusable
Space Tug.573 With the loss of the SOC in favor of a second Space Laboratory to succeed
Skylab, another important piece of the reusability paradigm fell by the wayside.

Reusable Satellites
Planning for the space shuttle began in earnest in 1970, but was not without its enduring
skeptics. For instance, Democratic senator Walter Mondale consistently resisted the
expenditure of such large sums of federal money that would be required as an initial
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outlay, no matter the projected eventual savings.574 Fletcher addressed these concerns by
emphasizing that the Shuttle would provide over a billion dollars in savings compared to
expendables once it became operational. He cited studies by the Aerospace Corporation
and other external organizations that demonstrated the monetary payoff of repairing and
maintaining satellites, even if some would be lost to obsolescence. However, Fletcher
also clearly delineated the need to provide other “essential future elements” that would
make it truly reusable—including the Space Tug, and perhaps most importantly, satellites
that had been built from the outset to be retrievable and reparable. Rather than requiring a
staggering research and development expenditure, Fletcher argued that “repair and
maintenance of satellites in orbit is technically and practically feasible when the satellites
have been designed with this in mind.”575
As part of STS development, NASA dedicated resources to developing a new
satellite design called the multimission modular spacecraft (MMS). Initially developed
for scientific research satellites, the MMS streamlined manufacturing costs by
incorporating standardized modules for power, attitude control, communications, and
data management, thereby fulfilling the “commonality” priority from the original 1968
Space Task Group report. In addition to saving money by manufacturing these
components in bulk rather than building them to spec for individual missions, MMS
designers expected that standardized modules would save money by enabling easier onorbit repairs to failing satellites. Because all MMS satellites used the same components,
574
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replacement parts would be easy and cheap to both procure and install. In 1981, NASA
projected that some 75 percent of space science missions of the 1980s could be achieved
using the MMS. The first tests of the MMS model came with the Solar Maximum
Mission and two Landsat satellites. NASA anticipated that other astronomical,
geophysical, climatological, and defense missions could be fulfilled by the MMS at
greatly reduced costs to the customer.576
Additionally, NASA developed several larger satellites that would be retrievable
from orbit, some of which used the MMS system. The candidates for such design
supported science research that would benefit from regular servicing and upgrades. Four
such satellites went into service: the Hubble Space Telescope (HST), Compton Gamma
Ray Observatory, Extreme Ultraviolet Explorer, and the Upper Atmosphere Research
Satellite.577 Of these four, only the Hubble received visits from the Shuttle—five over a
span of seventeen years, most infamously in 1993 to correct the telescope’s faulty
optics.578 Both the MMS and larger research satellites required specific features in order
to be considered “man-rated,” or safely manipulated by astronauts. These features
included hand holds and safety locks, and required larger overhead to include—which
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some satellite customers found onerous.579 However, not just any satellite could be
retrieved by Shuttle astronauts, as NASA demonstrated in several initial satellite rescue
missions during the mid-1980s. The high speeds at which satellites orbit in microgravity
conditions, as well as the risk inherent in sending astronauts into a lethal environment,
rendered repair nearly impossible without safety and manipulation devices that astronauts
could be adequately trained to use.580 In published materials intended to describe the
latest space technology to the American public, the NASA public affairs department
described the HST as “a test-bed for satellite repair work.” Lockheed designed the HST
to be serviced in space, and occasionally brought back to Earth for more complicated
upgrading and refurbishing.581
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Figure 4.3: The Multimission Modular Spacecraft (MMS) served as the basis for several
different satellites across a wide variety of science missions. Two of the featured
spacecraft have reentered the atmosphere, and one continues to orbit the planet following
its decommissioning in 2001.582
In addition to putting up the development costs from the outset in an austere
budget environment, NASA also ran into obstacles of compliance with its intended
satellite customer base. In 1982, JSC researcher Gordon Rysavy lamented NASA
management’s lack of attention to the need for a coordinated set of rules and regulations
for retrievable satellites, like the technical manuals provided by the FAA to military and
civilian jet manufacturers. Rysavy claimed that commercial satellite customers especially
had clamored for such defined parameters, and that NASA’s failure to provide them may
have set satellite servicing back by five years—at a cost of some $1.5 billion in estimated
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savings to be achieved through reuse.583 A Grumman Aerospace Corporation estimated
that the cost of repairing a satellite in orbit represented only 5 to 10 percent of the cost of
building a new satellite.584 However, in order to achieve these savings satellite customers
had to comply with man-rating standards that NASA did not have the resources to
distribute and regulate.
The strange physical environment of orbital space precluded any simple, onepoint solution to replace expensive single-use space infrastructure with reusable
technologies. Most satellites launched into orbit would never be seen again, and no
spacecraft existed that could reach artifacts at orbits above a few hundred kilometers.
Therefore, they were not designed in such a way as to make capture or repair possible.
Catching a satellite in a microgravity environment in which objects move at speeds of
upwards of 7 kilometers per hour presented a design challenge. Like the airline industry
of the preceding decades, satellite designers would need to adhere to a set of
specifications in order to qualify for access to outer space.585 Advocates of the reusability
paradigm saw greater economy in a more standardized form of satellite that they believed
would take shape dictated by the rest of the technological system in which it would be
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embedded. Constrained in size by the payload capacity of the proposed space shuttle
orbiter, commercial and government satellites would become part of a larger, integrated
system of reuse.
Compromises and Cuts
Those who advocated the development of the reusable Space Tug, Space Operations
Center, and serviceable satellites as the components of a reusable space transportation
infrastructure argued that the United States ought to work on making space a place for
industry, rather than solely a place for conducting science. While on the surface this
perhaps runs counter to the uses of space advocated by astronomers and biologists during
the early years of the Space Age, the operational model of Space Transportation System
nonetheless would support the overall goals of those who sought to protect the nearest
regions of outer space for scientific research.586 Not only would the large space telescope
be designed from the outset to be serviceable by astronauts or brought back to Earth for
full upgrading; but the ability to reach a wide breadth of near-Earth space to retrieve
nonfunctional satellites would mean a less cluttered place, a site of scientific research that
would be protected from potential collisions and obstructions.587
As the Shuttle slipped in schedule and rose in costs, each additional piece of the
Space Transportation System fell victim to the vagaries of legislative and presidential
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support. The nuclear shuttle dissipated in the face of contemporary anti-nuclear politics;
the reusable Space Tug gave way in the face of skyrocketing Shuttle expenses and
competitive expendable launch vehicles; and the operations model of Space Station
yielded to a more competitive laboratory version. Soon, the space shuttle was all that
remained from the heady proposals for an integrated, highly reusable space transportation
system of the 1970s.588 The name “Space Transportation System” eventually became a
synonym for the space shuttle.589 As physicist Thomas Johnson argued six years after the
first Shuttle launch, the Shuttle program ultimately failed because it was “expected to do
the impossible”—in Johnson’s framing, to provide an economy of scale that would
financially justify the program without cutting corners that would lead to catastrophes
like Challenger in 1986.590 It failed to deliver on its promises, which were willfully
sustained in order to maintain support from presidents and other branches of government.
In its 1981 report, Rockwell researchers laid out the ideal elements of an
operational system in orbit: Shuttle, man, SOC, orbital transfer vehicle, and serviceable
satellites.591 By that time, the first two of those elements had flown together and returned
safely to the Earth, with plans underway for a second launch the following month. The
second two elements continued to be debated among NASA personnel as the Space
Station program evolved and private enterprise developed expendable kick motors for
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interim use. The final component—satellites that were designed to be serviceable by the
other components of the system—would be the next test of the reusability. Even as the
operational Shuttle proved pricier than hoped, and the Space Tug that would provide
efficient access to higher orbits remained in limbo, many at NASA anticipated that the
most expensive part of the single use economy could still be replaced with more
affordable, standardized, reusable technologies. By the third year of the Shuttle program,
several critical trials would test the ultimate feasibility of the reuse economy.
Testing the Limits of Reuse
After the Shuttle went into service, and in the midst of debates over what form the
proposed space station should take, NASA demonstrated the feasibility of each of the
capabilities promised by a reusable space transportation and operations platform. As a
servicing station for satellites, such a system must be able to provide the ability to
achieve, with regularity and reliability, the three Rs of a reusable space technology ethos:
retrieve, repair, refuel. Each of these capabilities would be necessary in order to maintain
a longer-lived, and therefore more economical satellite. If any one of these tasks could
not be completed on budget and on time, the extant paradigm of expensive, single-use,
multipurpose satellites would continue into an indefinite future.
Within nine months in 1984, NASA astronauts tested all three Rs using the space
shuttle. In April of that year, astronauts maneuvered the Challenger within range of the
malfunctioning Solar Maximum satellite. An astronaut used a remote jet pack to reach
and grapple the Solar Maximum satellite, then used the orbiter’s remote manipulator arm
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to bring the satellite into the payload bay for the astronauts to assess and repair.592 After
replacing a faulty electronics box, they returned the satellite to orbit to continue its
mission of collecting data about the sun for an additional five years before it reentered the
atmosphere. The astronauts filmed the retrieval, repair, and redeployment of Solar Max
using the then-new IMAX film camera, immortalizing their activities in the movie The
Dream is Alive. On the same mission, astronauts deployed the Long Duration Exposure
Facility (LDEF), which would reveal the mixture of micrometeoroids, and anthropogenic
debris in low-Earth orbit over the course of its six years in orbit after a different mission
retrieved it in 1990.593
Later that same year, in October 1984, astronauts tested a refueling system that
could be used to revive satellites that had used up propellants—once a satellite consumes
its maneuvering fuel, it can no longer maintain its orbit and as a result often cannot fulfill
mission objects. On the STS-41-G mission, astronauts transferred hydrazine fuel from
one spherical bladder tank to another using the experimental Orbital Refueling System.
Although they did not retrieve and refuel any extant satellites, this demonstration showed
that volatile fuel could be safely transferred from one tank to another in microgravity
using pressurized nitrogen as the propelling force.594 Should such a practice become
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common, then satellites that continued to provide useful services could spend longer in
orbit, requiring fewer expensive replacements using entirely new satellites.

Figure 4.4: This image from a briefing on the Space Operations Center space station
model demonstrates high hopes among NASA researchers at the Johnson Space Center
for the future ability to refurbish and refuel satellites in situ and at low cost.595
The following month, NASA demonstrated the feasibility of accomplishing a
third lynchpin of the reuse economy using the space shuttle. When the Challenger
deployed the Westar and Palapa communications satellites earlier that year, the single-use
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PAM-D orbital maneuvering vehicle intended to boost the satellites to geosynchronous
orbit failed to function correctly. They remained stuck in an orbit too low to provide the
services for which they were designed. The companies that had insured the Westar and
Palapa satellites made a deal with NASA: The insurance companies would pay for
astronauts to retrieve and return the satellites to Earth for refurbishment and eventual
resale. After an extensive training period in which they practiced the customized rescue
plan devised for this particular mission, the team of astronauts that flew aboard the
Discovery that November first deployed two new satellites from the orbiter’s payload
bay, leaving room for the drifting Westar and Palapa satellites. Satellite controllers first
had to use the satellites’ thrusters to move them to a lower altitude and reduced spin for
easier manual capture. Because both satellites had been designed to be deployed using the
space shuttle, their size and shape made it possible to return both artifacts safely to the
ground. However, they had not been designed to be serviced, as both satellites were
destined for geosynchronous orbit far above the Shuttle’s highest functional altitude. In
order to bring the satellites back to Earth, astronauts had to manually grapple each using a
specially designed device meant to be inserted into the empty motor casing on one end of
the satellite, then use the thrusters of the newly designed manned maneuvering unit to
slow the spin of both satellite and astronaut so that the Shuttle’s remote manipulator arm
might then attach to the newly inserted grappling device. The lack of pre-installed
servicing features on the satellites complicated their rescue. The astronauts themselves
expressed doubt that the mission would succeed. According to astronaut Joseph Allen,
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mission commander Rick Hauck exclaimed that “it would be a fucking miracle” to get
both satellites back to Earth as planned.596
After struggling to follow the training plan and improvising new techniques, the
astronauts successfully retrieved the satellites. Upon safely securing them into the
payload bay, astronaut Dale Gardner posted a “for sale” sign on one to indicate its
intended future reuse. The Westar 6 satellite would eventually be sold to Chinese
company AsiaSat, which refurbished and launched again in 1990 atop a single-use Long
March rocket. Westar/AsiaSat represents the only instance of successful salvage and
reuse of a flown satellite. Whether the insurance company recouped its losses through the
sale to AsiaSat remains a proprietary matter.
These three demonstrations of each the three Rs of space economy appeared to be
the culmination of over a decade of negotiations with three different presidential
administrations. NASA had met the goal set by Fletcher and Nixon a decade earlier, and
as one space policy analyst claimed in 1985, the “era of ‘throw away’ space activities is
coming to an end.”597 Riding on the success of these missions, the future seemed bright
for a reuse economy in space. In an open letter to NASA in the magazine “Space World,”
space journalist David Leonard called for NASA to use these abilities to do even more
than revitalize the orbiting infrastructure on the cheap. He suggested that the Shuttle
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could be used to save a select number of orbiting artifacts that had historic or cultural
value; the shuttle could bring back such treasures as the first weather satellite. In addition
to preserving priceless historical artifacts, this practice would serve an ancillary benefit,
clearing orbital regions and making more room for functioning technologies while giving
space junk a second life in a museum.598
A Return to Disposability
In the end, the shuttle itself would become one of the only spacecraft of its era to enjoy
this form of retirement. When the space shuttle program ended in 2011, its three
remaining orbiter spacecraft went on to second lives as popular artifacts in museums
around America.599 NASA dedicated one of the final missions of the Shuttle program to
servicing the storied Hubble Space Telescope. Over its 26 years on orbit, the Hubble has
hosted five crews of visiting astronauts and persisted alongside the Shuttle as a rare relic
of the paradigm of reuse envisioned during the long 1970s. During a final Hubble
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servicing mission in 2009 astronauts installed several new instruments in the telescope
and retrieved the instruments that groundbreaking optical corrections equipment installed
during the 1993 repair.600 Given how rarely NASA used the space shuttle in its initial
planned role as a salvager, these space-flown artifacts are a true rarity. They now reside
at the Smithsonian National Air and Space Museum in a display that teaches about the
handful of repair missions achieved using the Shuttle—also a true rarity in the history of
space technology.601
The economy of reuse envisioned during the long 1970s fell victim to the same
combination of social and environmental factors that made the shift an uphill battle from
the outset. The proliferation of STS planning studies generated by NASA and American
aerospace companies during the mid-1970s predicted an economy of scale that would
eventually follow the wholesale implementation of a reusable space infrastructure. The
sticker shock that legislators suffered in response to the anticipated outlay needed to
develop the brand-new space shuttle system proved difficult for its supporters to
counteract. After this struggle, studies for the SOC model of space station emphasized a
lower initial investment required for research and development, given that such a station
would be built entirely out of “off-the-shelf” technology. However, the one-two punch of
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the upfront sticker shock needed to develop, build, and test the space shuttle and its
planned STS counterparts, and the eventual skyrocketing costs of the Shuttle program
itself doomed the dream of a fully reusable space infrastructure that many at NASA had
hoped would come to fruition by the 1990s and 2000s. While the success of such an
economic ethos would undeniably save money in the long run, a publicly funded space
program required the kind of investment and legislative support that no number of
dramatic satellite rescues could inspire. As seen in subsequent and continuing legislative
fights over other large-scale civilian satellite programs, garnering enough financial
support for the construction of new, expensive spacecraft presents a battle by those who
hope to use the space environment.602
Although it remained in use for thirty years, the space shuttle is considered by
many historians and amateur space junkies alike to have been a failure.603 Its skyrocketing
costs, proportionally high rate of failure, irregular launch rate, and inability to move
beyond the close confines of low-Earth orbit seem to some to have accomplished the
opposite of its stated purpose of routinizing space travel on the road to Mars and beyond;
rather, many argue it closed America out of the final frontier through demonstrating the
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considerable material and economic limits of routinely inhabiting space.604 As the one
part of the Space Transportation System that did come to full fruition, the Nixon through
Reagan administrations accepted the upfront cost for the Shuttle. Unfortunately the in-use
costs for the program ballooned well beyond the economy that was promised to follow
after that investment. By 2011 each launch cost approximately $450 million. Shuttle
flights became too expensive to justify using the spacecraft for routine satellite
launches.605 Building one-off expendable launch vehicles, while akin in cost to wasting a
747 after each transatlantic flight, still amounted to fewer overall expenditures than
required to launch, land, inspect, and refurbish a crewed spacecraft, which cost more than
any airplane in existence—in stark contrast to the promise of a revolution in space travel
to match that of civil aviation decades earlier.
The price of flights constituted only one component of the technological
momentum that sent the American space industry back to a single use culture. The
geophysical properties of the near-Earth space environment factored into the failure of
another component of the STS infrastructure. Different orbital angles and altitudes
require launches from different latitudes. For instance, vehicles that take off from Cape
Canaveral, Florida fly in an easterly direction to take advantage of an extra boost
provided by the Earth’s rotation. Florida-launched spacecraft reach orbital inclinations
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from 28.5 degrees to 57 degrees relative to the equator.606 Due to this physical reality, as
well as the need to adhere to air space sovereignty and safety concerns, spacecraft that
require a polar orbit cannot be launched from the subtropical Florida site. A second, Air
Force-sponsored space shuttle launch facility planned for Vandenberg Air Force Base,
the departure point for many DOD space launches destined for polar orbits, fell victim to
design conflict and the post-Challenger drive to consolidate all Shuttle launch activities at
Cape Canaveral.607 The Vandenberg site would have enabled the Shuttle to serve a
broader range of orbital inclinations.608 While the DOD did sponsor its own classified
Shuttle missions, the reusable spacecraft could not serve all national defense space needs.
After the cancellation of the California launch site and the Reagan Administration’s
support of commercial rockets, the DOD changed its policy and launched a majority of
defense satellites aboard single use, expendable launch vehicles, to live out their useful
lives and then turn into uncontrolled, potentially hazardous, often expensive pieces of
space junk.
The necessary presence of astronauts to fly the Shuttle and repair satellites
ultimately became one of the most intransigent obstacles to the paradigm of reuse
envisioned as the end goal of the STS. After the Challenger accident in 1986, NASA
brought in a committee of engineers, scientists, former astronauts, and administrators to
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review what had gone wrong and make recommendations for how to reduce the risk to
astronauts’ lives once the Shuttle program went back online. In the comprehensive report
delivered by the so-called Robinson Commission, but also in reports written by former
astronauts and NASA leadership, the regularity of Shuttle launches received particular
attention as an underlying cause of the tragedy. The commission report pointed to the
Shuttle’s status as the principle launch technology in America as forcing “relentless
pressure on NASA to increase the flight rate” that exceeded the resources available to
sustain safe operations.609 One of the results of the Robinson Commission report came
about in the revision of the official NASA policy on when to use the space shuttle for
satellite launches. The commission recommended that the Shuttle manifest be subjected
to strict controls to ensure that those payloads that did not require human tending for
mission success would not make the trip to orbit aboard the Shuttle.610
The Reagan Administration concurred with this conclusion. The president
reversed his 1981 position that the STS be made available to “all authorized space
users”611 in a policy statement decreeing that all commercial payloads would from then
on fly into space aboard ELVs. Andrew Butrica has argued that Reagan’s early support
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for the STS program stemmed from an ideology that favored the commercialization and
industrialization of space. Even in the immediate aftermath of the Challenger accident,
the President urged lawmakers to support the development of the next reusable
spacecraft, one that would truly fulfill the airline efficiencies and safety initially
desired.612 However, the president had also furthered policy positions intended to foster
private sector development of ELVs as early as 1983.613 A 1986 policy announcement
supported Reagan’s proven preference for free enterprise over government spending,
couched within appropriately presidential expressions of mourning for lives lost and
reassurances against future accidents:

The private sector, with its ingenuity and cost effectiveness, will be playing an
increasingly important role in the American space effort. Free enterprise
corporations will become a highly competitive method of launching commercial
satellites and doing those things which do not require a manned presence in
space…The greatest tribute we can pay to those brave pathfinders who gave their
lives on the Challenger is to move forward and rededicate ourselves to America’s
leadership in space.614
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A National Security Decision Directive issued by the White House at the end of the year
formalized the new requirement that all commercial space users launch payloads aboard
ELVs, unless a mission absolutely required the attention of astronauts. This directive
pushed the US space industry back in the direction of single-use production that had been
the rule since 1958. The tension between the austerity of reuse and the consumption of
free market capitalism embraced by Reagan saw an uneasy articulation in the aftermath
of the Challenger accident.615
The promise of a reuse economy was compromised by the larger-than-expected
costs of Shuttle use, but ended definitively with the demise of Challenger and her crew.
Saving money or the space environment could not outweigh the risk to human life
inherent in each crewed launch. Six weeks after the Challenger accident, veteran
astronaut and chief of the astronaut office John Young—who had vigorously campaigned
for the SOC as the first Shuttle commander—summarized this accusation in an
unintentionally evocative statement that reversed the lofty optimism of Shuttle advocates
two decades prior: “Our space shuttle machinery is not airline machinery.”616 By 1986,
the airline-like safety and economy of scale expected in 1968 had clearly not borne out in
the American space industry.617 With the exception of a few necessary payloads, and the
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servicing of the Hubble Space Telescope, NASA returned to its earlier policy of throwing
away the equivalent of a 747 jet after each orbital flight.
Of the thousands of satellites launched by America since the start of the space
shuttle program in 1981 only 180 were brought into orbit aboard the space shuttle. Only 7
satellites were retrieved from orbit, repaired, and placed back into orbit. Only two were
brought back from orbit to be refurbished and reused.618 Some eight years after the 1984
satellite refurbishment test flights, very few candidates for further repair seemed to be in
sight. In 1992, NASA Administrator Daniel Goldin asked his staff to devise clear criteria
and pricing for rescues.619 In the autumn of that year, NASA assembled a Group Task
Force on Satellite Rescue and Repair. The group compiled a list of total American
satellite failures that took place over the preceding 22 years, and assessed whether these
failures might have been corrected by astronaut intervention via the space shuttle. Of 42
satellite failures, the group concluded that 15 could have been salvaged on orbit. 5
failures did benefit from repair missions.620 Planning and training for the first, unplanned
Hubble repair mission took place at the same time that the task force conducted its
research and potentially influenced its conclusions. The first Hubble repair mission
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required nearly three years from initiation to completion—hardly the simplicity and
routine access provided by civil aircraft. The group task force used the Intelsat VI repair
aboard Endeavour’s maiden voyage as a prime example of the overruns that plague
planning, training, and funding satellite rescues.621 The Intelsat rescue demonstrated
several discouraging realities: that such repair missions tended to be non-generalizable,
requiring highly specific planning and training that could not be extrapolated forward to
other rescues; that simulating all contingencies in a microgravity environment could not
be fully accomplished on Earth beforehand; and that the difficulty of routinizing rescues
and the loss of institutional memory through staff attrition meant that such missions
resulted in a net loss of knowledge about how to undertake space operations.622
The task force concluded that regular rescue, repair, and salvage of faltering or
failed satellites would not be the best use of NASA resources moving forward,
particularly given the increased assumption of risk that accompanied each shuttle flight in
the immediate post-Challenger years. Even if the occasional satellite commercial
customer were to invest in the expensive overhead necessary to man-rate their satellites
for future servicing, if the full price of a Shuttle launch were to be considered part of the
rescue bill, such a cost would more than cancel out the economic benefit of satellite
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refurbishment.623 Without a significant customer base willing to commit to sharing the
load, such expenditures would fall on the habitually cash-strapped NASA. The task force
declined to fully close the door on repair missions, however, particularly given the
popularity that such successful missions seemed to generate among American citizens—
though they cautioned that the definition of “success” for rescue missions ought to be
more carefully communicated to the public to preclude negative publicity should any part
of extremely complex repair missions not go perfectly to plan. With this caveat, the task
force concluded that only some one percent of total satellites to be launched in the future
would be candidates for rescue and repair, and recommended that the majority of
satellites should be initially launched via uncrewed rocket rather than investing in a
launch via the expensive and risky shuttle.624
Conclusion: The Future in Reuse
The hoped-for austerity of reuse proposed and supported by NASA, the Nixon
Administration, and others in the aerospace industry failed in an additional respect. With
only single-use rockets and satellites that have not been built to be retrievable, the current
model of space use has contributed to a mess in orbit that intensifies already considerable
technological angular momentum. Although state space programs and private companies
have proposed a variety of space debris removal technologies, most suggest novel ways
to dispose of technologies at the end of their useful lives. These ideas range from using
large nets in orbit to ground-based lasers that can nudge debris into a reentry trajectory.
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Some exceptions to this trend exist. DARPA has developed a few theoretical models of
flexible spacecraft that can remotely and robotically repurpose old hardware in situ.625
Project Phoenix is currently developing small “satlets” that can be launched to
geosynchronous orbit, attach to expensive expired payloads, and commandeer mirrors,
antennae, and other features for new uses.626 The MDA Corp and Vivisat companies are
also currently developing satellite-servicing technologies that have been reported as a
potential “end to space trash.”627 A 2013 fuel test aboard the ISS demonstrated that an
automated system might be able to revive even those satellites not initially designed to be
serviced.628 Such a technique would remove one component of the technological angular
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momentum that plagued the STS program—human risk. The test was conducted under
the auspices of the Satellite Servicing Capabilities Office at NASA's Goddard Space
Flight Center, the continued existence of which suggests that satellite reuse remains at
least a nominal priority at NASA even in the absence of an infrastructure to support such
endeavors. Benjamin Reed, the deputy manager of the Goddard program, expressed his
belief that the successful experiment signaled an upcoming paradigm shift. "I don't want
to sound overly dramatic,” he enthused in a NASA TV interview, “but it is, or it might
be, the start of what could be a revolution or a new era in how satellites are built and
flown in space.”629
While recycling and reuse programs tend to be a hallmark of austerity at the level
of the individual consumer, even civic recycling programs fail when expenses outweigh
savings. The American space industry did not differ from local recycling efforts in this
sense; much like communities that cease recycling used glass in spite of user desire for
such programs, environmental politics or attempts at conservation alone cannot sustain a
recycling program that costs more than single-use consumption.630 However, the attempts
by legislators and the space industry to adopt reuse in space appears to have been
forgotten by those seeking to replicate it today. For the foreseeable future, however, what
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was then perceived as the most expensive way to deal with broken satellites, namely total
replacement, remains the only way to go. Without the ability to repair and salvage, the
number of dead spacecraft in orbit continues to grow, to the perennial consternation of
many in international space policy circles. Gaining the political capital to foster this shift
continues to be as difficult as it was during the 1970s. A group of engineers writing about
the history and future prospects of a new reusability paradigm have expressed the hope
that current mainstream political attention to recyclability and reusability may yield
support for sustainability in outer space, though the trickiness of demonstrating threats to
an invisible environment persisted from the early days of mainstream environmentalism
through the green politics of the present day.631
Since the end of the partially-reusable space shuttle program, NASA has relied
upon the Russian space program to provide human spacecraft to bring astronauts to and
from the International Space Station. The most recent designs for a next generation
crewed vehicle to come out of NASA have returned to an earlier version of a relatively
small crew capsule aboard an expendable rocket. The human spacecraft designed by
SpaceX, Blue Origin, and Virgin Galactic all fit the definition of “reusable.” However,
the latter two are intended only for recreation uses, not research or operations. Arguably,
opening space to leisure visitors could be seen as a major step towards the routinization
of space as originally envisioned by Nixon and Fletcher, but for a different purpose. The
SpaceX Dragon capsule, while intended for flexible use by NASA to conduct a variety of
missions, does not have the same capability as the Shuttle to retrieve, repair, and refuel
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faltering or aging satellites. While much of the rhetoric of the long 1970s initiative to
construct and maintain a reusable space infrastructure endures in the current race to a
reusable rocket, the end goals set by private aerospace are far narrower than the early
design and planning years of the space shuttle and Space Operations Center.
The stark parallels between the post-Apollo era and these most recent stories from
the private space sector confirm that private aerospace companies are chasing a white
whale that has tormented the American space industry and government for decades. The
latest attempt to return to the reuse ethos of the long 1970s American space program has
yet to bear out. Both Bezos and Musk have the advantage of not being bound by federal
money—and therefore legislative approval—in the same way that NASA answered to
Washington in developing the Shuttle. Both have represented reusability and economy as
inseparable outcomes in celebrating their technological achievements. And while both
CEOs fight for bragging rights, neither can predict whether the economy of scale they
anticipate will bear fruit where others have failed. Perhaps most importantly, this latest
attempt to forge an era of reusability only addresses waste on the front end, so to speak.
Expensive satellites, whether launched on reusable or expendable rockets, still have shelf
lives. Rather than repairing, retrieving, refueling, these artifacts either quietly decay in
their decaying orbits, or are nudged by nature or automated thrusters into the atmosphere.
Once this happens, these multi-million dollar satellites must be replaced de novo and at
full price in order to prevent a lapse in service.
On the morning of June 19, 2016, Blue Origin relaunched the same New Shepard
rocket it sent into suborbital space the preceding November. This would be the rocket’s
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fourth successful flight and landing.632 CEO Jeff Bezos provided live commentary
through all stages of the eight-minute flight. Upon safe touchdown of both the booster
and a test crew module, Bezos signed off with a celebratory comment: "Any day with a
rocket landing is a fantastic day.”633 As a rocket intended for suborbital space tourism
flights, New Shepard will not contribute to the same sector of the space economy
addressed by plans for the space shuttle, Space Tug, SOC, and reparable satellites.
However, the aerospace private sector for which Bezos’s company is at the vanguard has
combined the Reagan call for commercial ELV development with the NASA hope for a
reusability economy. Should the success of these new reusable private rockets coincide
with future success in automated satellite capture, a second wave of reuse in space may
yet succeed. The 1970s dream of making near-Earth space an extension of life on Earth—
economically, routinely, and tidily—may be in reach, but without a robust coalition and
commitment by all invested space users, such an ethos may yet not be strong enough to
counter the previously insurmountable forces of technological angular momentum.
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CONCLUSION
Early on the morning of February 1, 2003, the Space Shuttle orbiter Columbia turned
homeward after nearly sixteen days in orbit. As it began its journey through the upper
atmosphere, the protective thermal tiles on the underside of one wing began to
crumble.634 Shortly before 9AM, a final truncated transmission from the mission
commander came through to Mission Control in Houston, followed by an eerie silence.
Observers outside Dallas, Texas reported hearing a loud series of booms, and watching
smoking trails of debris streak through the clear morning sky. By mid-morning, citizens
of the small town of Nagadoches, Texas started recovering pieces of charred metal in
their backyards, farmlands, parking lots, and roadways. Some residents discovered
human remains among the fragments.635 Moments after crossing through the planetary
borderlands, space junk was all that remained of the Columbia and her crew of seven.
The venerable vessel performed many firsts in its more than twenty years of
service. The first of the shuttle orbiters to fly into space, Columbia was also the first
634
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airplane-style winged orbital spacecraft, the first spacecraft to fly more than once, and the
first to fly using solid rocket fuel. As would be the case for each of the additional four
orbiters subsequently built, the new ship received a name that honored a historic sailing
vessel. Columbia had two namesakes: the first American-built ship to circle the globe,
and the Apollo 11 command module that took astronauts to the Moon for the first lunar
landing mission.636 However, the name “Columbia” also unintentionally evokes another
dangerous moment of exchange earlier in American history. The Columbian exchange
between “old” and “new” worlds transformed peoples, ecosystems, and landscapes
previously separated by an uncrossable divide—a moment of exchange that echoed over
rural Texas as a technology built to brook safe passage between Earth and space instead
brought both environments into perilous, destructive proximity.
In addition to heralding the end of the Space Shuttle program—and with it hopes
for safe, routine, and cheap spaceflight that had been in decline since the Challenger
accident—the Columbia disaster serves as a fitting if tragic coda to this environmental
history of near-Earth space. When the orbiter transformed from a winged spacecraft to
falling space junk, it rendered the space infrastructure visible for a brief, terrifying
moment. Texas residents looked into the sky to find something they had not seen
before—not the moving star of Sputnik’s rocket nor the friendly twinkle of Echo, but the
fiery debris of destroyed machine and human bodies. Instead of pride, fear, or wonder,
the pieces of Columbia inspired horror and sorrow. Although pieces of debris hit cars and
homes, no humans on the ground were harmed—though one news article reported that a
636
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Nagodoches farmer spent the afternoon of the accident searching for a dead cow that a
neighbor suspected had been struck down by a piece of the orbiter in the second reported
but unconfirmed bovine death from falling space hardware.637 In its final, failed crossing
through the planetary borderlands, the Columbia transformed from spacecraft to falling
space junk, spurring potential legal consequences among the citizens below whose lands
and livelihoods may have been threatened by the unexpected, unsanctioned fallout.638 The
survival of nematodes that flew aboard the shuttle as part of an experiment on muscular
dystrophy prompted scientists to reaffirm longstanding appeals to police and protect the
planetary borderlands against passage by more robust organisms.639 The Columbia
accident tragically illustrated the dangerous permeability of the tenuous borderlands
between Earth and space. While this region is capable of self-healing and cleaning up
human-made messes, the ecosystem of near-Earth space can also cast our creations and
our selves back at the ground.
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In his 2004 critique of critique, Bruno Latour points to the Columbia accident to
demonstrate the catastrophic disbanding of an object into a thing (in the Heideggerian
sense of the word). Latour notes the multiple transformations at play when “here,
suddenly, in a stroke, an object had become a thing, a matter of fact was considered as a
matter of great concern.”640 Latour describes the perfect mastery of the space shuttle
assemblage—an object simultaneously so complex, yet so banal as to have been utterly
forgotten by the news media and the American public until it transformed into something
else.641 As part of an invisible space infrastructure and a system of material and capital
exchange, the shuttle represented an exemplar of Cronon’s “second nature.” After it
transformed into debris, it became a failed piece of infrastructure, no longer invisibly
supporting the practices of satellite users but rather raining down on the heads of a small
fraction of them.
Ten years after the Columbia accident, a major Hollywood movie brought space
junk as a bodily hazard back to broad cultural currency. In Alfonso Cuaron’s action
thriller Gravity, astronauts played by Sandra Bullock and George Clooney discover that a
Russian antisatellite mission has accidentally set off a chain reaction of collisions that all
but instantaneously destroys the entirety of the satellite infrastructure. While the scenario
as presented in the film would be physically impossible in the universe inhabited by the
worldwide moviegoing public, it illustrates an extreme, accelerated version of the Kessler
syndrome and its potentially disastrous outcomes. The social ramifications of losing all
640
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satellites in the blink of an eye merits only brief mention in the film—instead, Cuaron
materializes a space junk crisis in a form far more legible to the average moviegoer.
Rather than losing a virtual commodity—information—the swirling space junk that
obliterates the fictional space shuttle and non-fictional Hubble Space Telescope featured
in the film instead poses a bodily hazard to the astronauts moving through a ruined nearEarth space environment.642 Loss of life, not loss of information, typifies the plot points
of most successful summer action films.
As with the Columbia accident, Bruno Latour also responded to Gravity as
heralding a major transformation. In this case, Latour sees the transformation of perfectly
mastered objects into things as indicative of a symbolic turning inward in a moment of
global environmental crisis. Even as, once again, human beings turn from objects into
things, “debris among the debris” of the international orbital infrastructure, the main
tragedy of Gravity comes in what it tells us about life on the planet Earth during the
Anthropocene. Without outer space as an escape route, the borderlands between Earth
and space materialize and constrain humanity within the finite bounds of a shrinking
planet.643 When Sandra Bullock’s character Dr. Ryan Stone utters an angry “I hate
space,” she rejects the idealistic American frontierism that sent her into orbit and spends
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the rest of the film attempting to find safe passage back through the borderlands to the
safe embrace of terra firma. However, as Latour briefly notes in passing, during the
Anthropocene Earth has transformed from a planet bounded by its atmosphere into a
“sub-lunar Gaia”—an expanded realm of human activity and human consequences.644
In 1997, Launchspace Magazine published an article in which an engineer and
space policy analyst described recent evasive maneuvers taken by the space shuttle to
avoid space junk, describing near-Earth space as a “300-mile deep, omni-directional
dump moving at 18,000 mph.” Noting the success that Rachel Carson achieved in
spurring social action and legislative attention to chemical pollutants, the author asks:
“Why is there no ‘Rachel’ currently calling attention to what’s being done above our
atmosphere?”645
In terms of cultural visibility, perhaps even the fictional Dr. Ryan Stone of
Gravity could have fit the bill. Her body, the main victim of space pollutants, provides a
somatic grounding for an otherwise illegible environmental threat. However, in
expressing her hatred of space, Stone turns back to Earth as a refuge from the collapsed
orbital environment. In Latour’s take, this return to a ruined Earth from ruined space
signifies a profoundly traumatic, ultimately futile attempt to locate a safe haven in the
midst of an unforgiving anthropogenic crisis. Rachel Carson did not abandon the pastoral
landscapes threatened by invisible chemical pesticides; she did not respond to a fearful
future with expressions of hatred or a turning away, but rather with a concerted effort to
644
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make broadly legible the previously invisible networks of knowledge, power, and capital
that made up both the source and possible solution to the perceived environmental crisis.
This dissertation has demonstrated that there have been many would-be Rachels
for space, from Carson’s time through the present. Their accomplishments have not
inspired the same mainstream cultural transformations and concrete changes to relevant
sanctioned practices as Carson achieved through the publication of Silent Spring.
However, the actions of communities of Rachels within specialist and lay communities
have influenced the forging of agreements and precedents for how best to manage a
global, extraterritorial environment, simultaneously in everyone’s backyard and in
nobody’s backyard—even if no hard and fast rules for debris removal or reduction exist
at the international level. For the time being, the orbital infrastructure functions as it
should, its invisibility the hallmark of its success. If we have indeed passed the tipping
point, however, moments of orbital decay will likely become more common and more
visible—either directly in moments like the Columbia accident, or in the virtual,
incremental diffusion of a once-global world.
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